Opinion
Civ. No. 97-0356 (DRD).
December 11, 1998.
Glenn B. Carey, Esq., Agnes S. Wladyka, Esq., Abromson Carey, Newark, N.J., Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Faith S. Hochberg, Esq., United States Attorney, By: Peter G. O'Malley, Assistant U.S. Attorney, Newark, N.J., Attorney for Defendant.
OPINION
Plaintiff, Margaret Thorpe, appeals pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) from a final determination of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner"), denying her application for social security disability insurance benefits ("SSD") and supplementary security benefits ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act ("Act"). Plaintiff moves for a reversal of the dismissal of her claim by the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's decision will be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The administrative record discloses the following facts. Plaintiff, Margaret Thorpe, was born on November 8, 1955. (Tr. 41.) She has an eighth grade education, completed at age thirteen, and she speaks Spanish as well as English. (Tr. 44.) She also has two weeks of training as a home health aide. (Id.)
Plaintiff's most recent work experience was as a sewing machine operator, making coats, for four years. This job was performed sitting down and required no lifting or bending. (Tr. 48, 120-21.) Her previous work experience included working as a home health aide for eight years. Her duties consisted of taking care of elderly patients, feeding and bathing them. This required her to be on her feet eight hours a day, with frequent bending and lifting patients to and from bed. (Tr. 120-21.) She also had experience as a packer, where she stood and/or walked for eight hours a day, with constant bending, and lifting of up to fifty pounds. (Tr. 12, 124.) In addition, she had other work experience as a cashier, which required one hour of walking and seven hours of standing, with occasional bending and lifting and carrying of up to twenty-five pounds. (Tr. 120-25.)
Plaintiff applied for SSD and SSI benefits on August 27, 1993, alleging disability since September 1993 due to a congenital defect of the cervical spine with myospasms and headache. (Tr. 76-78, 116-125.) The application was initially denied on December 20, 1993, and on reconsideration on January 18, 1994. (Tr. 69-75, 79-111.) Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ, and on July 28, 1995, an administrative hearing was held before the Honorable James B. Reap. (Tr. 38-57, 112-113.) The ALJ's decision on February 12, 1996, held that plaintiff was not entitled to a period of disability or disability insurance benefits. (Tr. 9-21.) On November 29, 1996, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (Tr. 3-8.) Plaintiff now seeks review of that final decision.
A previous claim for disability insurance benefits, filed on September 10, 1982, was denied at the initial level, with no further review sought by plaintiff. (Tr. 58-68.)
At the July 28, 1995 hearing, plaintiff testified that she stopped working in February 1993 to take care of her grandmother, who later died in March 1993. (Tr. 46-47.) Plaintiff has not worked since September 1993, when she attempted to commit suicide by walking in front of a car. (Tr. 47.) She did this because after her grandmother died, there was no one else who was interested in her. (Tr. 53-54.) At present, she is homeless and spends her time walking the streets. (Tr. 45, 52-53.) She socializes with friends whom she sees in the park. (Tr. 56.)
Plaintiff also testified that she shakes all the time and hears voices, telling her to kill herself. (Tr. 48.) Plaintiff has problems with her memory and concentration and has trouble comprehending while reading. At times, she forgets what day it is, and she is unable to concentrate on television shows because her mind wanders. (Tr. 50-51.) Sometimes plaintiff cannot remember where she is physically; she gets lost because she has not been paying attention. (Tr. 55.) In addition, plaintiff is dependent on alcohol. (Tr. 49.) She drinks beer and does not know how much she drinks; she drinks every day if she has it. This problem preceded the death of her grandmother. (Tr. 52, 54.) Her appetite is not good, and she is not sure whether she has lost weight. (Tr. 56.) She is, though, able to handle money sometimes. (Tr. 52.)
Plaintiff sees a psychiatrist once a month for about an hour. (Tr. 49.) During their sessions, the psychiatrist mainly listens to her and has told her to get involved in reading and other interests. (Tr. 50.) The psychiatrist also prescribes medication to plaintiff. (Id.) On one occasion, the psychiatrist referred plaintiff to a hospital when she was in a bad depression. (Id.) Plaintiff has been hospitalized several times, each following a suicide attempt. (Tr. 54.) The suicide attempts were always preceded by alcohol use. (Tr. 55.)
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
St. Joseph's Hospital records reveal emergency room treatment on August 23, 1993, with complaints of pain in the base of the left 4th and 5th toes. (Tr. 184.) X-rays revealed a fracture of the mid aspect of the left 5th metatarsal. (Tr. 186.)
St. Joseph's Hospital records reveal an admission from September 21, 1993, to October 8, 1993, for depression. (Tr. 177, 216.) She felt that life was not worth living and was admitted due to suicidal threat. (Tr. 178, 217.) She was described as very tearful, severely depressed. Her insight and judgment were poor but fully oriented. (Id.) The diagnosis was depressive disorder and malnutrition. (Tr. 179.) She complained of headaches and abuse by her boyfriend who hit her in the head. (Tr. 181.) A CT scan of the head was negative. (Tr. 182.) The final diagnosis was Axis I: depressive disorder, not otherwise stated; Axis II: none; Axis III: status post fracture left foot and headache; Axis IV: severity of stressors was moderately severe; Axis V: GAF score was 30/50. (Tr. 218-19.)
St. Joseph's Hospital records reveal an admission from October 27, 1993, to October 29, 1993, for a diagnosis of atypical depression, alcohol dependence and borderline personality traits. (Tr. 172, 209.) Plaintiff was admitted through the emergency room, where it was reported she had presented in a very emotional state and seemingly intoxicated. She complained of feeling depressed and she had been drinking all day. She also apparently felt like jumping in front of a car, etc. Plaintiff was tearful and despondent. (Tr. 173, 210-13.)
Apparently, after being discharged on October 8, 1993, plaintiff was referred to the outpatient clinic, but seemingly did not follow up. (Tr. 210.)
Plaintiff was described as an average built, white female who appeared about her stated age. During the evaluation, she remained reasonably calm, cooperative, and engageable and spoke clearly and coherently. She was not considered psychotic. She vehemently denied feeling suicidal or having ever been suicidal, but acknowledges that alcohol intoxication might have clouded her memory and judgment. She did not manifest any alcohol withdrawal symptoms. Her mood was not considered to be clinically depressed. Her affect was generally appropriate. She was alert and oriented to all spheres. Her overall higher cognitive functioning appeared to be fairly intact. Her insight and judgment were perhaps somewhat limited. She was not considered to be suicidal or homicidal. The diagnosis was Axis I: alcohol dependence/atypical depression (the former having some causal relationship with the latter); Axis II: primary diagnosis was probably borderline type of personality disorder; Axis III: nonspecific. (Tr. 172, 211, 215.)
In a report dated March 14, 1994, Dr. Joseph Verret, a treating physician, evaluated plaintiff. His records reveal plaintiff's first monthly visit was on November 14, 1993, with the most recent examination being on February 24, 1994. The diagnosis was schizoaffective disorder. She had two psychiatric admissions, the first in September 1993 and the second in October 1993. Both of these admissions were the result of suicidal ideations. Patient claimed that she tried to kill herself by walking in front of cars. She denied any substance abuse. She was a thirty-eight year old single white female recently discharged from the psychiatric unit. She was oriented times three, her affect and mood were appropriate, her speech was clear and coherent. She was experiencing auditory hallucinations and feelings of paranoia. She was not suicidal or homicidal at that time. Her insight and judgment were fair. (Tr. 191.)
On February 24, 1994, plaintiff presented with some depression but mostly related to financial issues. She was still experiencing auditory hallucinations but not as often as prior to her first visit. She was feeling less paranoid but did feel anxious most of the time. She also reported having some short term memory problems. There was no evidence of a thought disorder, and she was not homicidal or suicidal. Her insight and judgment were fair. She had poor hygiene. (Tr. 192.) Her medications included Mellaril 150 mg. P.O. H.S., Prozac 20mg. O.D., Artane 2 mg. P.O. BID. Her prognosis was that if she was compliant with medication, her condition should remain stable. (Tr. 193.) Dr. Verret felt she was capable of managing her own funds. (Tr. 194.)
On December 2, 1993, a psychiatric consultative examination was performed by Dr. Luis Zeiguer. He reported that plaintiff was being followed at St. Joseph's Hospital Psychiatric Clinic, being given Prozac 20 mg. and Mellaril 200 mg. She had complaints of depression and difficulty with her sleep. Dr. Zeiguer was not able to obtain a substantial history from plaintiff due to her reticence. He did not feel her reticence was a result of major psychopathology in the Axis I. (Tr. 195.) She was negative for alcohol and drugs.
Plaintiff's mental status was that she appeared to be relaxed and comfortable and smiled appropriately through the interview. She could not remember the year, month, or day. She could not remember the name of the current president and had difficulties in solving most basic arithmetical problems. She could not remember any of three words after a few minutes. She was not intoxicated. She stated that she hears the voice of her grandmother inviting her to join in heaven. Dr. Zeiguer did not elicit any serious suicidal plan. She was reality oriented, and her mood was mildly depressed. Her affect was appropriate and responsive. Dr. Zeiguer felt that her concentration, orientation, and memory information could not be considered to be grossly impaired on the basis of the far fetched answers because they were contrived. Her judgment was "okay" and her insight could not be reliably assessed due to the limited self-reports. (Tr. 196.)
The diagnosis was Axis I: adjustment disorder, not otherwise specified. Dr. Zeiguer did not elicit a history of major depression or psychosis, but he did state that he did not have access, however, to independent information from previous examiners or providers such as St. Joseph's. Axis II: no diagnosis; Axis III: gives a history of pains in the neck and in the left arm. Recommendations were to screen for alcohol and drugs, reality oriented psychotherapy, and anti-depressants and anti-psychotic medication upon showing of substantial depression or psychosis. Dr. Zeiguer felt plaintiff was able to handle her benefits. (Tr. 197.)
On June 16, 1994, Dr. R. Mathews conducted a physical consultative examination. Dr. Mathews reported that plaintiff gave a history of neck pain and left shoulder and arm pain since 1974. At that time, she has a motor vehicle accident and whiplash injury. Her neck pain and shoulder and arm pain continue up to the present. She fell in 1993 and sustained left foot 4th and 5th metatarsal fractures. She also suffered last year from depression which required medication.
Plaintiff was described as a thirty-eight year old female who was alert, oriented, and cooperative. She could get on and off the table without much difficulty. She looked very depressed. The range of motion of the shoulders in all directions was normal but the left shoulder had bicipital tendinitis and there was myofascitis of the proximal shoulder muscles in the trapezius, upper and middle, and around the scapular border. The rest of the upper extremity examination was normal. Lower extremities were normal with the exception of the left foot 4th and 5th metatarsal bones which were slightly swollen. (Tr. 198-99.) There was extensor shortening of the 4th and 5th digits and tender to touch. She was unable to stand on her toes on the left side. The diagnosis was left bicipital tendinitis and myofascitis of the shoulders; fracture of the left 5th metatarsal bone of the foot; depression and a history of whiplash injury of the neck secondary to motor vehicle accident. (Tr. 199.)
St. Joseph's Hospital records reveal an admission from April 22, 1995, to May 1, 1995, for atypical depression, alcohol dependence and personality disorder — borderline. (Tr. 227.) Plaintiff stated that she was hearing voices and that she was going to kill herself. (Tr. 230-31.) She stated that her plan would be to "jump out of a window" or "run in front of a car." (Tr. 232.) She was described as low-average intelligence. (Id.) Plaintiff's male friend collaborated her story of attempting to jump through a window. (Tr. 236.)
St. Joseph's Hospital records reveal an admission from June 19, 1995, to June 23, 1995, for atypical psychosis, mixed substance abuse including amphetamines and borderline personality disorder. (Tr. 241.) Plaintiff was admitted with complaints that she was depressed and feeling suicidal. She was also complaining of hearing voices. This was one of many admissions to this unit for this patient under similar circumstances and she was only hospitalized here about a few months ago under similar circumstances and discharged in a stable state. The patient showed poor motivation to follow up as well as poor motivation to abstain from alcohol and possibly other substances. She had an alcohol level of 155 at the time of admission, and she also tested positive for amphetamines. (Tr. 242.) In the relatively short period she was in the hospital, she improved to a point where her overt symptoms gradually abated. The final diagnosis was atypical psychosis, mixed substance abuse including amphetamines, and borderline personality disorder. The patient was to continue to attend the outpatient clinic at St. Joseph's Hospital for medication, monitoring, and for counseling. (Tr. 243.)
DETERMINATION OF DISABILITY AND BURDENS OF PROOF
Under Social Security guidelines, disability is defined as the inability "to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
Work activity is considered "gainful" if it is the kind of work usually done for pay or profit, whether or not a profit is realized. Generally, activities such as household tasks, hobbies and social meetings are not considered substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572 (1996).
The Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary") has promulgated a five-step analysis for evaluating a claimant's disability.See C.F.R. § 404. The Secretary first considers whether the claimant is currently engaged in "substantial gainful activity." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a). If the claimant is working and the work is substantially gainful activity, his application for disability benefits is automatically denied. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If the claimant is not employed, the ALJ then proceeds to step two and determines whether the claimant has a "severe impairment" or "combination of impairments." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). A claimant who does not have a "severe impairment" is not disabled. Id.
Third, if the impairment is found to be severe, the ALJ determines whether the impairment is listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. If so, the claimant is conclusively presumed to be disabled, and the evaluation ends there. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If the impairment is not a listed impairment or its equivalent, the ALJ proceeds to step four.
At the fourth step, the ALJ determines whether the claimant can return to his previous type of employment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e). If the claimant can perform his previous work, the claimant is not disabled. Id. The Plaintiff has the burden of proving that he is unable to return to his former occupation. Rossi v. Califano, 602 F.2d 55, 57 (3d Cir. 1979). The Rossi court noted that a "plaintiff satisfies her initial burden of showing that she is unable to return to her previous employment when her doctor substantiates her subjective claims." Id. If the claimant has satisfied his initial burden that he is no longer able to perform his previous type of employment, the evaluation must continue to the fifth and final step.
For the fifth step "the burden of proof shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant, given [his] age, education and work experience, has the capacity to perform specific jobs that exist in the national economy." Id. at 55, 57. Entitlement to benefits is dependent on a finding that the claimant is incapable of performing some other type of work in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
ADMINISTRATIVE FINDINGS
On February 12, 1996, ALJ Reap determined the following:
1) The claimant met the disability insured status requirements of the Act on September 21, 1993, the date the claimant stated she became unable to work, and continues to meet them through December 31, 1997.
2) The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 21, 1993.
3) The medical evidence establishes that the claimant has severe emotional problems and alcohol abuse, but that she does not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically equal to one listed in Appendix 1, Subpart P, Regulations No. 4.
4) The claimant's allegations disabling depressions, emotional problems, and memory and concentration problems are not supported by the objective evidence in the record.
5) The claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform work related activities except for work involving complex or detailed tasks. The claimant has no exertional limitations.
6) The claimant's past work as a sewing machine operator did not require the performance of work-related activities precluded by the above limitations (citation omitted).
7) The claimant's impairments do not prevent [her] from performing past relevant work.
8) The claimant was not under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time through the date of the decision (citation omitted).
(Tr. 16.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court must accept the findings of fact by the Commissioner if those findings are supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C. § 495(g). The Supreme Court has defined substantial evidence as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," which is "more than a mere scintilla." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Morales on behalf of Morales v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 481, 488 (3d Cir. 1987). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has developed certain rules to scrutinize the evidentiary basis for administrative findings:
This oft-cited language [describing the standard of substantial evidence] is not, however, a talismanic or self-executing formula for adjudication; rather, our decisions make clear that determination of the existence vel non of substantial evidence is not merely a quantitative exercise. A single piece of evidence will not satisfy the substantiality test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to resolve, a conflict created by countervailing evidence. Nor is evidence substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence — particularly certain types of evidence (e.g., that offered by treating physicians) — or if it really constitutes not evidence, but mere conclusion. . . . The search for substantial evidence is thus a qualitative exercise without which our review of social security disability cases ceases to be merely deferential and becomes instead a sham.Kent v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). "However, `even if the Secretary's factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, a court may review whether the administrative determination was made upon correct legal standards.'" Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983) (quoting Curtain v. Harris, 508 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D.N.J. 1981)).
To enable a court to properly perform its function of review, an administrative decision "should be accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explanation of the basis on which it rests." Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir.), reh'g denied, 650 F.2d 481 (1981). The ALJ should indicate not only the evidence which supports his or her conclusion, but also indicate "significant probative evidence" that was rejected in order for the reviewing court to determine whether such evidence was not credited or simply ignored. Id. at 705. Additionally, when faced with conflicting evidence, an administrative decision must adequately explain in the record its reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence. Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D.Pa. 1987).
DISCUSSION
The duty of a district court is not to review the case de novo, but instead to discern whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the findings and determinations of the ALJ. See Bradley v. Bowen, 667 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1987).
Plaintiff asserts that the decision of the ALJ that she was not entitled to disability insurance and benefits was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, plaintiff's arguments are three-fold: 1) the Commissioner improperly evaluated the medical evidence; 2) the Commissioner erred in not considering plaintiff's nonexertional impairments when making his decision; and 3) the Commissioner wrongly evaluated the medical evidence in that plaintiff meets a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
Plaintiff first argues that ALJ Reap failed to give credence to her testimony of her disabling depression, emotional problems, memory and concentration problems. She alleges that her testimony is supported by the medical evidence, and that the ALJ's reliance on Dr. Zeiguer's opinion is not substantiated by the clinical findings of her other treating doctors.
It is true that in considering a claim for disability benefits, greater weight should be given to the findings of a treating physician than to a physician who has examined the claimant as a consultant. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 47 (3d Cir. 1994). It is also true that Dr. Zeiguer indicated that he did not have access to independent information from previous examiners or providers, such as St. Joseph's, when making his diagnosis. (Tr. 197.) Yet in this case, plaintiff's treating physicians are not in dispute with Dr. Zeiguer. Dr. Verret's report states that she was oriented with appropriate mood and affect, and her speech was clear and coherent. (Tr. 191.) There was no indication of a thought disorder, and she was not suicidal or homicidal. (Tr. 192.) Dr. Verret's prognosis was that if plaintiff is compliant with medication, her condition should remain stable. (Tr. 193.) In addition, Dr. Verret indicated that plaintiff is capable of managing her benefits. Id. Thus, Dr. Verret's evaluation does indeed support Dr. Zeiguer's opinion that plaintiff is not severely impaired. It is important to note that nowhere in the medical record does any physician state that plaintiff is disabled. Cf.Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 972 (3d Cir. 1981) (claimant's treating physician concluded that claimant was disabled, and there was no contrary medical evidence to refute this conclusion).
In regards to plaintiff's St. Joseph's admissions, they all follow a similar pattern. ALJ Reap succinctly summarized these admissions as suggesting a pattern that from time to time, plaintiff's emotional problems lead to heavy drinking, causing her to have suicidal thoughts. (Tr. 15.) Plaintiff contends that her depression and suicidal ideations are a result of the death of her grandmother and not the result of alcoholism. (Pl's Reply Letter at 2.) This, however, is not supported by the medical evidence. After plaintiff is admitted to the hospital, she sobers up and then denies suicidal ideations. (Tr. 15.) Upon discharge, she is not compliant with follow-up treatment and alcohol abstinence, and thus suffers relapses. Id.
In considering plaintiff's testimony, the ALJ has considerable discretion in evaluating the credibility of a claimant, and accordingly must view the complaints in light of the medical evidence in the record.See Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1186-87 (3d Cir. 1992). In this case, the ALJ properly evaluated plaintiff's testimony with the objective medical evidence in granting less weight to plaintiff's complaints in light of Dr. Zeiguer's findings that she gave contrived answers to make it appear that she was impaired. In addition, as stated previously, Dr. Zeiguer's findings are supported by other medical evidence in the record.
The ALJ also properly concluded that plaintiff's problems do not preclude her from performing work activity. The ALJ did find that plaintiff's emotional problems would interfere with her ability to perform complex or detailed tasks, but not simple or repetitive tasks. Plaintiff testified that she watches television and can follow the news. She takes walks in the park, socializes and interacts with others, shops and travels alone. At the hearing, plaintiff testified that she continues with her psychotropic drug treatment and her meetings with Dr. Verret, and since Dr. Verret concluded that her condition would remain stable if she is compliant with her medication, this is substantial evidence that she can perform simple, repetitive work despite her emotional problems.
It is clear from the ALJ's opinion that the ALJ did not substitute his own layman's opinion for that of a medical expert, and that his conclusions are not speculative but substantially evidenced from the medical record. There is no "uncontradicted medical evidence that [plaintiff] was totally and permanently disabled" in this case, as plaintiff argues. (Pl's Br. at 16.) Accordingly, there is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's decision to grant less weight to plaintiff's testimony and to find that plaintiff does not suffer a disabling condition to warrant entitlement to benefits.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to consider whether her condition met or equaled a listed impairment in the Listing of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, specifically, sections 12.03, Schizophrenic, Paranoid and Other Psychotic Disorders, and 12.04, Affective Disorders. Plaintiff argues:
A review of the medical records indicates that she has been diagnosed as schizophrenic and paranoid and has experienced numerous episodes of auditory hallucinations and a marked restriction of daily living with deficiencies in concentration. Further, plaintiff has a diagnosis of affective disorder with a depressive syndrome. This is manifested by sleep disturbance, feelings of worthlessness, difficulty in concentrating and thoughts of suicide with auditory hallucinations.
(Pl's Br. at 20.) Plaintiff states that these symptoms have persisted for many years despite medication and therapy. Id.
The ALJ found that the medical evidence established that plaintiff had severe emotional problems and alcohol abuse, but that she did not have an impairment or condition listed in Appendix 1. (Tr. 16.) This is substantiated by the medical evidence. Despite plaintiff's contentions, she was never diagnosed as schizophrenic or psychotic. She was, however, diagnosed as having a depressive disorder, which would be an affective disorder under section 12.04. Yet, in order to meet the level of severity for such a disorder, plaintiff must meet two requirements of section 12.04B: 1) marked restriction of activities of daily living; 2) marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; 3) deficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in frequent failure to complete tasks in a timely manner (in work settings or elsewhere; or 4) repeated episodes of deterioration or decompensation in work or work-like settings which cause the individual to withdraw from that situation or to experience exacerbation of signs and symptoms (which may include deterioration of adaptive behaviors).
The ALJ found that plaintiff was able to perform daily activities, such as shop and watching television. She can travel by herself and has no problems socializing or interacting with others. Although plaintiff alleges memory and concentration problems, as stated above, the ALJ found that these complaints lack merit. Thus, plaintiff does not meet two requirements of section 12.04B, and the ALJ was justified in determining that plaintiff did not meet any of the Listings of Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, and that disability could not be established on these grounds.
CONCLUSION
In light of the medical evidence presented and the accompanying documents in the record, the findings of the ALJ is supported by substantial evidence. Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed. An appropriate order follows.
O R D E R
This matter having been opened to the Court by plaintiff Margaret Thorpe on an appeal of a decision by the Commissioner denying her Social Security benefits, and notice having been given to all parties, in consideration of the papers submitted, for good cause shown, and for the reasons set forth in the Court's opinion of even date,
IT IS, on this day of December 1998, ORDERED that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.