This definition incorporates three key elements: consideration, prize and chance. See Tierce v. State, 122 Ga.App. 845, 846, 178 S.E.2d 913 (1970). Kemp maintains that all three elements were satisfied by showing that his grandson called a number that offered a chance to win a prize in exchange for a fee.
In addition to the cases cited in § 5(a), p. 896 of the annotation, see Mobil Oil Corporation v. Danforth, Mo., 455 S.W.2d 505 (1970); People v. Brundage, 381 Mich. 399, 162 N.W.2d 659 (1968); State ex rel. Schillberg v. Safeway Stores, Inc., note 3, supra. In addition to the cases cited under § 5(c), pp. 901-903 of 29 A.L.R.3d, see Kroger Co. v. Cook, 24 Ohio St.2d 170, 265 N.E.2d 780 (1970); Tierce v. State, 122 Ga. App. 845, 178 S.E.2d 913 (1970). See the cases set forth in § 5(b), pp. 897-898 of 29 A.L.R.3d.
Nor do I find that the ALJ's conclusions fall under the "common sense rule" of presumptive evidence defined under OCGA § 24-1-1(6) and upon which Johnson relies. See Tierce v. State, 122 Ga.App. 845, 849, 178 S.E.2d 913 (1970) (Evans, J., concurring specially). The only evidence regarding the state of the terrazzo flooring on the day of the accident was the manager's opinion that it was not slippery; thus the evidence does not support the ALJ's presumption that it was.