Opinion
No. 4-262 / 02-1454.
June 23, 2004.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Scott Rosenberg, Judge.
Thorsheim appeals from the district court's denial of his application for postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.
Kenneth Weiland, Jr. of Weiland Law Firm, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.
Kent Thorsheim, Des Moines, appellant pro se.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, John Sarcone, County Attorney, and John Judisch, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., Huitink, J., and Harris, S.J.
Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2003).
Kent Thorsheim was convicted of one count of third-degree harassment in violation of Iowa Code section 708.7(4) (2001). There were three counts; he was acquitted of the other two and sentenced to a ten-day jail term. He appealed to the district court where, on the State's motion, the appeal was dismissed on procedural grounds. The supreme court denied Thorsheim's application for discretionary review. Thorsheim then brought the present application for postconviction relief, and has brought the present appeal from a district court order rejecting his claim.
The assignments of error are wide ranging and all embracing. Even though the case involves only a simple misdemeanor, and the supreme court denied discretionary review, this matter is of obvious importance to Thorsheim. Each of his contentions deserves and has had our careful attention. Each does not, however, deserve a written analysis in a formal opinion. We find merit in none of the assignments and therefore affirm.
Attorney Marla Suddreth had been appointed to represent Thorsheim in a prior postconviction proceeding. Friction developed in the relationship because Thorsheim had strong feelings and specific notions concerning the strategy to be employed by Suddreth. He was highly suspicious of the level of her commitment to his cause. On the day in question, Thorsheim made three phone calls to Suddreth's office, the first of which was the basis for his conviction. Thorsheim spoke with Suddreth's secretary, telling her that "Marla had better win the case" and, that if she didn't, he "was taking matters into [his] own hands, and she can take that as a personal f___ing threat." He also stated he would turn her into the bar and she would not have a career left. Thorsheim's version of his remarks differs somewhat, but we of course accept the secretary's version on appeal. Two later calls were grounds for the counts for which Thorsheim was acquitted. Thorsheim admits making the later calls and, even under his version, they reflected anger and extreme hostility.
Thorsheim's remarks qualified as harassment. He himself labeled them as a threat. State v. Button, 622 N.W.2d 480, 484 (Iowa 2001); State v. McGuinnes, 243 N.W.2d 583, 588-89 (Iowa 1976). Both Suddreth and her secretary took the remarks as threats of future violence and were understandably frightened and upset by the language. Contrary to Thorsheim's contention, the language qualified as "fighting words" that were not protected by the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Button, 622 N.W.2d at 485. We also reject Thorsheim's contention that his remarks had a legitimate purpose, that is, to communicate a criticism to his lawyer. Threats of violence have no legitimate purpose. Button, 622 N.W.2d 485-86.
We have considered and rejected Thorsheim's arguments that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Without listing his specific complaints, we find that he has failed to show either that his counsel's representation was inadequate or that he was prejudiced thereby. Both were of course required for him to prevail. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).
AFFIRMED.
Huitink, J., and Harris, S.J., concur; Sackett, C.J., concurs specially without opinion.