Opinion
No. CV-06-4005252
August 2, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
This is an appeal brought by the plaintiff, Gwendolyn S. Tillett, from the denial of unemployment compensation benefits. The procedural history is as follows. On January 10, 2006, the employment security board of review (the board or board of review) certified and filed with the court the record of the proceedings addressing the plaintiff's ineligibility to receive unemployment compensation benefits. The record indicates that on or about June 22, 2005, the defendant administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act (the administrator) determined that the plaintiff was eligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Specifically, the administrator found that the plaintiff had voluntarily left her employment for good cause attributable to her employer, the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Council (the employer). (Return of Record, [ROR], pp. 8-11.)
The employer filed a timely appeal to the employment security appeals division where an appeals referee (the appeals referee or referee) held a hearing on August 16, 2005 and September 7, 2005. On September 29, 2005, the appeals referee issued her findings of fact and conclusions of law, and reversed the administrator's determination of eligibility, sustaining the employer's appeal. (ROR, pp. 69-75.)
The plaintiff timely appealed the referee's decision to the board of review on October 18, 2005. (ROR, p. 125.) By a decision dated December 2, 2005, the board of review adopted the referee's findings of fact as its own, adding two additional findings of fact. (ROR, p. 126.) Affirming the referee's decision, the board dismissed the plaintiff's appeal and held that the plaintiff be disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits effective June 5, 2005. The plaintiff timely filed the present appeal pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b; the record was filed with the Superior Court on January 10, 2006. The plaintiff, pro se, filed her brief on February 21, 2006. The defendant administrator filed its brief on April 21, 2006.
DISCUSSION
"[A]ppeals from the board [of review] to the Superior Court are specifically exempted from governance by General Statutes § 4-166 et seq., the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act. All appeals from the board to the court are controlled by § 31-249b." Calnan v. Administrator, 43 Conn.App. 779, 783, 686 A.2d 134 (1996). "[T]he purpose of the unemployment compensation act is to provide income for the worker earning nothing because he is out of work through no fault or act of his own . . . Cervantes v. Administrator, 177 Conn. 132, 136, 411 A.2d 921 (1979). [T]he [unemployment compensation] act is remedial and consequently, should be liberally construed in favor of its beneficiaries . . . Indeed, the legislature underscored its intent by expressly mandating that the act shall be construed, interpreted and administered in such manner as to presume coverage, eligibility and nondisqualification in doubtful cases. General Statutes § 31-274(c) . . . Mattatuck Museum-Mattatuck Historical Society v. Administrator, 238 Conn. 273, 278, 679 A.2d 347 (1996)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connole v. Administrator, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 04 0092495 (August 17, 2004, Pickard, J.).
General Statutes § 31-249b provides in relevant part: "At any time before the board's decision has become final, any party . . . may appeal to the superior court for the judicial district of Hartford or for the judicial district wherein the appellant resides . . ."
"The Supreme Court has . . . noted that the trial court's role in reviewing unemployment compensation appeals is limited, in that [t]o the extent that an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, concerns findings of fact, a court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the board of review. The court must not retry the facts nor hear evidence . . . If, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts.
Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Quercia v. Administrator, Superior Court, judicial district of New London, Docket No. CV 05 4002147 (August 26, 2005, Hurley J.), quoting United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, 209 Conn. 381, 385-86, 551 A.2d 724 (1988). "[I]t is the function of the court to determine, on the record, whether there is a logical and rational basis for the decision of the [board] or whether, in . . . light of the evidence, [the board] has acted illegally or in abuse of [its] discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Calnan v. Administrator, supra, 43 Conn.App. 785.
In the present case, the scope of review is even more limited because the plaintiff failed to file a motion to correct the findings of the board. "General Statutes § 31-249b provides, in pertinent part, that: In any appeal, any finding of the referee or the board shall be subject to correction only to the extent provided by section 22-9 of the Connecticut Practice Book. Moreover, Practice Book § 22-4 provides that if an appellant seeks to have the board's findings corrected, he must, within two weeks after the record is filed with the court, file with the board a motion for the correction of the finding accompanied by such portions of the evidence considered relevant to the corrections being sought . . . [F]iling a motion with the board for correction of the findings is a necessary prerequisite to a challenge to the board's decision . . . The Supreme Court has recently refused to hear challeges to the board's findings if the parties who appeal fail to file motions to correct." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Connole v. Administrator, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 04 0092495.
In the present case, the plaintiff appears pro se. "[I]t is the established policy of Connecticut courts to be solicitous of pro se litigants and when it does not interfere with the rights of other parties to construe the rules of practice liberally in favor of the pro se party . . . [n]onetheless, [a]lthough [the courts] allow pro se litigants some latitude, the right of self-representation provides no attendant license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Quercia v. Administrator, supra, Superior Court, Docket No. CV 05 4002147, citing New Haven v. Bonner, 272 Conn. 489, 497-98, 863 A.2d 680 (2004).
The plaintiff in the present controversy has not filed a motion to correct the findings of the board. The board's factual findings and conclusions, which are based on the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses, cannot now be challenged. This court must only consider whether the record contains evidence to support the decision reached by the board and whether that decision was logically and rationally supported by the evidence. See Calnan v. Administrator, supra, 43 Conn.App. 785.
The board of review adopted the following relevant findings of fact from the referee's decision: (ROR pp. 70-73.) The board of review found additional facts after reviewing the record. (ROR p. 126.)
In its analysis, the board of review stated that it had "conducted an independent review of the record, including the tape recording of the referee's hearing. The referee questioned the [plaintiff] thoroughly about her reasons for leaving the job and her attempts to remedy those complaints. [The referee] did not question either party about the [plaintiff]'s job performance. The referee properly excluded the [plaintiff]'s job performance evaluations as irrelevant to the issue before her, which was whether the [plaintiff] had good cause attributable to the employer to leave work." (ROR, p. 126.)
"The final incident that caused the [plaintiff] to leave the job was when the employer assigned the [plaintiff] work one day which she believed should not be prioritized over her usual daily tasks. The employer agreed to let the [plaintiff] perform the tasks that she wanted to do after she complained to the employer's administrator. The [plaintiff] maintains that this situation exacerbated her medical condition. However, she did not provide the employer with any documentation that this disagreement, which was resolved in the [plaintiff's] favor, jeopardized her health or caused her physician to recommend that she leave the job. The employer's administrator specifically told the [plaintiff's] supervisor that it would be best to allow the [plaintiff] to choose her own tasks that day in order to reduce her anxiety. Therefore, we find that the working conditions did not pose a risk to the [plaintiff's] health." (ROR, pp. 126-27.)
"The [plaintiff] did not provide the employer with any medical documentation that her health was endangered either by the noise level or the temperature in the office. The [plaintiff] also did not bring these concerns to Fred Cataluya [sic], who had remedied a complaint that she had made earlier. Thus, she did not adequately explore alternatives to leaving the job." (ROR, p. 127.)
General Statutes § 31-236(a) provides that "[a]n individual shall be ineligible for [unemployment compensation] benefits . . . (2)(A) [i]f, in the opinion of the administrator, the individual has left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer . . . and provided further, no individual shall be ineligible for benefits if the individual leaves suitable work (i) for good cause attributable to the employer, including leaving as a result of changes in conditions created by the individual's employer . . ." Section 31-236-22 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies provides in relevant part: "(a) To determine that an individual voluntarily left suitable work for good cause attributable to the employer, the Administrator must find, with respect to working conditions, that: (1)(C) working conditions threatened the individual's health, either by causing illness or by contributing to the aggravation or worsening of the individual's medical condition . . . (2) . . . and in the instance of subdivision (1)(C) of this section, the individual shall present competent evidence that: (A) [t]he medical condition complained of necessitated his leaving such employment; and (B) [t]he individual advised the employer of his condition; and (C) [t]he individual unsuccessfully sought a remedy through those means reasonably available to him before leaving employment."
"An individual leaves suitable work for cause within the meaning of [§ 31-236], when he leaves employment for reasons which would impel the ordinary reasonable person to leave and which provide the individual with no reasonable alternative but to terminate his employment . . . As a matter of law, therefore, a claimant must show that his basis for leaving employment is objectively reasonable and that no reasonable alternative to termination exists . . . Acro Technology, Inc. v. Administrator, 25 Conn.App. 130, 135, 593 A.2d 154 (1991)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milner v. Administrator, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 04 0198679 (January 27, 2005, Nadeau, J.
In the present case, the board determined, in part, that the plaintiff's failure to seek alternatives before leaving her employment defeated her claim that she left suitable work for good cause attributable to the employer. The board affirmed the referee's decision and dismissed the plaintiff's appeal. The record indicates that the plaintiff failed to find an alternative solution, as required by § 31-236-22 of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies, before resigning from her employment. The plaintiff could have pursued alternatives to termination by discussing her situation with superiors or other appropriate personnel. The board found that she failed to do so, and, therefore, she was determined disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits under § 31-236. Accordingly, this court finds that the decision of the board was logically and rationally supported by the evidence, and was not unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal or an abuse of the board's discretion.
ORDER
The decision of the Board of Review is hereby affirmed and plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.