Opinion
No. 3:02cv0117 AS
July 10, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On February 12, 2002, pro se petitioner, Loren Wayne Tidwell, an inmate at the Indiana State Prison (ISP) in Michigan City, Indiana, filed a petition seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Response filed on behalf of the respondent by the Attorney General of Indiana on June 14, 2002, demonstrates the necessary compliance with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982). The petitioner filed a Traverse on July 8, 2002, which this Court has carefully examined.
This Court has before it a series of exhibits which explicate the proceedings had which involve this petitioner. The petitioner is a convicted felon serving a sentence imposed by a court in the State of Indiana. He was the subject of a Conduct Adjustment Board (CAB) proceeding, identified as 01-ISP-095. In this regard, the Attorney General of Indiana in an appendix to its Response lays out Exhibits 1 through 21, both inclusive, which tell the basic story here. The sanction is for battery resulting in serious injury, and it included 365 days of earned credit time and demotion to credit earning class II and one year in disciplinary segregation. The earning time deprivation implicates Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). This Court does not retry these proceedings. The collateral review that is envisioned by § 2254 focuses on violations of the Constitution, treaties and laws of the United States. See Bell v. Duckworth, 861 F.2d 169 (7th C ir. 1988), cert. den., 489 U.S. 1088 (1989). The focus is not on violations of state law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). See also Hickey v. O'Bannon, 287 F.3d 656 (7th Cir. 2002).
An offender named Robinson informed a correctional lieutenant that he had been assaulted during the evening of February 28, 2001. That information was passed to the correctional lieutenant the next day on March 1, 2000. Robinson received severe injuries to his face and was taken for medical treatment, having 15 puncture wounds on his body. Apparently, there is confidential information in the record to identify this petitioner, as well as an offender named Steve Smith as the one who initiated the assault on Robinson. Apparently, there was a videotape and it was examined by the CAB, which appears to be all that is necessary under the current state of the law in this circuit. The proceedings under Wolff appear to be adequate as far as the procedures are concerned, and the administrative review left the critical sanctions in place. The evidence here is sufficient under Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Institution at W alpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), and certainly under the "some evidence" test applicable in this circuit. See Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 2000 WL 1512783 (U.S.), McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 1999), and Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1996). Robinson did identify his assailant and that credibility determination had to be made by the CAB and will not be gainsaid here. This Court is troubled by so many cases that are coming here relying on confidential informant testimony, but, apparently, that is a necessary way of life in the prison setting. There appears to be compliance with Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 1995), and Mendoza v. Miller, 779 F.2d 1287 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1142 (1986).
This Court is in the process of acting as clean-up man in the Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922 (7th Cir. 2002) case, but it does not appear that the hard edges of Piggie change the results here in any way. There is no indication that this hearing fell afoul of the mandates in Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984). For all of these reasons, the petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.