Opinion
C. A. 8:22-cv-01478-DCC-JDA
07-07-2022
Jarvis Kenta Tims, Plaintiff, v. York County Detention Center, Chief John Hicks, Captain Rodney Hope, Nurse Lynn Bell, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Jacquelyn D. Austin United States Magistrate Judge
Jarvis Kenta Tims (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. When Plaintiff commenced this action, he was incarcerated as a pretrial detainee at the York County Detention Center (the “Detention Center”). [Doc. 1 at 2.] On June 9, 2022, Plaintiff notified the Court that he had been released from custody at the Detention Center, and he provided an updated address to the Court at which he receives his mail. [Doc. 12.]
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B), D.S.C., the undersigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court. Having reviewed the Complaint in accordance with applicable law, the undersigned finds that this action is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons below.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a Complaint on the standard court form, which was entered on May 9, 2022. [Doc. 1.] By Order dated June 10, 2022, the Court notified Plaintiff that this action was subject to summary dismissal for the reasons identified by the Court in that Order. [Doc. 15.] The Court noted, however, that Plaintiff may be able to cure the pleading deficiencies of his Complaint and granted Plaintiff twenty-one days to amend his Complaint. [Id. at 9-10.] Further, Plaintiff was specifically warned as follows:
If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint that corrects those deficiencies [identified in the Court's Order], this action will be recommended for summary dismissal.[Id. at 10.] Nevertheless, Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint, and he has failed to cure the deficiencies identified by the Court in its Order.
Because Plaintiff did not respond to the Court's Order, and the time for response has lapsed, he has failed to prosecute this case and has failed to comply with an Order of this Court. Because Plaintiff has already ignored this Court's Order and deadlines, sanctions less drastic than dismissal would not be effective. Accordingly, as an additional basis for dismissal, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
Plaintiff makes the following allegations in his Complaint. [Doc. 1.] Plaintiff contends Officer Pitts gave him the wrong medications on February 9, 2022. [Id. At 4.] Officer Eagan denied him medical assistance pertaining to his Assuma pump. [Id.] He later had an anxiety attack which caused him to fall and injure himself. [Id.] Nurse Bell gave him some ibuprofen but refused to send him to the hospital or receive any outside care. [Id.]
Plaintiff contends Defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by submitting him to cruel and unusual punishment, medical malpractice, and personal injury. [Id. at 5.] Plaintiff contends Officer Eagan denied him medical assistance pertaining to his Assuma pump and that he later had an anxiety attack, which caused him to fall and sustain injuries. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff contends he suffered a knot by his eye, brain shake, and loss of his wisdom tooth. [Id. at 8.] He received a CT scan a week after his accident and was prescribed ibuprofen. [Id.] However, he has not been taken to an outside doctor for his pain. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff requests damages in the amount of $10,000,000. [Id.]
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” is “frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, his pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, even under this less stringent standard, Plaintiff's Complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which Plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct Plaintiff's legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411,417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the Court, Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
Although the Court must liberally construe the pro se Complaint and Plaintiff is not required to plead facts sufficient to prove his case as an evidentiary matter in the Complaint, the Complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a plaintiff may proceed into the litigation process only when his complaint is justified by both law and fact). “A claim has ‘facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.'” Owens v. Baltimore City State's Attorneys Office, 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a complaint for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). “And, although the pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) are very liberal, more detail often is required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 326 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and internal quotations omitted). This is particularly true in a § 1983 action where “liability is personal, based upon each defendant's own constitutional violations.” Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001). “In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff's rights.... Consequently, [defendants] must have had personal knowledge of and involvement in the alleged deprivation of [plaintiff]'s rights in order to be liable.” Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 “creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of ‘rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States.” Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
Here, Defendants are entitled to dismissal and Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to assert a plausible claim for relief. Accordingly, the Complaint is subject to summary dismissal for the reasons explained below.
Defendants Entitled to Dismissal
As an initial mater, the undersigned notes that certain Defendants are entitled to dismissal from this action because Plaintiff makes no allegations about their direct, personal involvement in the events underlying Plaintiff's claims. Instead, Plaintiff merely names the Defendants in the caption and makes only general, vague allegations about the medical care he received at the Detention Center. “However, such general allegations, absent any specific facts of personal involvement in the events giving rise to this case, are insufficient to state a cognizable § 1983 claim.” Tracey v. Nelson, No. 1:12-cv-1614-JMC-SVH, 2012 WL 4583107, at *2 (D.S.C. Aug. 31, 2012), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2012 WL 4588205 (D.S.C. Oct. 1, 2012).
Here, Plaintiff makes no allegations at all in the body of his Complaint against Defendants Hicks and Hope. Because Plaintiff makes no factual allegations in the Complaint of personal involvement against these Defendants, they are entitled to summary dismissal. See Potter v. Clark, 497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974) (“Where a complaint alleges no specific act or conduct on the part of the defendant and the complaint is silent as to the defendant except for his name appearing in the caption, the complaint is properly dismissed.”); Newkirk v. Circuit Court of City of Hampton, No. 3:14-cv-372-HEH, 2014 WL 4072212, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 14, 2014) (finding the complaint was subject to summary dismissal where plaintiff made no factual allegations against the named defendants within the body of the pleading). In the absence of specific allegations against the named Defendants to support a claim for relief, the Complaint is subject to dismissal on this basis as to these Defendants. See Weller, 901 F.2d at 391 (finding dismissal was proper where complaint contained no allegations against defendants).
Further, to the extent Plaintiff's claims against these Defendants are based on supervisory liability, the undersigned notes that the doctrine of respondeat superior is generally not applicable in § 1983 actions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”); Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 221 (4th Cir. 1999). For a supervisory official to be held liable for constitutional injuries inflicted by his subordinates, certain criteria must be established. Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1994). Specifically, a plaintiff must show that the supervisory official was (1) actually or constructively aware of a risk of constitutional injury, (2) and deliberately indifferent to that risk, and (3) that an affirmative causal link exists between the supervisor's inaction and the particular constitutional injury suffered by the plaintiff. Carter, 164 F.3d at 221. Here, the Complaint contains no plausible allegations against these Defendants to demonstrate that they were aware of, or deliberately indifferent to, any risk of constitutional injury to Plaintiff.
Likewise, Plaintiff makes only cursory allegations against Defendant Bell. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bell gave him some ibuprofen but refused to send him to the hospital to receive outside care. [Doc. 1 at 4.] Those allegations, however, fail to provide a basis to support any claim for relief against Defendant Bell, and she is therefore entitled to dismissal from this action. Further, although Plaintiff makes allegations against other officers at the Detention Center, he does not name them as Defendants in this action.
Finally, the Detention Center is entitled to summary dismissal. It is well settled that only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” See Harden v. Green, 27 Fed.Appx. 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001). The Detention Center is a facility or building and, as such, is not subject to suit because it cannot be sued as a “person” in a § 1983 lawsuit. See e.g., Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail, 722 F.Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D. N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons' and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”); Morrison v. Greenville Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv-2657-JMC-TER, 2017 WL 7732598, at *3 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2018 WL 936383 (D.S.C. Feb. 16, 2018). Police departments, buildings, and correctional institutions usually are not considered legal entities subject to suit. See Harden, 27 Fed.Appx. at 178 (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); Nelson v. Lexington Cnty. Det. Ctr., No. 8:10-cv-2988-JMC, 2011 WL 2066551, at *1 (D.S.C. May 26, 2011) (finding that a building-the detention center-is not amenable to suit under § 1983 and that Food Service Supervisors was a group of people not subject to suit); see also Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 750 F.Supp. 1131, 1132 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because it was not a “person” under the statute); Shelby v. City of Atlanta, 578 F.Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D.Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). Accordingly, the Detention Center is not a proper party to this action under § 1983.
Failure to State a Claim
Further, Plaintiff's Complaint as a whole is subject to dismissal because his allegations fail to state a claim for relief that is cognizable under § 1983. To the extent Plaintiff asserts state law claims for medical malpractice, personal injury, and negligence [see Doc. 1 at 5 (alleging Defendants engaged in “Medical Malpractice and Personal Injury”)], his claims are not cognizable. This is so because the law is well settled that state law tort claims are not actionable under § 1983. See, e.g., Grayson v. Peed, 195 F.3d 692, 695 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Deliberate indifference is a very high standard-a showing of mere negligence will not meet it.”); Pink v. Lester, 52 F.3d 73, 75 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[N]egligent deprivations of life, liberty, or property are not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); Ruefly v. Landon, 825 F.2d 792, 793 (4th Cir. 1987) (“Mere negligent conduct . . . does not constitute a violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”). “A state law tort is not actionable as a claim under § 1983 on its own.” Warthen v. Midgett, No. 2:16-cv-00931-DCN-MGB, 2017 WL 9250328, at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 26, 2017), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2017 WL 1190869 (D.S.C. Mar. 31, 2017). Likewise, “[n]egligent police failures to investigate do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.” Hines v. Johnson, No. 1:19-cv-515, 2020 WL 1516397, at *6 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 30, 2020). Thus, because Plaintiff's claims each arise under a theory of negligence or other state tort, his claims fail to state a claim under § 1983 as a matter of law.
Further, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a plausible federal law claim for Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For example, Plaintiff alleges that he was given the wrong medication. [Doc. 1 at 4.] However, “[d]ispensing the wrong medication does not constitute deliberate indifference and such claims are routinely dismissed.” Tillery v. Va. Peninsula Reg'l Jail, No. 1:20-cv-751-RDA-TCB, 2020 WL 6742991, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 17, 2020) (collecting cases). Additionally, Plaintiff's other cursory allegations fail to state a deliberate indifference claim because “[he] has not established a serious medical need or any harm.” Id. at *4.
As the Fourth Circuit has noted:
To state a claim under Section 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, a prisoner must show that he had a serious medical need, and that officials knowingly disregarded that need and the substantial risk it posed. A “serious medical need” is a condition “diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” An official acts with deliberate indifference if he had actual knowledge of the prisoner's serious medical needs and the related risks, but nevertheless disregarded them.Depaola v. Clarke, 884 F.3d 481, 486 (4th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted).
In sum, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts to state a cognizable constitutional claim, and this action is therefore subject to summary dismissal on this basis in addition to the other reasons stated above.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
In light of the foregoing, it is recommended that the District Court DISMISS this action for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and § 1915A without further leave to amend and without issuance and service of process.
As noted, Plaintiff was directed to file an amended complaint to cure the deficiencies noted by the Court in its Order dated June 10, 2022. [Doc. 15.] Plaintiff has not filed an amended complaint or attempted to cure the deficiencies in his original filings. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends dismissal without further leave to amend. See Workman v. Morrison Healthcare, No. 17-7621, 2018 WL 2472069, at *1 (4th Cir. June 4, 2018) (explaining that, where the district court has already afforded a plaintiff with the opportunity to amend, the district court, in its discretion, can either afford plaintiff an additional opportunity to file an amended complaint or dismiss the complaint with prejudice).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
Plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk United States District Court 250 East North Street, Suite 2300 Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).