Hightower v. Hogan, 69 Fla. 86, 68 So. 669, 671. See also Sinclair v. Alford, Fla., 72 So.2d 783. The ruling of the court in the case of Tindel v. Griffin, 157 Fla. 156, 25 So.2d 200, being confined to a conclusion as a matter of pleading that the bill under consideration simply failed to allege that the notice did not contain the information required by the statutes, does not appear to infringe upon the above cited principle and cases. It is apparent, therefore, that whatever might be our conclusion as to other matters upon which the decree was predicated, with reference to an alleged failure to comply with the statutory provision for mailing of notice, the decree for appellees should be sustained for the reason above stated.

The chancellor so found and adjudged the Ashmore tax deed fatally defective on authority of Kester v. Bostwick, 153 Fla. 450, 15 So.2d 208. In Goodman v. Carter, 158 Fla. 112, 27 So.2d 748, this court held that Kester v. Bostwick had to do with a tax deed issued under Chapter 17457, Acts of 1935, F.S.A. § 194.15 et seq., while Goodman v. Carter was controlled by Chapter 20722, Acts of 1941, as amended by Chapter 22079, Acts of 1943, now Section 192.21, Florida Statutes 1953, F.S.A., which was then the law controlling the issuance of tax deed rather than Chapter 17457, Acts of 1935, the law controlling Kester v. Bostwick. The court was accordingly in error in holding that the case at bar was governed by Kester v. Bostwick. See also Sudduth v. Hutchison, Fla., 42 So.2d 355 and Tindel v. Griffin, 157 Fla. 156, 25 So.2d 200. Aside from this, if the alleged defects in Ashmore's tax deed could be said to vitiate his title, they were cured by Chapter 23827, Acts of 1947, now Section 192.48, Laws of Florida 1953, F.S.A. The purpose of this Statute was to cure defects in tax deeds provided they had been recorded one year and were subject to taxes which had not been paid. Ashmore's tax deed was recorded in June 1944; he was not in possession at the time nor at any subsequent time.

The appellants first pose the question whether the provisions of Chapter 17457, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1935, F.S.A. § 194.15 et seq., and notes, govern, the tax deed having been executed in 1944 but the certificates on which it was founded having been issued pursuant to sales held in 1937 and 1939. The chancellor specifically answered the question in the affirmative. Counsel for appellants insist this was clear error, and cite to support their position the decisions of this court in Tindel v. Griffin, 157 Fla. 156, 25 So.2d 200, and Sudduth v. Hutchison, Fla., 42 So.2d 355, 358. It was held in the former that the sufficiency of the notice to an owner of an application for a tax deed against his property must be judged by the law in effect at the time of the issuance of the deed, and in the latter that "the statute in force at the time of the application for a tax deed, not the statute in force at the time of the issuance of the tax certificates, regulates the procedure to be followed in obtaining a tax deed." The appellee contends that the 1935 act governs because of the provision in Section 24 of Chapter 20722, Acts of 1941, F.S.A. § 194.15, that "this section shall not apply to tax certificates issued prior to 1941", and a provision in Section 58 of the act, the repealing clause, that laws in conflict with the act were repealed only so far as they applied to assessment and collection of taxes subsequent to the year 1940. (Italics supplied.)

We feel that in all candor we should recognize the confusion which has arisen in the treatment by this court of the importance of the notice to be mailed by a clerk to a property owner at the time an application for tax deed is made. In the case of Tindel v. Griffin, 157 Fla. 156, 25 So.2d 200, 204, Division A, as then constituted, held, in considering the law applicable to a tax deed issued December 6, 1943, that the plaintiff's attack on it failed because the bill of complaint contained no statement that there were addresses of any persons appearing on the tax roll for the year in which the taxes were last extended, and no averment that the name and address of the person last paying taxes on the land was shown by the tax collector's receipt book; so the court concluded that "the allegations of the bill of complaint are insufficient to show a lack of notice as required by statute, or a lack of due process of law." Although there is in that opinion a reference also to the failure to show that the property was not subject to taxes or that the taxes had been paid or the land redeemed, we think there is a clear inference that the requirements with reference to the notice were not merely directory, but were indispensable to a procedure to deprive an owner of his property by issuing

This allegation of the answer was doubtless predicated upon the belief that the giving of such a notice or the making of such a certificate was jurisdictional and that the failure to observe this requirement invalidated the tax deed. The statute in force at the time of the application for a tax deed, not the statute in force at the time of the issuance of the tax certificates, regulates the procedure to be followed in obtaining a tax deed. Tindel v. Griffin, 157 Fla. 156, 25 So.2d 200. Section 194.18 Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., the statute in force at the time of the application for tax deed, though prescribing that a copy of notice of sale should be given the record title owner and lien claimants, if the addresses of such persons are known, and that a certificate of non-service should be made if after diligent search and inquiry their addresses cannot be ascertained, does not make such procedure mandatory but directory only. Consequently, the failure of the clerk to mail a copy of the notice of the sale to the defendants in the present case did not affect the validity of the underlying proceedings or the tax deed issued pursuant to the published notice that was given.

PER CURIAM: The decree in favor of appellee in this case should be reversed and the cause remanded with direction that decree be entered in favor of the appellant on authority of our opinions and judgments in Kester v. Bostwick, 153 Fla. 437, 15 So.2d 201; Tindel v. Griffin, 157 Fla. 156, 25 So.2d 200 and Goodman v. Carter, 158 Fla. 112, 27 So.2d 748. It is so ordered.