Lakin, 318 Mich.App. at 131. In Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396; 295 N.W. 201 (1940), our Supreme Court explained that "[a] battery . . . is the willful touching of the person of another by the aggressor or by some substance put in motion by him; or, as it is sometimes expressed, a battery is the consummation of the assault." Id. at 401 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
"Michigan criminal law, however, defines a criminal assault as any intentional, unlawful offer of violence to another with the apparent present ability to carry out the offer, creating a reasonable fear of immediate injury. People v Carlson, 160 Mich. 426; 125 N.W. 361 (1910), Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396; 295 N.W. 201 (1940); but see People v Syakovich, 32 Mich. App. 356; 188 N.W.2d 642 (1971). An "assault" requires that the victim be put in reasonable fear of immediate harm; `force and violence' does not.
Once the jury in the prior suit responded affirmatively to the special question, it found that plaintiffs aided or abetted in an act of intention. Assault and battery is an intentional act. Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396, 401-402; 295 N.W. 201 (1940). We reject plaintiffs' argument that the presence of the word "negligently" in the complaint in the prior action removes the cause of action from the exception clause which refers only to intentional as distinguished from negligently inflicted injuries.
To recover civil damages for assault, a plaintiff must show an “intentional unlawful offer of corporal injury to another person by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, under circumstances which create a well-founded apprehension of imminent contact, coupled with the apparent present ability to accomplish the contact.” Espinoza v. Thomas, 189 Mich.App. 110, 472 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich.Ct.App.1991) (citing Tinkler v. Richter, 295 Mich. 396, 295 N.W. 201, 203 (1940)); see also Thornton v. Fray, 429 Fed.Appx. 504, 512 (6th Cir.2011); VanVorous v. Burmeister, 262 Mich.App. 467, 687 N.W.2d 132, 142 (Mich.Ct.App.2004). Under Michigan law, a battery is defined as an unconsented and harmful or offensive touching of the person of another, or of something closely connected with the person.
I have done that, but Mr. Pollock [plaintiff's attorney] requested an added alternate definition which came from — what case was it? "Mr. Pollock: Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396 (indicating). "The Court: All right. Any objection to that procedure, gentlemen?
“A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such contact.” Espinoza v. Thomas, 189 Mich.App. 110, 119, 472 N.W.2d 16 (1991) (citing Tinkler v. Richter, 295 Mich. 396, 401, 295 N.W. 201 (1940)). An assault is the “unlawful offer of corporal injury to another by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, under such circumstances as create a well founded fear of imminent peril” combined with the likelihood of such force occurring if not prevented.
To establish a claim of assault, a plaintiff must show an "intentional unlawful offer of corporal injury to another person by force, or force unlawfully directed toward the person of another, under circumstances which create a well-founded apprehension of imminent contact, coupled with the apparent present ability to accomplish the contact." Espinoza v. Thomas, 472 N.W.2d 16, 21 (Mich.Ct.App. 1991) (citing Tinkler v. Richter, 295 N.W. 201, 203 (Mich. 1940)). A reasonable fact finder could conclude that Defendants' conduct constituted an assault.
Liability for assault attaches if the actor intends to commit a battery or the actor intends to put the victim in fear or apprehension of an immediate battery. Tinkler v. Richter, 295 Mich. 396; 295 N.W. 201 (1940). Under 1 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 21, p 37, the protected interest under the tort of assault is freedom from the apprehension of a harmful or offensive contact.
Similarly, see Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 10, p 37; 1 Harper James, Law of Torts, § 3.5, p 221. See, also, Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396; 295 N.W. 201 (1940). LaFave Scott, supra, § 82, p 611.
"A battery is the wilful and harmful or offensive touching of another person which results from an act intended to cause such a contact." Id.; see also Tinkler v Richter, 295 Mich. 396, 401; 295 N.W. 201 (1940), and M Civ JI 115.02 (defining a battery as "the willful or intentional touching of a person against that person's will [by another/by an object or substance put in motion by another person]"). The intent necessary to prove battery is the intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with another person, or knowing, with substantial certainty, that such contact would result.