Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. LC057468, Michael Harwin, Judge.
Law Office of Lee David Lubin and Lee David Lubin for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
No appearance for Objecting Lienholder and Respondent.
CHANEY, J.
Defendant Yoram Yehuda appeals from an order determining priority of liens for purposes of a sheriff’s sale of certain real property. The trial court determined that the second and third liens on the property were an abstract of judgment and an amended abstract of judgment from this action in favor of plaintiff Jacob Tikosky and against Yehuda. Yehuda contends that three other liens have priority over the two abstracts of judgment because he did not have an interest in the real property at the time the abstracts were recorded. He argues that Tikosky’s liens did not “attach to the property” until the date the trial court ordered the real property sold to satisfy the judgments, thereby creating Yehuda’s “unrecorded interest in the property.”
On the appellate record before us, which consists of an Appellant’s Appendix, Yehuda has not and cannot show error. The record is inadequate for this court to evaluate his claims. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
More than 10 years ago, Tikosky filed this action against Yehuda for partnership dissolution and related claims. (See Tikosky v. Yehuda (Mar. 15, 2005, B170534) [nonpub. opn.], p. 4.) On July 20, 2003, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Tikosky in the amount of $223,460.47. On August 5, 2003, the abstract of judgment was recorded as a lien on real property located at 17984 Boris Dr., Encino, California 91316 (the Boris property). After Tikosky prevailed on his motion for attorney fees in this action, an amended abstract of judgment in the amount of $643,577.33, dated October 18, 2005, was recorded on January 4, 2006, as a lien on the Boris property.
At the time the abstracts of judgment were recorded, the Boris property was held in the name of “Yoram Yehuda and Sharona Yehuda, Trustees of the Keshet Intervivos Trust, dated August 20, 2000.” On March 12, 2002, Washington Mutual Bank had recorded a deed of trust securing a loan on the property in the amount of $675,000. Other liens were recorded on the Boris property subsequent to the recording of Tikosky’s liens.
On May 13, 2008, the trial court ordered that the Boris property could be sold to satisfy the judgment entered on October 11, 2005 in favor of Tikosky and against Yehuda. This order is included in the Appellant’s Appendix. None of the moving or opposition papers are in the record before us, although Yehuda represents in his appellate brief that Tikosky filed an application for an order for sale of the property, and the Keshet Intervivos Trust “filed a third party claim” in opposition to Tikosky’s application.
At some point, Yehuda filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida. (In re Yoram Yehuda (S.D.Fla., 2009, No. 09-12803-RBR).) In his brief, Yehuda lists the date as February 19, 2009. On November 3, 2009, the bankruptcy court granted Tikosky’s “Motion For Abstention Regarding Resolution Of Lien Priority Disputes As to Certain Fully Encumbered California Real Property.” The bankruptcy court ordered that creditors, such as Tikosky, could seek from a California court a resolution of lien priority disputes regarding the Boris property. Any moving and opposition papers are not included in the record on appeal.
On November 16, 2009, Tikosky filed in this action his motion for order determining priority of liens against the Boris property. Tikosky asserted that the abstract of judgment recorded in 2003 and amended in 2005 “supersedes any and all subsequent recorded liens on said real property and premises, and thereby constitutes the first lien thereon.”
Yehuda filed an opposition, arguing that Tikosky’s “lien should take priority only as of the date that [Yehuda]’s interest in the real property was determined.” Yehuda listed that date as May 13, 2008, when the trial court ordered that the Boris property could be sold to satisfy Tikosky’s judgment. Yehuda maintained that Tikosky’s judgment lien could not attach to the Boris property until May 13, 2008 when the trial court “found an interest of [Yehuda] to exist in the [Boris] property.”
Objecting Lienholder JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (JP Morgan) also filed an opposition to Tikosky’s motion. JP Morgan had acquired assets and liabilities of Washington Mutual Bank. As set forth above, Washington Mutual recorded a deed of trust on the Boris property on March 12, 2002. JP Morgan asserted that Washington Mutual’s lien was senior to Tikosky’s liens. We need not discuss the arguments supporting JP Morgan’s assertion because those arguments are not germane to the issues Yehuda raises on appeal.
On January 28, 2010, the trial court issued an order on Tikosky’s motion. Tikosky, Yehuda and JP Morgan appeared at the hearing. The court ordered that JP Morgan had an equitable lien on the Boris property “in the principal amount of $647,149.23, which is a senior and first lien and effective as of March 12, 2002.” The court also ordered that the abstract of judgment in favor of Tikosky and against Yehuda, recorded August 5, 2003, was the second lien, and the amended abstract of judgment in favor of Tikosky and against Yehuda, recorded on January 4, 2006, was the third lien on the Boris property. The court also set forth the order of three other liens that it found to be junior to Tikosky’s liens. The reporter’s transcript from the hearing is not included in the record on appeal.
Yehuda appealed the January 28, 2010 order. Neither Tikosky nor JP Morgan appeared on appeal. Counsel for Tikosky submitted a letter explaining why his client has not appeared. Counsel represented that Tikosky has sold his interest in the abstract of judgment recorded on the Boris property in 2006.
DISCUSSION
Yehuda’s contentions on appeal hinge on his assertion that he did not have an interest in the Boris property until the trial court created such an interest on May 13, 2008 when it ordered that the property could be sold to satisfy the judgment in favor of Tikosky and against Yehuda. He argues that the abstract and amended abstract of judgment did not attach to the Boris property until May 13, 2008. Therefore, he claims that Tikosky’s liens are the most junior because the other four liens on the property were recorded before May 13, 2008.
On appeal, we presume a judgment of the trial court is correct. “‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133.) To prevail on appeal, a party must provide an adequate appellate record demonstrating error. (Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296.) “[I]f the particular form of record appears to show any need for speculation or inference in determining whether error occurred, the record is inadequate.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2007) ¶ 4:43, p. 4-11.) Where appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, we must presume the judgment is proper and affirm. (See Estrada v. Ramirez (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 618, 620, fn. 1.)
The record does not show when Yehuda first had an interest in the Boris property. Nor does the record show that the trial court created Yehuda’s interest in the property on May 13, 2008 when it ordered that the property could be sold to satisfy the judgment in Tikosky’s favor. As set forth above, Yehuda represents that the Keshet Intervivos Trust opposed Tikosky’s application for order for sale of the Boris property. Presumably the trust argued that Yehuda did not have an interest in the property. Presumably Tikosky argued that Yehuda did have an interest in the property. Yehuda did not include those papers in the record on appeal.
Yehuda cannot show that the trial court erred because his claims are dependent on an assertion about which the record is silent -- the date of creation of his interest in the Boris property. Because we cannot evaluate his claims based on the appellate record before us, we must presume the trial court’s order is proper and affirm. (See Estrada v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.4th at p. 620, fn. 1.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
We concur:, MALLANO, P. J., JOHNSON, J.