Tinkler v. Richter

54 Citing cases

  1. Gallup v. Sergeant Olivia Moss-Fort

    No. 363306 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 2025)

    Lakin, 318 Mich.App. at 131. In Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396; 295 N.W. 201 (1940), our Supreme Court explained that "[a] battery . . . is the willful touching of the person of another by the aggressor or by some substance put in motion by him; or, as it is sometimes expressed, a battery is the consummation of the assault." Id. at 401 (quotation marks and citation omitted).

  2. People v. Sanford

    402 Mich. 460 (Mich. 1978)   Cited 91 times
    Holding that "the assault with intent to rob unarmed statute is conjunctive; there must be an assault with force and violence. The attempted robbery unarmed statute is disjunctive; the offense can be accomplished either by force and violence, or by assaulting, or putting in fear"

    "Michigan criminal law, however, defines a criminal assault as any intentional, unlawful offer of violence to another with the apparent present ability to carry out the offer, creating a reasonable fear of immediate injury. People v Carlson, 160 Mich. 426; 125 N.W. 361 (1910), Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396; 295 N.W. 201 (1940); but see People v Syakovich, 32 Mich. App. 356; 188 N.W.2d 642 (1971). An "assault" requires that the victim be put in reasonable fear of immediate harm; `force and violence' does not.

  3. Kangas v. Aetna Casualty Co.

    64 Mich. App. 1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 99 times
    Holding that where occupants left uninsured vehicle, assaulted a pedestrian, pedestrian ran into highway and was struck by a truck, no causal connection existed between pedestrian's injuries and use of the uninsured vehicle because "assaults and fisticuffs are not normal foreseeable occurrences in the use of a vehicle"

    Once the jury in the prior suit responded affirmatively to the special question, it found that plaintiffs aided or abetted in an act of intention. Assault and battery is an intentional act. Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396, 401-402; 295 N.W. 201 (1940). We reject plaintiffs' argument that the presence of the word "negligently" in the complaint in the prior action removes the cause of action from the exception clause which refers only to intentional as distinguished from negligently inflicted injuries.

  4. Moher v. United States

    875 F. Supp. 2d 739 (W.D. Mich. 2012)   Cited 34 times
    Considering tort claims based on warrantless entry of border patrol agents on private timber land after plaintiff had exhausted FTCA administrative remedy

    To recover civil damages for assault, a plaintiff must show an “intentional unlawful offer of corporal injury to another person by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, under circumstances which create a well-founded apprehension of imminent contact, coupled with the apparent present ability to accomplish the contact.” Espinoza v. Thomas, 189 Mich.App. 110, 472 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich.Ct.App.1991) (citing Tinkler v. Richter, 295 Mich. 396, 295 N.W. 201, 203 (1940)); see also Thornton v. Fray, 429 Fed.Appx. 504, 512 (6th Cir.2011); VanVorous v. Burmeister, 262 Mich.App. 467, 687 N.W.2d 132, 142 (Mich.Ct.App.2004). Under Michigan law, a battery is defined as an unconsented and harmful or offensive touching of the person of another, or of something closely connected with the person.

  5. Mitchell v. Daly

    133 Mich. App. 414 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 18 times
    Adopting Restatement of Torts, 2d, §§ 21, 32: "an actor is subject to liability to another for assault if he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and the other is thereby put in such imminent apprehension."

    I have done that, but Mr. Pollock [plaintiff's attorney] requested an added alternate definition which came from — what case was it? "Mr. Pollock: Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396 (indicating). "The Court: All right. Any objection to that procedure, gentlemen?

  6. Rowlery v. Genesee Cnty.

    54 F. Supp. 3d 763 (E.D. Mich. 2014)

    “A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such contact.” Espinoza v. Thomas, 189 Mich.App. 110, 119, 472 N.W.2d 16 (1991) (citing Tinkler v. Richter, 295 Mich. 396, 401, 295 N.W. 201 (1940)). An assault is the “unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, under such circumstances as create a well founded fear of imminent peril” combined with the likelihood of such force occurring if not prevented.

  7. Mead v. County of St. Joseph

    Case No. 1:06-CV-555 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2008)   Cited 1 times
    In Mead v. County of St. Joseph, No. 1:06-CV-555, 2008 WL 441129 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2008), plaintiffs alleged that the defendants conspired to violate the Michigan Strip Search Law.

    To establish a claim of assault, a plaintiff must show an "intentional unlawful offer of corporal injury to another person by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, under circumstances which create a well-founded apprehension of imminent contact, coupled with the apparent present ability to accomplish the contact." Espinoza v. Thomas, 472 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich.Ct.App. 1991) (citing Tinkler v. Richter, 295 N.W. 201, 203 (Mich. 1940)). A reasonable fact finder could conclude that Defendants' conduct constituted an assault.

  8. Gray v. Morley

    460 Mich. 738 (Mich. 1999)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that there could be no intentional tort even where the employer swerved violently in his truck while the employee was in the bed in order to scare the plaintiff

    Liability for assault attaches if the actor intends to commit a battery or the actor intends to put the victim in fear or apprehension of an immediate battery. Tinkler v. Richter, 295 Mich. 396; 295 N.W. 201 (1940). Under 1 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 21, p 37, the protected interest under the tort of assault is freedom from the apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact.

  9. People v. Johnson

    407 Mich. 196 (Mich. 1979)   Cited 93 times
    Stating that the elements of felonious assault are an assault and the use of a dangerous weapon in the assault

    Similarly, see Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 10, p 37; 1 Harper James, Law of Torts, § 3.5, p 221. See, also, Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396; 295 N.W. 201 (1940). LaFave Scott, supra, § 82, p 611.

  10. Griggs-Swanson v. Beaumont Hosp. Farmington Hills

    No. 364134 (Mich. Ct. App. May. 30, 2024)

    "A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such a contact." Id.; see also Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396, 401; 295 N.W. 201 (1940), and M Civ JI 115.02 (defining a battery as "the willful or intentional touching of a person against that person's will [by another/by an object or substance put in motion by another person]"). The intent necessary to prove battery is the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another person, or knowing, with substantial certainty, that such contact would result.