Opinion
CV175007690S
10-02-2018
Christopher TIERINNI v. Alexa MILLINGER
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Farley, J.
The defendant has moved to strike the entirety of the plaintiff’s eight-count complaint, which asserts claims arising out of the alleged filing of documents in a prior lawsuit containing personal identifying information and sealed juvenile records. As explained below, the court grants the motion on all but the eighth count, which alleges an invasion of privacy.
FACTS
The plaintiff, Christopher Tierinni, commenced this action in August of 2017 against the defendant, Alexa Millinger. In his eight-count complaint, the plaintiff alleges the following facts. On July 29, 2014, the plaintiff commenced an action against the Hartford Courant and David Owens (the underlying action). William S. Fish, Jr., filed an appearance in the case for himself and for the law firm Hinckley, Allen, & Snyder, LLP. The defendant is an attorney with that law firm. On July 26, 2016, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment in the underlying action. In support of the motion, the defendant filed exhibits that contained personal identifying information about the plaintiff. Specifically, the defendant not only filed documents from the plaintiff’s sealed juvenile record, but she also failed to redact or seal the documents. As a result, the plaintiff’s name, date of birth, home address, and license plate number were posted online. The documents also contained information about the victim identified in the plaintiff’s juvenile file, including the victim’s date of birth, the victim’s grandmother’s name, and the name of the victim’s therapist.
In count one, the plaintiff states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, alleging that the defendant "failed to redact the exhibits on purpose, because of the plaintiff’s criminal charges [and] incarceration"; he further alleges that the defendant "is trying to get other people to discriminate against the plaintiff." Count two states a claim for negligence in which the plaintiff alleges that the defendant not only failed to redact the personal identifying information, but that she also "failed to file a [‘withdrawal’] or even a ‘motion to seal’ regarding the exhibits." Count three alleges that the defendant violated Practice Book § § 4-7, 11-20A, and 11-20B. Count four states a claim pursuant to the E-Government Act of 2002. In count five, the plaintiff claims that the defendant violated General Statutes § 54-86e by failing to redact information concerning the victim identified in the plaintiff’s juvenile file. Count six alleges that the defendant violated the plaintiff’s right to privacy under the ninth amendment of the constitution. Count seven alleges that the defendant’s conduct violated the plaintiff’s rights. Finally, count eight states a claim for invasion of privacy, alleging that the defendant’s "releasing [of] personal, confidential, private [and] sealed information about the plaintiff ... caused the plaintiff to have privacy [and] trust issues."
On February 16, 2018, the defendant filed a motion to strike the plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety. The motion was accompanied by a memorandum of law in support. On May 7, 2018, the plaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to the motion, to which the defendant replied with a memorandum on May 31, 2018. The parties were heard on June 5, 2018, and the court reserved judgment at that time.
DISCUSSION
"The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest ... the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint ... to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). "[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court ... [The court] construe[s] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency ... Thus, [i]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied ... Moreover, [the court notes] that [w]hat is necessarily implied [in an allegation] need not be expressly alleged ... It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant’s motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted ... Indeed, pleadings must be construed broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Geysen v. Securitas Security Services USA, Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 398, 142 A.3d 227 (2016). "If any facts provable under the express and implied allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint support a cause of action ... the complaint is not vulnerable to a motion to strike." Bouchard v. People’s Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991).
Nevertheless, "[i]t is well established that a motion to strike must be considered within the confines of the pleadings and not external documents ... [The court is] limited ... to a consideration of the facts alleged in the complaint." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, 87 Conn.App. 257, 268-69 n.9, 865 A.2d 488, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 916, 871 A.2d 372 (2005); see also Beck & Beck, LLC v. Costello, 159 Conn.App. 203, 207, 122 A.3d 269 (2015) (trial court will not look beyond challenged pleading for facts not alleged, or necessarily implied).
I. Count One: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The defendant argues that count one of the plaintiff’s complaint, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, is insufficient for several reasons. First, the defendant argues that there are no allegations that the defendant intended to inflict emotional distress or that the defendant should have known that emotional distress was the likely result of her conduct. Second, the defendant contends that the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, and moreover, since the rules of practice provide a remedy for the situation alleged, the defendant’s conduct may not be considered outrageous. Last, the defendant argues that there are no allegations of severe emotional distress, and that the plaintiff’s conclusory allegations about negative emotions are insufficient.
In response to the defendant’s motion, the plaintiff first argues that, at the time the exhibits were filed, the defendant knew that he was receiving treatment for his mental health, and she sought to take advantage of this; the plaintiff also contends that he was targeted due to his criminal record. Next, the plaintiff argues that the defendant’s alleged conduct was extreme and outrageous "because there is in fact stuff embarrassing or intimate about plaintiff’s date of birth and sealed juvenile file." The plaintiff further notes that he now has to worry about, inter alia, people stealing his identity and targeting him and his family.
"[I]n assessing a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court performs a gatekeeping function. In this capacity, the role of the court is to determine whether the allegations of a complaint ... set forth behaviors that a reasonable fact finder could find to be extreme or outrageous. In exercising this responsibility, the court is not fact finding, but rather is making an assessment whether, as a matter of law, the alleged behavior fits the criteria required to establish a claim premised on intentional infliction of emotional distress." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tracy v. New Milford Public Schools, 101 Conn.App. 560, 569, 922 A.2d 280, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 910, 931 A.2d 935 (2007).
To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the alleged conduct must be extreme and outrageous. Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, 304 Conn. 483, 526-27, 43 A.3d 69 (2012). "Liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires conduct that exceeds all bounds usually tolerated by decent society ... Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, Outrageous!" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 527.
"The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may arise from the actor’s knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity. The conduct may become heartless, flagrant, and outrageous when the actor proceeds in the face of such knowledge, where it would not be so if he did not know. It must be emphasized again, however, that major outrage is essential to the tort; and the mere fact that the actor knows that the other will regard the conduct as insulting, or will have his feelings hurt, is not enough." (Emphasis added.) 1 Restatement (Second), Torts § 46 comment (f), p. 75 (1965). Accordingly, "wrongful motivation by itself does not meet the standard for intentional infliction of severe emotional distress; rather, it is the act itself which must be outrageous." (Internal quotationmarks omitted.) Perez-Dickson v. Bridgeport, supra, 304 Conn. 528.
"The bar for what conduct may be considered extreme and outrageous is a well-established and high one ..." Pollack v. Eitelberg, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. CV-09-5011274-S (November 30, 2012, Jennings, J.). In Pollack, the defendant alleged in his counterclaim that the plaintiffs had told members of the community and a reporter that the defendant had committed various crimes. The court determined that the conduct was not sufficiently outrageous, reasoning that "[t]he alleged conduct of the plaintiffs, if proven, could be characterized as an attempt to harass the defendant through the intermediary of the press, but conduct comprising patterns of threatening and intimidating behavior, which must be considered more outrageous, have not supported claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress." Id. ; see also Huston v. Cossette, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at Meriden, Docket No. CV-11-6003351-S (January 22, 2015, Fischer, J.) (releasing information from employee personnel file to reporter not sufficiently outrageous).
In the present case, the plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that the defendant’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to rise to the level required to sustain a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant filed exhibits containing personal identifying information about the plaintiff; he further alleges that the defendant intentionally did not redact these documents due to her hostility toward the plaintiff and that she acted without regard for his vulnerable mental state. Even assuming the allegations concerning the defendant’s motivations are true, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defendant’s actions are intolerable in a civilized community. Indeed, as the defendant points out, the rules of practice anticipate this very conduct, cutting against a determination that filing a document that ought to be sealed or redacted is beyond all bounds of decency. Moreover, to the extent that the plaintiff alleges the defendant "is trying to get other people to discriminate against the plaintiff," other Superior Court decisions have found that allegations of harassment through an intermediary such as the press, without more, do not constitute extreme and outrageous behavior. The plaintiff’s allegation that the defendant’s filings were apparently aimed at generating animosity against the plaintiff therefore does not secure his claim.
Practice Book § 11-20B(b) even provides that if such a document is filed and the court orders the filing party to submit a redacted copy, the court may- but is not required to- order sanctions if the filing party fails to comply with the court’s order within ten days. The imposition of discretionary sanctions further indicates that although filing a document with personal identifying information may run counter to the rules of the court, it is not likely to be the act that could anchor a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Having determined the plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded extreme and outrageous conduct, the court need not reach the defendant’s remaining arguments with respect to count one.
II. Count Two: Negligence
With regard to count two, the defendant argues that the element of duty is not sufficiently pleaded. Specifically, the defendant contends that under the circumstances alleged, an attorney is not liable to a non-client third party, such as the plaintiff. The plaintiff, in turn, contends that the defendant was required to redact the personal identifying information in the exhibits she filed regardless of their relationship. At oral argument, the plaintiff advanced the argument that even though the defendant was not his attorney, the defendant was not entitled to violate the law and disclose personal identifying information about the plaintiff.
"The essential elements of a cause of action in negligence are well established: duty; breach of that duty; causation; and actual injury ... Contained within the first element, duty, there are two distinct considerations ... First, it is necessary to determine the existence of a duty, and then, if one is found, it is necessary to evaluate the scope of that duty ... The existence of a duty is a question of law and only if such a duty is found to exist does the trier of fact then determine whether the defendant violated that duty in the particular situation at hand ... If a court determines, as a matter of law, that a defendant owes no duty to a plaintiff, the plaintiff cannot recover in negligence from the defendant." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pelletier v. Sordoni/Skanska Construction Co., 286 Conn. 563, 593, 945 A.2d 388 (2008).
"[A]s a general rule, attorneys are not liable to persons other than their clients for the negligent rendering of services." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodyear v. Discala, 269 Conn. 507, 517, 849 A.2d 791 (2004). There is a narrow exception "so long as the plaintiff is the intended or foreseeable beneficiary of the professional’s undertaking ..." Mozzochi v. Beck, 204 Conn. 490, 499, 529 A.2d 171 (1987); see also Krawczyk v. Stingle, 208 Conn. 239, 244, 543 A.2d 733 (1988).
In the present case, the complaint fails to sufficiently allege a claim for negligence because the plaintiff has not alleged that he was the defendant’s client or that he was the intended or foreseeable beneficiary of her services. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant negligently caused him harm in the course of her work as opposing counsel. Although it is true that the defendant is not generally entitled to violate the plaintiff’s rights, the more narrow and specific inquiry here is whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that the defendant owed a duty of care to him under the circumstances. In the absence of allegations establishing the element of duty, count two is insufficiently pleaded.
III. Count Three: Violation of the Rules of Practice (Practice Book § § 4-7, 11-20A and 11-20B)
Regarding count three, the defendant argues that the rules of practice do not give rise to a private cause of action. The plaintiff maintains that the Practice Book does give rise to private causes of action, including negligence and invasion of privacy.
The Practice Book defines the scope of its rules accordingly: "The rules for the superior court govern the practice and procedure in the superior court in all civil and family actions whether cognizable as cases at law, in equity or otherwise, in all criminal proceedings and in all proceedings on juvenile matters. These rules also relate to the admission, qualifications, practice and removal of attorneys." Practice Book § 1-1(a). With regard to the rules of court, General Statutes § 51-14(a) provides in relevant part: "The judges of the Supreme Court, the judges of the Appellate Court, and the judges of the Superior Court shall adopt and promulgate and may from time to time modify or repeal rules and forms regulating pleading, practice and procedure in judicial proceedings in courts in which they have the constitutional authority to make rules, for the purpose of simplifying proceedings in the courts and of promoting the speedy and efficient determination of litigation upon its merits ... Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right or the jurisdiction of any of the courts ..."
The plaintiff alleges in the third count of his complaint that the defendant is liable to him because she violated several sections of the Practice Book. Nevertheless, the plaintiff has not cited to any authority indicating that any section of the Practice Book creates a private right of action, and the court has found none. The Practice Book describes the scope of its rules as governing the practice and procedure of matters before the court, but provides no indication that its rules create substantive rights. Indeed, the statute enabling the rules of practice expressly provides that the rules promulgated by the courts do not alter any substantive right. Accordingly, as the rules in the Practice Book do not create a private right of action, the third count of the plaintiff’s complaint does not allege a claim upon which relief can be granted.
IV. Count Four: E-Government Act of 2002
The defendant argues that count four is insufficiently pleaded for two reasons. First, the defendant contends that the E-Government Act of 2002 does not give rise to a private cause of action. Second, the defendant argues that the act is inapplicable, as none of its provisions prohibit a private party from disclosing personally identifying information in connection with a court filing. In response, the plaintiff argues that the act is relevant to the present case because it applies to privacy and security concerns and establishes guidelines of what is to be redacted from pleadings. The plaintiff also argues that the act "puts a burden on individuals regarding privacy."
The plaintiff also submits a document he identifies as "the judiciary’s privacy policy" as evidence that a litigant should not include certain information in documents filed with the court. The document submitted by the plaintiff is apparently from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut and therefore does not represent a policy adopted by the state court system; regardless, the court may not consider this document, because the court is limited to considering the plaintiff’s complaint and the allegations therein when considering a motion to strike. See Zirinsky v. Zirinsky, supra, 87 Conn.App. 268-69 n.9.
Several federal courts have questioned whether the E-Government Act of 2002 creates a private cause of action; see Cornish v. Dudas, 715 F.Supp.2d 56, 69 (D.D.C. 2010); whereas others have determined that the act does not provide a cause of action. See In re French, 401 B.R. 295, 310-13 (E.D.Tenn. 2009). In In re French, for example, the court determined that a claim alleging a violation of the E-Government Act failed because the act did not provide a private right of action. In that case, the court noted, "the Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant ‘willfully violated the Courts’ [sic] policies putting the Plaintiff at risk and causing damage by making publicly available the personal data identifiers and sensitive information’ addressed in the Act by failing to redact and/or delete the Plaintiff’s personal information, citing to the E-Government Act of 2002." Id., 310. The court identified section 205(c) as addressing "electronic filing within the federal courts system, including privacy concerns ..." Id., 311. The court then quotes the act at length, including § 205(c)(3)(A)(I), which provides "[t]he Supreme Court shall prescribe rules, in accordance with sections 2072 and 2075 of title 28, United States Code, to protect privacy and security concerns relating to electronic filing of documents and the public availability under this subsection of documents filed electronically." Id., 312. After reviewing the language of the act, the court concluded that because the act does not create a private cause of action, "there are no facts that the Plaintiff can plead that would entitle her to the relief sought." Id., 313.
Similarly, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland determined that "there is absolutely nothing in the text of Section 205 [of the E-Government Act of 2002] that supports finding a private cause of action. Section 205(c)(3) outlines the requirements for courts to maintain electronic document filing systems. Lest there be any concern that Section 205 was unique ... 205(c)(3)(A)(i) requires the Supreme Court to ‘prescribe rules, in accordance with sections 2072 and 2075 of title 28, United States Code.’ ... [S]ection 2072 clearly states that the rules promulgated under its authority do not create new substantive rights." Carmax Auto Superstores, Inc. v. Sibley, 194 F.Supp.3d 392, 402-03 (D.Md. 2016) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that a claim may be brought pursuant to Rule 5.2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because section 205 of the E-Government Act of 2002 creates a private right of action).
In this case, the plaintiff baldly alleges that the defendant violated the E-Government Act of 2002 by failing to properly redact information about the plaintiff from the exhibits she filed. The plaintiff, however, has not cited any authority indicating that the act creates a private cause of action, and the court can find none. Rather, there are federal decisions declining to recognize a claim brought pursuant to the act. In view of the stated purpose of the privacy provisions of the act- to have courts establish rules concerning electronic filings and privacy- and the lack of case law finding that the act establishes a cause of action, the fourth count of the plaintiff’s complaint is not sufficiently pleaded because the act in question does not afford him a private right of action.
V. Count Five: General Statutes § 54-86e
Next, the defendant argues that count five of the plaintiff’s complaint, alleging a violation of General Statutes § 54-86e, is insufficiently pleaded for several reasons. General Statutes § 54-86e provides in relevant part: "The name and address of the victim of a sexual assault ... and such other identifying information pertaining to such victim as determined by the court, shall be confidential and shall be disclosed only upon order of the Superior Court ..." The defendant argues that the statute does not give rise to a private cause of action; that the conduct alleged is not in violation of the statute because there are no allegations that the name or address of the victim was disclosed; and the plaintiff lacks standing because the victim is the proper party to make this claim. In opposition, the plaintiff argues that the defendant was aware of and intentionally violated § 54-86e by disclosing personal identifying information about the plaintiff and the victim.
"In determining whether a statute regulating certain conduct also affords a private remedy, Connecticut courts generally hold to the rule that when the legislature intends to create a new cause of action it does so explicitly in the statute itself." D’Attilo v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 329 Conn. 624, 637 (2018). "Although the operating presumption is that a statute does not create a private right of action unless explicitly stated, that presumption may be overcome on rare occasions ... [A] party asserting the existence of an implicit private remedy must satisfy an exacting three-part test: First, is the plaintiff one of the class for whose ... benefit the statute was enacted ...? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Additionally, in order to overcome the presumption that no private right of action is implied in the statutory enactment, the plaintiff must demonstrate that no factor weighs against affording an implied right of action and [that] the balance of factors weighs in [the plaintiffs’] favor." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 638.
Here, the plaintiff has not demonstrated that § 54-86e provides him a private right of action. The statute does not explicitly provide a private remedy, and to the extent that the plaintiff argues that an implicit private remedy exists, it is clear that the plaintiff is not one of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. The statute expressly protects victims of sexual assault; there is no indication that this statute was meant to protect the privacy of an individual who perpetrates such an assault. As this factor- the first of the three-part test- precludes the existence of an implied right of action for the plaintiff, the presumption that the statute does not provide a private right of action is not overcome. Accordingly, the fifth count of the plaintiff’s complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted.
VI. Count Six: Ninth Amendment
The defendant argues that the sixth count of the plaintiff’s complaint is not sufficiently pleaded because the plaintiff is unable to assert a constitutional claim against a private party such as the defendant, and because there is no constitutional right to be protected from the disclosure of the sort of information referenced in the complaint. The plaintiff contends that the defendant is being sued in her individual and official capacity, and that "the constitutional right to privacy does not relate exclusively to the ability of the government, but it also relates to every citizen in the United States as well." The plaintiff further argues that the information he alleges the defendant disclosed sufficiently implicates his constitutionally protected right to privacy.
"Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that the challenged conduct constitutes ‘state action.’ See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1002, 73 L.Ed.2d 534, 102 S.Ct. 2777 (1982). To qualify as state action, the conduct in question ‘must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsible,’ and ‘the party charged with the [conduct] must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.’ Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 73 L.Ed.2d 482, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (1982)." United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, 941 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 (2d Cir. 1991).
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant is an attorney with a law firm who, in the course of representing private entities, violated the plaintiff’s rights under the ninth amendment. Although the plaintiff asserts that the defendant is being sued in her official capacity, there are no allegations suggesting that the defendant was a state official or was acting on behalf of the state. Accordingly, regardless of whether the information that was allegedly disclosed implicates the plaintiff’s constitutional rights, the plaintiff has no cause of action against the defendant pursuant to the constitution. Count six, alleging a violation of the ninth amendment, is therefore insufficiently pleaded.
VII. Count Seven: Violation of Plaintiff’s Rights
The defendant argues that the seventh count of the plaintiff’s complaint is insufficient because it fails to identify which of the plaintiff’s rights were allegedly violated or any legal theory of recovery. The plaintiff does not appear to expressly address this argument in his memorandum of law in opposition, though he did generally contend at oral argument that the defendant knowingly violated his rights by publishing personally identifying information, and that the defendant did so because of the plaintiff’s criminal record.
"The modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically ... Although essential allegations may not be supplied by conjecture or remote implication ... the complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded ... As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the complaint is insufficient ..." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J.D.C. Enterprises, Inc. v. Sarjac Partners, LLC, 164 Conn.App. 508, 512-13, 137 A.3d 894, cert. denied, 321 Conn. 913, 136 A.3d 1274 (2016).
In the present case, the seventh count of the plaintiff’s complaint is insufficiently pleaded. The count is entitled "violation of plaintiff’s rights," and it reads, in its entirety: "[The defendant] violated this by disclosing [the] plaintiff’s personal [and] confidential information, as well as [by disclosing] sealed information about the plaintiff to the entire world [and the] judicial system, online, by filing it with the court, without any kind of permission from the plaintiff [and/or] the court." This count reiterates the allegations found throughout the complaint, but does not allege, even generally, a theory of recovery. It therefore provides the defendant with no notice as to the issues to be tried. Accordingly, count seven is insufficient to the extent that it does not allege a cause of action.
VIII. Count Eight: Invasion of Privacy
Last, the defendant argues that count eight is insufficient because there is no allegation that the disclosed information was the type of information that would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; rather, it was all a matter of public record. In response, the plaintiff contends that the information is personal and private. The plaintiff’s memorandum specifically argues that the defendant intruded upon his seclusion by illegally obtaining and disclosing sealed documents and personal information about the plaintiff, such as the addresses of the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s parents, as well as the plaintiff’s date of birth, his license plate number, and his sealed juvenile file. The plaintiff further notes that his information was given unreasonable publicity, as it was put on the internet.
As a threshold matter, "the law of privacy has not developed as a single tort, but as a complex of four distinct kinds of invasion of four different interests of the plaintiff, which are tied together by the common name, but otherwise have almost nothing in common except that each represents an interference with the right of the plaintiff to be let alone ... The four categories of invasion of privacy are set forth in 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652A as follows: (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another; (b) appropriation of the other’s name or likeness; (c) unreasonable publicity given to the other’s private life; or (d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the public." (Citation omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn. 107, 127-28, 448 A.2d 1317 (1982).
In general, where the information that has been allegedly disclosed about the plaintiff is a matter of public record, there is no invasion of privacy. See Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., supra, 188 Conn. 134 ("the articles here merely published information about the plaintiff’s finances that were already matters of public record, such as liens and lawsuits filed against him, and this fact defeats the claim that his privacy was invaded by their publication"). Matters of public record generally do not impute liability where the claim is alleged pursuant to a theory of intrusion upon seclusion; 3 Restatement (Second), Torts § 652B, comment (c) (1977); or pursuant to a theory of unreasonable publicity. 3 Restatement (Second), supra, § 652D, comment (b). The Restatement section concerning unreasonable publicity does note, however, that "if the record is one not open to public inspection, as in the case of income tax returns, it is not public, and there is an invasion of privacy when it is made so." Id., comment (b), pp. 385-86.
In Doe v. Madison, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV-095032869-S (July 6, 2011, Woods, J.) (52 Conn.L.Rptr. 216), the plaintiff stated a claim for "invasion of privacy," alleging that "[t]he town of Madison, acting through its employees, allowed confidential information with respect to the plaintiff’s juvenile arrest record to be published on the internet as part of its arrest log ..." The court noted that because the plaintiff was a minor at the time of his arrest, the arrest record was confidential "and was not open to public inspection." Id. The defendants in Doe filed a motion to strike the plaintiff’s invasion of privacy claim, which the court denied in part because "the plaintiff’s arrest is not a public record, but instead, is confidential, not open to public inspection or permitted to be disclosed." Id. The court further noted that "our legislature has clearly afforded privacy rights to juveniles that do not fall within a limited class of enumerated offenses. Therefore, a reasonable person could find the publication of a juvenile arrest record to be highly offensive and would feel justified in feeling seriously aggrieved by it ... As a result, the plaintiff pleads sufficient facts in support of the first element of an invasion of privacy cause of action." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
In the present case, the plaintiff has alleged that the defendant invaded his privacy by "releasing personal, confidential, private, and sealed information about the plaintiff ..." Although some of the personal identifying information that the plaintiff alleges the defendant disclosed might be considered to be public record- such as his name and address- the plaintiff more generally alleges that some of the documents published by the defendant were from the plaintiff’s sealed juvenile record. Indeed, although the allegations focus on the defendant’s failure to redact or seal the documents, the plaintiff does note that "it’s still a mystery how [the defendant] got sealed information documents [and] juvenile records regarding the plaintiff, when it was all sealed from the public." Construing the complaint in the light most favorable to maintaining its sufficiency, it does appear that the plaintiff separately and distinctly alleges that the defendant filed documents that were sealed from the public and should not have been available to her. In view of the allegation that the defendant published documents that were not open to public inspection, count eight of the plaintiff’s complaint is sufficiently pleaded.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the defendant’s motion to strike is granted as to counts one through seven, but denied as to count eight.