"His Honor erred in not sustaining defendants' objection, to the introduction of tax receipts offered in evidence by plaintiffs, and in expressing an opinion, as to the weight and importance to be attached to same." The cases of Ellen v. Ellen, 16 S.C. 132, and Busby v. Ry., 45 S.C. 312, 23 S.E. 50, show that the receipts were admissible in evidence, for the purpose of proving a claim of ownership, and that the State had parted with its title to the land. This exception cannot be sustained.

We see nothing in the instant record sufficient to rebut the foregoing presumptions to the benefit of which Wood and those parties now claiming under him are entitled. That Jeter, who acquired ten acres of the land in 1952, is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of a grant is shown by the cases of Ellen v. Ellen, 16 S.C. 132; McLeod v. Gardner, 2 Rich. 19, and Thomson v. Peake, 7 Rich. 353, holding that continuous adverse possession of land for twenty years by different persons and at different times is sufficient to raise the presumption of a grant. For all of the foregoing reasons, we conclude that there was no error on the part of the lower court in holding that the parties claiming under Mrs. Jeannette H. May are not entitled to the property.

For the same reason, there is no merit in appellants' contention that the twenty-year period of possession giving rise to the presumption of a grant commenced to run when Willie D. Summer, the purchaser at the tax sale, entered into possession under the sheriff's deed in 1929. Plaintiffs having established their legal title to the premises, appellant Whitney's claim of title by adverse possession required proof of actual, open, notorious, hostile, continuous and exclusive possession by him, or by one or more persons through whom he claimed, for the full statutory period of ten years, without tacking of possession except by descent cast. Code 1952, Sections 10-2421, 10-124; Ellen v. Ellen, 16 S.C. 132; Burnett v. Crawford, 50 S.C. 161, 27 S.E. 645; Epperson v. Stansill, 64 S.C. 485, 42 S.E. 426; Haithcock v. Haithcock, 123 S.C. 61, 115 S.E. 727; Terwilliger v. Marion, 222 S.C. 185, 72 S.E.2d 165; Gregg v. Moore, 226 S.C. 366, 85 S.E.2d 279. Since possession adverse to plaintiffs' title as remaindermen could not begin until the death of the life tenant, it is apparent from the chronology of the case as hereinbefore stated that the claim of title by adverse possession has failed for lack of continuity in any claimant during the ten-year period required by the statute. Appellants argue, however, that Titus held title as trustee; that his conveyance to William B. Whitney in 1943 in effect transferred the title to the latter as trustee for those beneficially entitled; and that therefore there has been continuity of adverse possession in the original trustee and his said successor trustee, at least to the extent of Robert Whitney's beneficial interest, for more than ten years, to wit: f

His finding that it was for the best interests of Gloria to remain in the care, custody and control of the defendants is entitled to weight and the consideration of this court. Maron v. Maron, 238 Iowa 587, 591, 28 N.W.2d 17; Dow v. Dow, 240 Iowa 145, 151, 35 N.W.2d 853; Voy v. Voy, supra, 241 Iowa 673, 675; Bell v. Bell, 240 Iowa 934, 938, 38 N.W.2d 658; Nichols v. Nichols, 239 Iowa 1173, 1180, 34 N.W.2d 187; Wood v. Wood, 220 Iowa 441, 447, 262 N.W. 773; Tilton v. Tilton, 206 Iowa 998, 1003, 221 N.W. 552; McDonald v. Stitt, supra, 118 Iowa 199, 203. V. The wishes of the deceased mother that her child be cared for by the defendants and that she not be in the home of the plaintiff and his wife is entitled to weight and consideration. Holmes v. Derrig, supra, 127 Iowa 625, 631; In re Guardianship of O'Connell, 102 Iowa 355, 356, 71 N.W. 211; Lancey v. Shelley, supra, 232 Iowa 178, 186.

Appellant, T.M. Adams, contends that his possession can be tacked on to that of T.A. Adams, thus creating a connected period in excess of the ten year period necessary to establish title by adverse possession. In the case of Ellen v. Ellen, 16 S.C. 132, cited by both appellant and respondent, this Court stated: "In this case, as it has been already stated, David Ellen, some four years before the statutory period of adverse possession — ten years — had expired, conveyed the land in dispute to the plaintiff, still holding possession, however, under the terms of his deed, until the ten years had expired, when he died.

In all circumstances the interest of the child should be given paramount consideration. In re McFarland's Guardianship, 214 Iowa ___; Tilton v. Tilton, 206 Iowa 998; Smidt v. Benenga, 140 Iowa 399; Bonnett v. Bonnett, 61 Iowa 199; Kuhn v. Breen, 101 Iowa 665. Here the evidence fails to show abandonment of the child by plaintiff, or relinquishment of his right to its custody. It fails to show that the interest of the child requires that its custody be awarded to defendants as against the rights of the plaintiff.

The court erred in permitting Lockenour, Smyth and Morgan to file an amended answer upon amendment of the trial; also in refusing to admit in evidence plaintiff's exhibit No. 14, a tax receipt showing taxes to have been paid upon the property involved, assessed to Ryan and paid by Lockenour, said receipt tending to show Ryan's ownership in 1922. Hodgdon v. Shannon, 44 N.H. 572; Ellen v. Ellen, 16 S.C. 132; also in ruling out plaintiff's exhibit No. 16, a tax redemption certificate showing assessment to Ryan in 1921, 10 Ency. Ed. 745. The court erred in receiving the testimony of Omstead as to the financial worth of defendant Dea. Stockmens Loan Company v. Johnson, (Wyo.) 240 P. 449.

In Holden v. Cantrell, 100 S.C. 265; 84 S.E., 826, the Court says: "There was no error in admitting evidence of the declarations of former owners of plaintiff's land, made while they were in possession thereof, * * * and tending to show the character and extent of their possession" — citing Turpin v.Brannon, 3 McCord, 261. Martin v. Simpson, 4 McCord, 262. Leger v. Doyle, 11 Rich., 109; 70 Am. Dec., 240. Ellen v. Ellen, 16 S.C. 132. Levi v. Gardner, 53 S.C. 24; 30 S.E., 617. Holden v. Cantrell, 88 S.C. 283; 70 S.E., 815. "The claim under which property is being held by a declarant, or the character of his possession, may be shown by declarations indicative of a relevant animus whether favorable or unfavorable to the declarant."

The declaration was an admission against proprietary interest, conceding and acknowledging that the owner's title was subject to and burdened with an easement granted. As such it was admissible under the principle above stated, and also in reply to testimony introduced by plaintiff as to other declarations of A.E. Hutchison tending to show character of his holding or possession. Levi v. Gardner, 53 S.C. 31; 30 S.E., 617; Ellen v. Ellen, 16 S.C. 135; Metz v. Metz, 48 S.C. 486; 26 S.E., 787. Exceptions 2, 3, 4, and 5 assign error in submitting to the jury the question of whether the defendants had acquired a title, legal or equitable, by adverse possession or otherwise, in the lands in dispute.

In such case the favorable declarations of the party may be proved to rebut those first made hostile to title. Ellen v. Ellen, 16 S.C. 135. But a party who rests his title on adverse and continuous possession may always put in evidence his acts upon the land. They are circumstances from which a jury may find out the character of the occupancy. If the party cut timber, plowed the fields, paid the taxes, built houses, these acts may be proven to show the character of the occupancy.