Opinion
Case No. 3:02CV7161.
December 13, 2004
ORDER
This is a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arising from the alleged violation of plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee. Plaintiff, Stanley Tillman (Tillman) brings claims against the Huron County Sheriff, the Warden of the Huron County Jail, and three corrections officers for deliberate indifference to plaintiff's medical needs, physical assault/use of excessive force, and failure to train corrections officers properly.
Pending is defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the motion shall be granted.
Background
On June 23, 2001, officers incarcerated Tillman in the maximum security pod (i.e., G-pod) at the Huron County Jail in Norwalk, Ohio. Tillman remained at the facility as a pretrial detainee until December 21, 2003, when officers transported him to a state penal institution.
Plaintiff originally filed his complaint pro se on March 12, 2002. In a lengthy handwritten complaint plaintiff asserted claims for racial discrimination and harassment, inadequate medical care, and a conspiracy among jail personnel to interfere with plaintiff's defense in his criminal case.
Plaintiff obtained representation and filed an amended complaint on November 26, 2003. Plaintiff asserts, in the amended complaint, claims for: 1) failure to administer proper medication showing deliberate indifference in violation of plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right as a pretrial detainee to medical care; 2) physical assault/use of excessive force in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee; and 3) improper training of corrections officers demonstrating deliberate indifference in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right as a pretrial detainee to medical care.
Plaintiff alleges, as a basis for his deliberate indifference claims, that on three separate occasions, correction officers gave him incorrect medication. Tillman frequently requested and received Tylenol. He contends that on August 8, 2001, September 15, 2001, and October 29, 2001, corrections officers gave him, instead of Tylenol, an unknown medication that caused fainting, vomiting, loss of breath, loss of appetite, nausea, depression, anxiety, dizziness, and sudden symptoms of seizure.
Plaintiff further alleges, in a separate but related claim, that the Huron County Sheriff and the Warden of the Huron County Jail failed to train corrections officers as to the proper procedures for dispensing medications. Plaintiff contends that this failure to train also demonstrates deliberate indifference to his medical needs and is violative of his Fourteenth Amendment rights as a pretrial detainee.
Plaintiff alleges, as a basis for his final claim, that on four occasions correction officers physically assaulted him. He contends that Corrections Officer Polen slammed him against the wall on June 23, 2001, injuring his head, back, and shoulder and causing "severe headaches and severe swelling." (Doc. 42, at 5) Plaintiff states that on July 28, 2001, an unknown corrections officer slammed him against a cell door, causing plaintiff to faint and suffer "severe headaches and swelling in the back and head." (Doc. 42, at 5.) He asserts that another assault occurred on August 8, 2001, when Corrections Officer Pollen slammed plaintiff against a wall and attempted to place him in a neck hold, causing plaintiff to lose consciousness and injuring his neck. The last alleged assault occurred on November 7, 2001 when Corrections Officer Webber hit Tillman on the back of the neck, causing "severe swelling." (Doc. 42, at 5.)
While an inmate at the jail, Tillman used the jail's grievance and request procedures extensively. None of the grievance forms or request forms contained in the record, however, address the claims plaintiff asserts in this action. Plaintiff contends that he filed grievances regarding the administration of improper medication and physical assaults, but that corrections officers destroyed these grievances.
Sergeant Chris Stanfield testified that plaintiff submitted two requests/grievances in June, twenty-three in July, twenty-eight in August, twelve in September, seven in October, eight in November, and nine in December. (Doc. 74, Exhibit I, at 2.)
Discussion 1. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) requires prisoners challenging "prison conditions" to exhaust all administrative remedies before bringing an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). A prisoner, to exhaust his or her administrative remedies, must "plead his [or her] claims with specificity and show that they have been exhausted by attaching a copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the complaint or, in the absence of written documentation, describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome." Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 1998)).
The pertinent section of the PLRA states: "No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
A plaintiff who does not allege that he or she has exhausted administrative remedies through "particularized averments" fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and the prisoner's complaint must be dismissed sua sponte. Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 489 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Knuckles El, 215 F.3d at 642; Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104).
The Sixth Circuit has further interpreted the exhaustion requirement to prevent a plaintiff who fails to make a sufficient allegation of exhaustion in the initial complaint from amending the complaint. Baxter, 305 F.3d at 489 (citing McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 612 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Though the PLRA requires dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint, if the plaintiff later exhausts his administrative remedies, he mayrefile the complaint and plead exhaustion with sufficient detail in the refiled complaint. Baxter, 305 F.3d at 489.
In the present case, plaintiff averred inhis original handwritten complaint that he had "exhausted and used Huron County grievance procedure." (Doc. 1, at 2.) Plaintiff made a similar general averment in his amended complaint: "These actions have been pursued through the Huron County Jail administrative grievance process pursuant to the PLRA."(Doc. 42, at 2.) Such general averments, however, do not satisfy the Brown pleading standard. Knuckles, 215 F.3d at 642; Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104.
The pleading standard requires plaintiff to attach copies of the grievances to the complaint or, in the absence of such documentation, to specifically describe the administrative proceedings and their outcomes. Id. Plaintiff did not attach grievances to his complaint and has been unable to produce copies of any grievances regarding the claims he asserts in this action. Though plaintiff now states that he submitted grievances regarding the claims in this case which were destroyed by corrections officers or not returned to him, plaintiff did not set forth specific averments in his complaint as to that fact and thus, has failed to describe the administrative proceeding for each claim and its outcome.
Plaintiff has attached request forms to his amended complaint. These forms, however, do not pertain to the claims asserted in this action (i.e., claims for improper medication and physical assault). Thus I find that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the pleading standard because these forms do not demonstrate that plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies.
I, further, am not convinced that these request forms are part of the Huron County Jail's grievance procedure. The Huron County Jail Inmate Rules and Regulations describe the grievance procedure:
All inmates shall be entitled to voice any grievance. Forms are available from the Corrections Staff to write out the complaint. When possible, grievances can be resolved by Corrections Staff. Decisions may be appealed to the Jail Administrator, who will make the conclusive ruling. An inmate may file a grievance without fear of reprisal; however, making unfound complaints against staff members or the facility with malicious intent is a major rule violation.
(Doc. 82, Exhibit 3.) The Huron County Jail has specific forms for the grievance process entitled "The Huron County Jail Inmate Grievance" which plaintiff frequently obtained, completed, and submitted successfully for consideration when he believed he had a grievable offense. The jail's procedure, however, does not refer to the existence of "request" forms, nor does it seem logical that both forms would be used by inmates for the same purpose (i.e., to submit grievances).
Because plaintiff's complaint does not contain specific averments describing the administrative proceeding that followed each alleged incident in which correction officers gave improper medication to or assaulted plaintiff, defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted.
2. Deliberate Indifference to Plaintiff's Medical Needs
In the alternative, defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted on plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim against the corrections officers because plaintiff has failed to show that the corrections officers had "a sufficiently culpable state of mind" when they allegedly administered improper medication to plaintiff.
A plaintiff must prove two elements to recover under § 1983: 1) the defendant has deprived plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States; and 2) the defendant deprived plaintiff of that right under color of law. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40 (U.S., 1999); Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970).
Plaintiff bases his § 1983 claim on an alleged failure to receive adequate medical care when he was given an unidentified medication instead of the Tylenol he requested while being held as a pretrial detainee. Because plaintiff cannot show a deprivation of his Fourteenth Amendment right as a pretrial detainee to medical care, defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted.
The Eighth Amendment does not permit the state to withhold medical care from inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). The Supreme Court has held that corrections personnel violate that Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment if they are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of prisoners. Id. at 104.
Pretrial detainees do not come within the Eighth Amendment, which protects convicted prisoners. City of Revere v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983); Graham v. County of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 383 (6th Cir. 2004). That does not mean, however, that jailors can be deliberately indifferent to the medical needs of detainees. They are entitled under the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process clause to the same care as prison inmates. Graham, 358 F.3d at 383 (Fourteenth Amendment "affords pretrial detainees a due process right to adequate medical treatment that is analogous to the Eighth Amendment rights of prisoners."). The same standard — deliberate indifference — applies to detainees and convicts alike. See id.; Watkins v. City of Battle Creek, 273 F.3d 682, 686 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim of deliberate indifference has both an objective and subjective component. See Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). The objective component requires an inmate to show that the alleged deprivation is "sufficiently serious" and poses "a substantial risk of serious harm." Id. The Sixth Circuit has held that "[a] serious medical need is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention." Blackmore v. Kalamazoo County, F.3d, 2004 WL 2792016, *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 7, 2004) (quoting Friend v. Rees, 779 F.2d 50, 1985 WL 13825, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 1985) (unpublished disposition referenced in "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions)).
To satisfy the subjective component, an inmate must show that prison officials had "a sufficiently culpable state of mind" (i.e., "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety"). Id.; see also Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). This component "entails something more than mere negligence," but can be "satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. The standard is recklessness: "the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. at 836-37.
In the present case, plaintiff has shown that the alleged deprivation of medicalcare was "sufficiently serious." On each of the days plaintiff allegedly received improper medication, plaintiff states that he requested Tylenol, but corrections officers gave him another drug which caused him to become ill. Though plaintiff lacks a physician's diagnosis, I find that the symptoms plaintiff experienced (i.e., fainting, vomiting, hallucinations, loss of breath and appetite, nausea, depression, anxiety, dizziness, and sudden symptoms of seizure) are sufficient to render the need for medical treatment obvious to a lay person.
Plaintiff's medical records, however, indicate that he took Tylenol on August 8, 2001, and September 15, 2001, but not on October 29, 2001.
Plaintiff's claim, however, fails on the second element because plaintiff has not alleged, much less shown, that the correction officers acted with "a sufficiently culpable state of mind."Plaintiff alleges that the corrections officers gave him an unidentified medication instead of the Tylenol he requested. Plaintiff, however, does not contend that the officers deliberately gave him improper medication for the purpose of causing plaintiff harm. Nor does plaintiff assert that the officers had knowledge that the medication was not Tylenol and thus inferred that a substantial risk of serious harm existed to plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim rather, seems to assert that the officers negligently administered the medication to plaintiff. A successful deliberate indifference claim requires more.
Plaintiff has also asserted a deliberate indifference claim against the Huron County Sheriff and the Huron County Jail Warden based on allegations that they improperly trained the corrections officers in administering medication. This claim when viewed in conjunction with plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim against the corrections officers further demonstrates that plaintiff has failed to allege and prove the corrections officers acted with a sufficiently capable state of mind.
Because plaintiff has failed to show any evidence that defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs, defendants' motion for summary judgment shall be granted as to plaintiff's first claim for relief.
3. Improper Training
Plaintiff asserts his third claim for relief against the Huron County Sheriff and the Warden of the Huron County Jail in their official capacity for their failure to train corrections officers as to the proper procedures for dispensing medications, thereby demonstrating deliberate indifference to plaintiff's medical needs.
Suits against persons in their official capacity are tantamount to suits against the governmental entity, and generally should be treated as such because the real party in interest is the entity. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690, n. 55 (1978); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471-472 (1985)).
In a Monell claim, liability under § 1983 exists only "when execution of a government's policy or custom" causes the constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Where no constitutional violation has been committed by an official, a governmental entity cannot be held liable for inadequate training or supervision of the official. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1078 n. 12 (6th Cir. 1998).
Because I determined that plaintiff failed to show that the corrections officers acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs, plaintiff has failed to prove a constitutional violation. In the absence of a constitutional violation, the Sheriff, Warden, and Huron County cannot be held liable for inadequately training the corrections officers. Accordingly, defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's third claim for relief shall be granted.
Conclusion
It is, for the foregoing reasons, hereby
ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants' motion for summary judgment be, and the same hereby is, granted as to plaintiff's first and third claims for relief;
2. Leave be, and it hereby is, granted sue sponte, for plaintiff to file an amended complaint by February 28, 2005, regarding his second claim, in which he delineates, as separate counts, each alleged incident of physical assault, giving details and describing exhaustion of remedies;
3. The settlement conference of December 20, 2004, and the trial date of January 25, 2004, be, and the same hereby are, vacated. The settlement conference is rescheduled for February 28, 2005 at 2:30 p.m.
So ordered.