The Court rejects Ventura's suggestion that the "crime fraud exception" to the attorney-client privilege bars application of the privilege here, given that no evidence before the Court suggests that the pre-publication communications at issue — between the two reporters and their counsel — were undertaken for the purpose of committing or continuing Gallagher's crimes. See Thut v. Thut, No. 2000-G-2281, 2001 WL 369674, at *4 (Ohio Ct.App. Apr. 13. 2001); State ex rel. Nix v. Cleveland, 83 Ohio St.3d 379, 383, 700 N.E.2d 12, 16 (1998) ( per curiam). Turning to the deposition questions asked of McWhirter, which he only challenges on attorney-client privilege grounds, the Court finds question two objectionable because it concerns the legal advice McWhirter supposedly received from counsel.

{¶ 32} When a plaintiff discovers, or should have discovered, an alleged fraud usually constitutes a question of fact that precludes summary judgment. McDougal v. Vecchio, 8th Dist. No. 98003, 2012-Ohio-4287, ¶18, citing Thut v. Thut, 11th Dist. No. 2000-G-2281 (Apr. 13, 2001). Accord Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 70 Ohio St.3d 137, 140, 637 N.E.2d 887 (1994) (stating that when alleged fraud was or should have been discovered "necessarily involves questions of fact that preclude summary judgment").

Stokes v. Berick, 1999 Ohio App. LEXIS 6264, *14 (Dec. 23, 1999), Lake App. No. 98-L-094, unreported, citing Investors REIT One, supra, paragraph 2b of the syllabus." Thut v. Thut, 11th Dist. No. 2000-G-2281, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1748, *8-9 (April 13, 2001). See also Ciganek v. Kaley, 11th Dist. No. 2004-P-0001, 2004-Ohio-6029, ¶23.

{¶18} Generally, the determination of when a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered the fraud necessarily involves questions of fact that would preclude resolution of the matter by summary judgment. Thut v. Thut, 11th Dist. No. 2000-G-2281, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1748, 9 (Apr. 13, 2001); Hamilton v. Ohio Sav. Bank, 70 Ohio St.3d 137, 637 N.E.2d 887 (1994). See also Cyrus v. Henes, 89 Ohio App.3d 172, 623 N.E.2d 1256 (9th Dist.1993), rev'd on other grounds, 70 Ohio St.3d 640, 1994-Ohio-185, 640 N.E.2d 810.

"`The discovery rule states that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovered, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have discovered, the complained of injury.'" Thut v. Thut, 11th Dist. No. 2000-G-2281, 2001 WL 369674, at * 3 (quoting Smith v. Rudler, 11th Dist. No. 92-A-1753, 1993 WL 318797, at * 4 (citing Investors REIT One v. Jacobs (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 176, 179, 546 N.E.2d 206)). {¶ 12} Graham's complaint essentially alleges conversion.

In regard to the second prong of the provision, this court has further stated that the determination of "reasonable diligence" turns on whether the underlying facts were such that a fair and prudent person, using ordinary care and thoughtfulness, would conclude that further inquiry into the situation was warranted. Thut v. Thut (Apr. 13, 2001), 11th Dist. No. 2000-G-2281, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 1748, at *9-*10. {¶ 27} In the instant action, our review of the amended complaint shows that appellants' claim for intentional interference with an inheritance was expressly predicated upon an allegation of fraud; hence, it follows that the foregoing rules for deciding the accruement date under R.C. 2305.09 would apply to all three of appellants' claims.

I recognize that, [g]enerally, the determination of when a plaintiff reasonably should have discovered the perpetration of a fraud necessarily involves questions of fact that would preclude resolution of the matter by summary judgment. Thut v. Thut (Apr. 13, 2001), Geauga App. No. 2000-G-2281, unreported, citing Hamilton v. Ohio Savings Bank (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 137, 140; Investors REIT One v. Jacobs (1989), 46 Ohio St.3d 176, 182. However, Ohio courts have upheld the grant of summary judgment in similar cases.