Opinion
C086253
10-09-2018
ANDERSON P. THURSTON, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF AMADOR COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14CR22968)
Petitioner Anderson P. Thurston is the defendant in a criminal action. The respondent superior court revoked petitioner's right to represent himself in the action. Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate compelling the respondent court to reinstate his right to represent himself. We shall issue a writ of mandate directing the respondent court to allow petitioner to represent himself.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is the defendant in three criminal actions (Amador County Superior Court case Nos. 14-CR-22968, 15-CR-23486 and 15-CR-24084). Petitioner appeared before the respondent superior court on December 12, 2017. At the time, petitioner represented himself in the instant action (14-CR-22968), but was represented by counsel in the other two actions (15-CR-23486 and 15-CR-24084). The purpose of the hearing was to appoint substitute counsel for petitioner in the two cases in which he had counsel.
During the hearing, the respondent court informed petitioner: "One thing I don't want to do is have a situation where [petitioner] represents himself in one case and has counsel in other cases. So . . . you are going to have to select which route you want to go, whether you want to represent yourself in all of these cases or whether you want to be represented by counsel in all of them. It's one or the other."
Petitioner repeatedly objected that he has the right, under the Sixth Amendment and "Faretta" (i.e., Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (hereafter Faretta)), to represent himself in the instant action regardless of whether he is represented by counsel in the other two actions. The respondent court ordered the attorney who was appointed to be counsel in the two other actions to represent petitioner also in the instant action. The respondent court explained: "It's illegal to proceed and impractical as well to proceed with a person who says that he wants to represent himself in two cases, but he doesn't want to represent himself in a third case. It's impractical, causes headaches for the Court, the administration of justice." The court said also that the court was "going to stop with all of the shenanigans that you've been pulling all along" and was not "going to spin wheels in these cases forever."
Petitioner requested a copy of the reporter's transcript of the hearing, indicating his intent to seek appellate review, but the court rejected that request. Petitioner then requested a stay of proceedings to seek writ review of the order denying his "Faretta rights," but the court did not act on that request.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of mandate in this court, challenging the order revoking his Faretta rights, in Thurston v. Superior Court, C086133. Although petitioner said in the petition that the respondent court denied his request for a transcript of the proceedings, petitioner failed to attach any other documents related to the action. Petitioner did not explain his failure to provide this court with the complaint in case No. 14-CR-22968, or other documents related to the proceeding. Accordingly, this court was unable to determine the nature of the criminal action, or even whether petitioner had filed his action in the correct court. (See, e.g., Magallan v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453 ["The superior court is the court with jurisdiction to review the actions of a magistrate and issue a writ of mandate to a magistrate"].) Accordingly, we denied the petition, citing authority that a petitioner seeking a writ of mandate must provide an adequate record. (Sherwood v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 183, 186; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.486(b).)
Petitioner then filed the same writ petition in this court, again without a supporting record. We again denied his petition. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court, which the court treated as a petition for review. Petitioner then provided the Supreme Court with a reporter's transcript of the December 12, 2017, hearing. On April 18, 2018, the Supreme Court granted the petition for review, and directed this court to vacate our order denying the petition for writ of mandate and to issue an alternative writ.
On February 16, 2018, the Supreme Court ordered all proceedings stayed in People v. Thurston, Amador County Superior Court case No. 14-CR-22968. The Supreme Court's April 18, 2018, order directs that the stay previously issued by the Supreme Court remains in effect pending further order of the Court of Appeal.
We issued an alternative writ in accordance with the Supreme Court's order, and appointed counsel to represent petitioner. The People have informed this court that the People agree petitioner is entitled to relief, and the People waive the filing of a return.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner contends the respondent superior court erred in denying his right to represent himself in Amador County Superior Court case No. 14-CR-22968. We agree.
The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees the right of a defendant in a criminal action to represent himself. (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 818-819.) A court may terminate a defendant's right to self-representation if the defendant "deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct." (Id. at p. 834, fn. 46; see also People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1, 6 (Carson) ["a court may order termination for misconduct that seriously threatens the core integrity of the trial"].)
But, "it is incumbent on the trial court to document its decision to terminate self-representation with some evidence reasonably supporting a finding that the defendant's obstructive behavior seriously threatens the core integrity of the trial." (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 11.) "The court should also explain how the misconduct threatened to impair the core integrity of the trial." (Ibid.; see also People v. Becerra (2016) 63 Cal.4th 511, 519 ["In Carson we emphasized the necessity of providing an adequate record to justify terminating a defendant's self-representation status"].) Although we review an order terminating Faretta rights for abuse of discretion, when the record fails to support the order, reversal is required. (See People v. Becerra, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 518-520.)
Here, the respondent court gave two reasons for terminating petitioner's Faretta rights, neither of which is supported. First, the court indicated that allowing petitioner to represent himself in the instant action but not in two other pending criminal actions was illegal and impractical, and would adversely affect the administration of justice. We fail to see how petitioner's self-representation in one case, while being represented by counsel in two others, constitutes "obstructive behavior [that] seriously threatens the core integrity of the trial." (Carson, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 11.) Moreover, the People were provided the opportunity to respond to this writ proceeding, but have not provided us with any additional portion of the record of the three criminal actions. Thus, we cannot tell whether the three actions are consolidated in the trial court. We, accordingly, express no opinion as to whether the cases' consolidation could justify the respondent court's order.
The respondent court's second reason for revoking petitioner's right to self-representation was that petitioner had engaged in "shenanigans," causing the court to "spin [its] wheels." But, again, the respondent court made no record to support this assertion. And the People have not provided us with any portion of the record that supports the claim.
As the respondent superior court erred in ordering the revocation of petitioner's right to represent himself in case No. 14-CR-22968, we shall issue a peremptory writ of mandate directing the court to vacate that order and to reinstate petitioner's right to self-representation.
DISPOSITION
Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent superior court to vacate its order of December 12, 2017, revoking petitioner's right to represent himself in Amador County Superior Court case No. 14-CR-22968, and to issue a new order reinstating petitioner's right to self-representation in that action. The stay previously issued by the California Supreme Court by orders of February 16, 2018, and April 18, 2018, is vacated upon finality of this opinion.
HULL, Acting P.J. We concur: BUTZ, J. MAURO, J.