Thurmon v. Hogg

17 Citing cases

  1. Blevins v. Manufacturers Record Publishing Co.

    235 La. 708 (La. 1958)   Cited 80 times
    In Blevins v. Manufacurers Record Publishing Co., 235 La. 708, 771-72, 105 So.2d 392 (1958), Justice Tate referred to the "public policy of this state that... there can be no actual owner of immovable property, so far as third persons are concerned, other than the owner of record," quoting Baker v. Atkins, 107 La. 490, 32 So. 69 (1901).

    However, Blevins may not recover the property simply because defendant lacks title to it, since, in a petitory action such as the present, the plaintiff out of possession must make out his title to the property claimed and must recover upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of the defendant possessor's. Articles 43 and 44 of the Code of Practice; Albritton v. Chilers [Childers], 225 La. 900, 74 So.2d 156; Thurmon v. Hogg, 225 La. 263, 72 So.2d 500; Parham v. Maxwell, 222 La. 149, 62 So.2d 255; Waterman v. Tidewater Associated Oil Co., 213 La. 588, 35 So.2d 225; Dugas v. Powell, 197 La. 409. 1 So.2d 677; Cook v. Martin, 188 La. 1063, 178 So. 881; Smith v. Chappell, 177 La. 311, 148 So. 242.

  2. Campbell v. Cerdes

    181 So. 3d 41 (La. Ct. App. 2015)   Cited 4 times
    In Campbell, this court held that a willful and forceful intrusion that prevented a party from exercising a recognized property right supported an award of at least nominal damages to compensate the victims for the inconvenience and mental anguish associated with the disturbance of their possession.

    In the absence of this juridical link, separate acts of adverse possession are nothing more than a series of independent trespasses, and on the termination of each of those acts, possession returns by [ 10] operation of law to the rightful owner of the immovable property. See Thurmon v. Hogg, 225 La. 263, 278–79, 72 So.2d 500, 505 (1954).Tacking possession is also permitted under Louisiana Civil Code article 794, which appears in the title of the Civil Code that governs boundaries. Although the present proceeding is a petitory action, our courts have consistently recognized that boundary prescriptions may be asserted in title suits, and title prescriptions may be pled in boundary actions. See Ledoux v. Waterbury, 292 So.2d 485, 487 (La.1974); Harry Bourg Corporation v. Punch, 94–1557 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/7/95), 653 So.2d 1322, 1324; Williams v. Baughman, 477 So.2d 734, 741 (La.App. 1 Cir.), writ denied, 479 So.2d 921 (La.1985).

  3. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Company v. Butler

    234 La. 322 (La. 1958)   Cited 18 times
    In Mansfield the wrong quarter section of land had been assessed to a taxpayer due to a clerical error and taxes thereon were paid by him.

    '" In Thurmon v. Hogg, 225 La. 263, 72 So.2d 500, 509, decided by this court in 1954, we adopted as our own the major part of the trial judge's reasons for judgment. In the course of that opinion it was said:

  4. Hodgeson v. McDaniel

    96 So. 2d 481 (La. 1957)   Cited 29 times

    This being so, the five-year peremption provided by Section 11 of Article 10 of the Constitution did not accrue during this possession as it is established that the running of the peremptive period is suspended so long as the tax debtor remains in possession of the property adjudicated either in person or through tenants or coowners. Pill v. Morgan, 186 La. 329, 172 So. 409 and Thurmon v. Hogg, 225 La. 263, 72 So.2d 500. The possession of James Rafe King in his capacity as agent for his coheirs (the plaintiffs) operates in law as a constant protest to his tax title and the constitutional peremption did not commence running as long as the possession continued.

  5. Esso Standard Oil Co. v. Jordan

    92 So. 2d 377 (La. 1957)   Cited 12 times

    In order for possession to interrupt the constitutional peremption of Article X, § 11 of the Constitution of 1921, such possession must be a constant objection to the tax sale." [ 225 La. 805, 74 So.2d 41.] Pierson v. Castell Land Harbor Co., Inc., 159 La. 158, 105 So. 274; Kivlen v. Horvath, supra; Pill v. Morgan, 186 La. 329, 172 So. 409; Di Giovanni v. Cortinas, 216 La. 687, 44 So.2d 818; and Thurmon v. Hogg, 225 La. 263, 72 So.2d 500. In Gonsoulin v. Sparrow, 150 La. 103, 90 So. 528, we held that possession by one claiming to be the owner of property was insufficient to put those acquiring title thereto on faith of the record upon inquiry or to prove that they acted in bad faith in purchasing this property.

  6. Stevens v. Johnson

    87 So. 2d 743 (La. 1956)   Cited 20 times
    In Stevens v. Johnson, 230 La. 101, 87 So.2d 743, a wife brought suit to be declared the owner of certain property, and the defendants filed in the appellate court an exception of no cause or right of action based on the ground that she, a married woman, could not sue for the community.

    "* * * No judgment annulling a tax sale shall have effect until the price and all taxes and costs are paid, with ten per cent per annum interest on the amount of the price and taxes paid from date of respective payments, be previously paid to the purchaser; * * *." We have recently held in Thurmon v. Hogg, 225 La. 263, 72 So.2d 500, that the above provision does not apply to the vendee or transferee of the tax purchaser. Therefore, the cancellation of the tax deed to Travis Campbell and his quit-claim deed to Iva E. Johnson cannot be predicated upon plaintiff's payment of taxes.

  7. Robinson v. Mafrige

    229 La. 376 (La. 1956)   Cited 5 times

    Also, it is well established in the jurisprudence of this state that the prescription or peremption of five years provided for in our constitution, and pleaded herein by plaintiff, does not commence to run so long as the tax debtor is in corporeal possession of the property sold for taxes. Pill v. Morgan, 186 La. 329, 172 So. 409; Westover Realty Co., Inc., v. State, 208 La. 163, 23 So.2d 33; Di Giovanni v. Cortinas, 216 La. 687, 44 So.2d 818; and Thurmon v. Hogg, 225 La. 263, 72 So.2d 500. And it has been held that corporeal possession through a tenant or "any other person holding for the account of the owner" (tax debtor) is considered possession by the tax debtor.

  8. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Marks

    74 So. 2d 36 (La. 1954)   Cited 13 times

    In order for possession to interrupt the constitutional peremption of Article X, § 11 of the Constitution of 1921, such possession must be a constant objection to the tax sale. Kivlen v. Horvath, 163 La. 901, 113 So. 140; Pierson v. Castell Land Harbor Co., Inc., 159 La. 158, 105 So. 274; Pill v. Morgan, 186 La. 329, 172 So. 409; DiGiovanni v. Cortinas, 216 La. 687, 44 So.2d 818; and Thurman v. Hogg, 225 La. 263, 72 So.2d 500. Article X, § 11, of the Constitution of 1921 provides that, after giving notice to the delinquent tax debtor in the manner provided by law, the tax collector shall advertise and sell the property upon which unpaid taxes are due, subject to redemption at any time during three years from date of recordation of the tax sale.

  9. Jackson v. Hanna

    206 So. 2d 779 (La. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 5 times

    "* * * In order for possession to interrupt the constitutional peremption of Article X, § 11 of the Constitution of 1921, such possession must be a constant objection to the tax sale. Kivlen v. Horvath, 163 La. 901, 113 So. 140; Pierson v. Castell Land Harbor Co., Inc., 159 La. 158, 105 So. 274; Pill v. Morgan, 186 La. 329, 172 So. 409; DiGiovanni v. Cortinas, 216 La. 687, 44 So.2d 818; and Thurmon v. Hogg, 225 La. 263, 72 So.2d 500. * * * * * *

  10. Shell v. Greer

    171 So. 2d 669 (La. Ct. App. 1965)   Cited 3 times

    Neither of the aforementioned instruments is sufficient to vest title in Mrs. Greer since such acts are merely declaratory of title and cannot, in themselves, transfer title. If the ancestor in title did not own the property at the time of his death, the heir cannot enhance his title by an ex parte judgment of possession and a voluntary act of partition. See Thurmon v. Hogg et al. (1954), 225 La. 263, 72 So.2d 500. It is also contended by defendant that he neither cut plaintiff's timber nor had it done.