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Tinner v. New Haven Firefighters Local 825

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
Mar 5, 2008
2008 Ct. Sup. 3763 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

Opinion

No. CV07-4029029S

March 5, 2008


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS #101


On December 5, 2007, the plaintiffs, Gary Tinney and the Firebirds Society ("society"), filed a four-count complaint against the defendant, New Haven Firefighters Local 825. The society is a "voluntary association comprised of African American and other protected class firefighters" employed by the New Haven Fire Department. The four counts include causes of action for disparate treatment as provided by the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress and breach of contract. The society alleges therein that the defendant has failed to recognize the interests of the members of the society, as well as the interests of the named plaintiff, Tinney. Those allegations include favorable treatment for Caucasian employees of the defendant, relating to promotions and discipline, and allegations that the defendant has retaliated against Tinney himself for voicing opposition to discrimination. Furthermore, the society alleges that the defendant breached its contract by accepting financial dues from the plaintiffs but not adequately representing their interests. In the third count, the society alleges that the defendant, though its actions, intentionally inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiffs. And, in the final count, the society alleges that the defendant negligently inflicted emotional distress on the plaintiffs, resulting in "severe emotional distress and trauma, sleeplessness, loss of appetite, overly burdensome financial hardships, damage to their relationships with their family and friends, as well as damage to their self-esteem and self-worth."

On August 16, 2006, the society filed a complaint affidavit with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO). At that time, the CHRO directed the society to name a specific individual as the plaintiff rather than the voluntary organization, so as to comply with the CHRO's practice. Consequently, on September 5, 2006, Tinney brought his claims to the CHRO.

On November 2, 2007, the CHRO sent a letter releasing jurisdiction to the Superior Court. This action was commenced with service of process on the defendant on November 30, 2007. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on January 4, 2008, accompanied by a memorandum of law. In its motion, the defendant challenged the society's standing, alleging that it did not demonstrate an injury in fact, and challenged the jurisdiction of the court, alleging that the society did not exhaust its administrative remedies. The society filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion on February 7, 2008. The matter was heard on the short calendar on February 11, 2008.

"A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matter of law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court . . . A motion to dismiss tests, inter alia, whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cox v. Aiken, 278 Conn. 204, 210-11, 897 A.2d 71 (2006); see also Kozlowski v. Commissioner of Transportation, 274 Conn. 497, 501, 876 A.2d 1148 (2005); Filippi v. Sullivan, 273 Conn. 1, 8, 866 A.2d 599 (2005). "The proper procedural vehicle for disputing a party's standing is a motion to dismiss." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 615 n. 6, 872 A.2d 408 (2005).

"Because the exhaustion [of administrative remedies] doctrine implicates subject matter jurisdiction, [the court] must decide as a threshold matter whether that doctrine requires dismissal of the plaintiff's claim." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Neiman v. Yale University, 270 Conn. 244, 251, 851 A.2d 1165 (2004). "Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum . . . In the absence of exhaustion of that remedy, the action must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) D'Eramo v. Smith, 273 Conn. 610, 616, 872 A.2d 408 (2005).

The defendant moves to dismiss the action on the ground that "(1) the court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter because the [society] lacks standing to bring its claims to this court; and (2) the court lacks jurisdiction over the [society's] claims under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act ("CFEPA"), because that statutory framework was intended to apply only to individuals."

The society counters that it can establish "both legal and pecuniary injuries as a result of the defendant's continuous policy and practices." Furthermore, the society contends that they brought their claim to the CHRO in August 2006, at which time the CHRO directed the society to name a plaintiff. The society argues that despite the CHRO's expressed preference for a named individual, the organization is not precluded from bringing suit in the Superior Court.

"The concept of standing as presented . . . by the question of aggrievement is a practical and functional one designed to assure that only those with a genuine and legitimate interest can [pursue] an [action in court] . . . Two broad yet distinct categories of aggrievement exist, classical and statutory . . . Classical aggrievement requires a two part showing. First, a party must demonstrate a specific, personal and legal interest in the subject matter of the [controversy], as opposed to a general interest that all members of the community share . . . Second, the party must also show that the [alleged conduct] has specially and injuriously affected that specific personal or legal interest . . . Statutory aggrievement exists by legislative fiat, not by judicial analysis of the particular facts of the case. In other words, in cases of statutory aggrievement, particular legislation grants standing to those who claim injury to an interest protected by that legislation. Furthermore, [i]t is settled that the existence of statutory standing [also] depends on whether the interest sought to be protected by the [plaintiffs] is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Gillon v. Bysiewicz, 105 Conn.App. 654, 659-60, 939 A.2d 605 (2008).

Standing was at issue in Brown v. Windley, Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield, Docket No. CV 01 0382951 (November 6, 2001, Skolnick, J.) (30 Conn. L. Rptr. 652), a case with similar facts to the present case. In Brown, two individuals filed suit against a fraternal organization, alleging that the organization failed to follow its own rules and, consequently, the plaintiffs were deprived of their benefits. The Brown court held that the plaintiffs had standing because they demonstrated a personal legal interest, because the defendant's contract "sets forth benefits that are available to members in good standing," and they "contend that these benefits are legally protected interests." Brown v. Windley, supra, 30 Conn. L. Rptr. 653. The Brown court agreed. Similarly, in the present case, the society argues that the defendant has failed to respect their interests, as members of the defendant organization. Consequently, an individual can bring suit for deprivation of contractual rights within an organization.

Brown differs from the present case, however, because the plaintiffs were individuals and here, the society is an organization. Courts have found that an organization can enjoy a contractual relationship with another organization, thereby creating a legal interest. In another Superior Court case, involving the same plaintiff Firebirds, the court found that "the plaintiffs have a legal and equitable interest and are in danger of losing rights to which they are entitled." New Haven Firebirds Society v. Board of Fire Commissioners, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. 28 81 83 (June 9, 1992, Sullivan, J.) (21 Conn. L. Rptr. 648). In that case, the society brought suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the grounds that the promotion policy of the defendant was discriminatory. Therefore, the society has standing for similar equitable claims.

In the present case, however, the society is suing under CFEPA and is seeking monetary damages. Consequently, an organization suing on behalf of its members must meet the elements laid out in Connecticut Associational Builders Contractors v. Hartford, 251 Conn. 169, 740 A.2d 814 (1999), which have been adopted by Connecticut law. "Under that test, an [a]ssociation has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Associational Builders Contractors v. Hartford, supra, 251 Conn. 185. The second prong of the test is satisfied because the interests of the group, as addressed in (b), are germane to the society, with the group consisting of similarly situated firefighters who voluntarily belong. The first and third prong, however, cannot be satisfied. The first prong requires standing, and standing requires exhaustion of administrative remedies. Furthermore, the relief sought, pursuant to CFEPA, also requires an individual to exhaust his or her administrative remedies first.

The test is adopted from Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 97 S.Ct. 2434, 53 L.Ed.2d 383 (1977).

In the present case, the society grounds its claims in the CFEPA statute which requires administrative exhaustion. That statute clearly defines an appropriate plaintiff as an individual who has exhausted his administrative remedies. Pursuant to Connecticut General Statutes § 46a-82, which describes the complaint process for one alleging discrimination under the CFEPA, the plaintiff must be an individual to gain release from the CHRO. "The plaintiff's burden of establishing a prima facie case is not onerous under this model . . . The plaintiff need prove only four elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that he or she belongs to a protected class; (2) that he or she applied and was qualified for the position in question; (3) that despite his or her qualifications, the individual was rejected; and (4) that after the individual was rejected, the position remained open . . . Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, a presumption of discrimination is created." (Citations omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Levy v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 107-08, 671 A.2d 349 (1996).

General Statutes § 46a-82(a) provides: "Any person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged discriminatory practice, except for an alleged violation of section 46a-68, may, by himself or his attorney, make, sign and file with the commission a complaint in writing under oath, which shall state the name and address of the person alleged to have committed the discriminatory practice, and which shall set forth the particulars thereof and contain such other information as may be required by the commission. After the filing of a complaint pursuant to this subsection, the commission shall serve upon the person claiming to be aggrieved a notice that: (1) Acknowledges receipt of the complaint and (2) advises of the time frames and choice of forums available under this chapter."

In its memorandum in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss, the society discusses the course of events occurring after filing a complaint with the CHRO in August 2006. While the society explains that the CHRO preferred a named individual on the complaint, thereby bringing Tinney into the action, the society does not explain how the organization itself has standing pursuant to the CFEPA to bring suit with Tinney in Superior Court. According to the memorandum submitted by the society, and to the undisputed facts, the society itself was not granted a release from the CHRO to sue. The evidence attached to the society's memorandum further reflects that Tinney was the only party granted release to sue.

For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.


Summaries of

Tinner v. New Haven Firefighters Local 825

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven
Mar 5, 2008
2008 Ct. Sup. 3763 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)
Case details for

Tinner v. New Haven Firefighters Local 825

Case Details

Full title:GARY TINNER ET AL. v. NEW HAVEN FIREFIGHTERS LOCAL 825

Court:Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of New Haven at New Haven

Date published: Mar 5, 2008

Citations

2008 Ct. Sup. 3763 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)
45 CLR 20