It was to be resumed only when the plaintiff started to board the train which would take her from New Raven to Fall River. Her journey, so far as it appears from the facts before us, was intrastate. See New York Cent. R. Co. v. Mohney, 252 U.S. 152, 157, 40 S.Ct. 287, 64 L.Ed. 502: In this very important aspect, the case at bar is distinguishable from these cases, relied upon by the defendant: Birmingham Term. Co. v. Wilson, 249 Ala. 397, 31 So.2d 563; Franklin v. Southern Pac. Co., 203 Cal. 680, 265 P. 963, cert. denied, 278 U.S. 621, 49 S.Ct. 24, 73 L.Ed. 542: Tilson v. Terminal B. Assn., 236 S.W.2d 42 (St. Louis Ct. App.). It was conceded in the Birmingham Terminal case (p. 399) that the plaintiff was an interstate passenger.
the case at bar, we are convinced after very careful consideration of the entire record that the declaration of the trial court as to the infant William Dean Rasco represents a miscarriage of justice which can only lead to manifest injustice to all concerned. Being so convinced we proceed to express our views on the question of whether or not the evidence is sufficient to support the finding of the trial court that William Dean Rasco is not the son of defendant and a child born of this marriage. We believe that our action in this respect is authorized by the foregoing authorities and by the following cases: Union Electric Co., v. Pfarr, Mo., 375 S.W.2d 1; Allen v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., Mo., 368 S.W.2d 460; Irwin v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., Mo., 368 S.W.2d 452; Miller v. Ste. Genevieve County, Mo., 358 S.W.2d 28; State ex rel. Alton R. Co. v. Shain, 346 Mo. 681, 143 S.W.2d 233; Wittels v. Dubinsky, Mo., 343 S.W.2d 644; Tilson v. Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, Mo.App., 236 S.W.2d 42; Riley v. White, Mo.App., 231 S.W.2d 291; and Caddell v. Gulf, M O R. Co., Mo.App., 217 S.W.2d 751. As stated in Wells v. Wells, Mo. App., 117 S.W.2d 700, and in many, many other such cases, the state is an interested party in suits for divorce and has a special concern for the welfare of children involved therein.
Under the foregoing authorities we feel compelled to rule that the limitation of liability contained in the tariff schedule above mentioned was valid and binding on the plaintiff and that the trial court erred in permitting a recovery in excess of $250, the amount tendered by defendant and paid into the registry of the court. Such ruling is consistent with our holding in Tilson v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis, Mo.App., 236 S.W.2d 42. In that case a similar tariff provision filed under the Interstate Commerce Commission's regulations limiting the liability of the operator of a railway station for the loss of luggage handled by redcaps was held to be valid and binding on the passenger.
Whether or not the court acted within its sound discretion in granting a new trial, or whether or not it erred in so doing as asserted in the points raised by the appellants, need not be considered, for the record shows that the plaintiffs cannot recover, and the parties should be spared the effort and cost of another trial. Tilson v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, Mo.App., 236 S.W.2d 42. In Peters v. McDonough, 327 Mo. 487, 37 S.W.2d 530, our Supreme Court held that a petition stating a joint cause of action for three plaintiffs could not be sustained by proving the indebtedness to seven.