"Claims of error addressed to the charge are tested by she pleadings and by the evidence relevant to the claimed error as presented in narrative form. . . in the parties' briefs." Tierney v. America Urban Corporation, 170 Conn. 243; 250, 365 A.2d 1153; Galligan v. Blais, 170 Conn. 73, 74, 364 A.2d 164; Practice Book, 1963, 631A. A court does not err in declining to charge the jury on an issue not supported by the evidence, particularly where such charge might unfairly influence the jury. Hamill v. Neikind, 171 Conn. 357, 361, 370 A.2d 959; Panaroni v. Johnson, 158 Conn. 92, 110-11, 256 A.2d 246; DeCarufel v. Colonial Trust Co., 143 Conn. 18, 20, 118 A.2d 798. Instructions regarding the issue of damages "(1) should be confined to matters of damages in issue by virtue of the pleadings and evidence in the case, (2) must be sufficiently definite to authorize the assessment of damages to which the party is entitled, and (3) cannot be left entirely to the discretion of the jury without reasonable guidelines for them to find damages to which they think the plaintiff may be entitled."
Id. The plaintiff did not move for a postponement or a continuance of the trial in order to remedy his alleged surprise at the special defenses; nor has he shown any injustice or prejudice from the allowance of the amendment. See Tierney v. American Urban Corporation, 170 Conn. 243, 249 n. 3, 365 A.2d 1153 (1976). We therefore conclude that permitting the amendment was proper.
One, [General Statutes § 52-576], allows a period of six years, and applies to executed or simple parol contracts, i.e., those contracts where, at the time of the breach, one party has completely performed, and all that remains is for that party to be paid. See Tierney v. American Urban Corp., 170 Conn. 243, [243], 365 A.2d 1153 (1976). The second, [General Statutes § 52-581], allows a period of three years, and applies to executory contracts.
It is also true that an agent's authority cannot be proved by out-of-court declarations of the agent though the agent can testify to any facts relevant to show that authority, E. Paul Kovacs Co. v. Blumgarten, 150 Conn. 8, 13 (1962). There is a doctrine of complied authority which can define the agent's authority solely on the basis of the nature of the task which the principal assigns to the agent and is not dependent on the perceptions of a third party dealing with the agent, cf Wesson v. F.M. Heritage Co., 174 Conn. 236, 242 (1978), Tierney v. American Urban Co., 170 Conn. 243, 250 (1976), Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 496 (1967), Lickteig v. Buckholz, 129 Conn. 399, 402 (1942). But it would be difficult to find implied authority for Bubaris to make representations in this letter binding Pacetti by the mere fact that some months before Pacetti, in the original application, represented that Bubaris was his authorized representative.
In Hitchcock v. Union of New Haven Trust Co., 134 Conn. 246, 259 (1947), the court reconciled the apparent conflict between the three year limitation of 52-581(a) for "any express contract or agreement which is not reduced to writing" and the six year limitation of 52-576 for "any simple or implied contract" by holding that the former applied "only to executory contracts." See Tierney v. American Urban Corporation, 170 Conn. 243, 249 (1976). The plaintiff maintains that its contract with Micro-Tech has been executed by both parties in that all services to be performed thereunder have been completed and payment for them has been made.
Connecticut's six-year statute of limitations therefore applies. See, e.g., Tierney v. Am. Urban Corp., 365 A.2d 1153, 1157 (Conn. 1976). And, because plaintiffs' filed their complaint within six years of when they allege that the Knights' of Columbus breached the parties' agreement, plaintiffs' breach of contract claim is not time-barred.
Based on Bank of America's own description, Paul fulfilled his obligations and therefore executed his side of the agreement when he accepted the position in Harford. See Tierney v. American Urban Corp., 170 Conn. 243, 249 (contract was executed when plaintiff fulfilled his contractual obligations). Thus, Bank of America describes an executed contract.
One, Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 52-576 (West Supp. 1988), allows a period of six years, and applies to executed or simple parol contracts, i.e., those contracts where, at the time of the breach, one party has completely performed, and all that remains is for that party to be paid. See Tierney v. American Urban Corp., 170 Conn. 243, 365 A.2d 1153 (1976). The second, Conn.Gen.Stat.Ann. § 52-581 (West Supp. 1988), allows a period of three years, and applies to executory contracts.
Although Conn.Gen.Stat. § 52-581 establishes a limitations period of only three years for actions based on oral contracts, that statute is applicable only to contracts that are executory in nature at the time the claim is presented. See, e.g., Tierney v. American Urban Corp., 170 Conn. 243, 365 A.2d 1153 (1976); Campbell v. Rockefeller, 134 Conn. 585, 59 A.2d 524 (1948); Hitchcock v. Union New Haven Trust Co., 134 Conn. 246, 56 A.2d 655 (1947). In the instant case, because the performance or failure to perform any obligations by either plaintiff or defendants occurred well before the institution of this action, plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief is not premised upon a contract which is executory in nature.
"The trial court need charge only on those points of law that arise pursuant to the claims of proof advanced by the parties in their pleadings. Nesbitt v. Mulligan, 11 Conn. App. 348, 351, 527 A.2d 1195, cert. denied, 205 Conn. 805, 531 A.2d 936 (1987); see Tierney v. American Urban Corporation, 170 Conn. 243, 250, 365 A.2d 1153 (1976)." Drummond v. Hussey, 24 Conn. App. 247, 248-49, 588 A.2d 223 (1991).