Moen, 659 F. Supp. at 990. Further, in Thorp v. Price Bros. Co., 441 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn.App. 1989), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989), this court stated "enhancement of property value is only one factor to consider."

See, e.g., Sartori v. Harnischfeger Corp., 432 N.W.2d 448 (Minn. 1988) (70 ton removable crane); Pacific Indem. Co. v. Thompson-Yaeger, Inc., 260 N.W.2d 548 (1977) (installation of a furnace); Thorp v. Price Bros. Co., 441 N.W.2d 817 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989) (movable plant equipment, here a concrete molding machine), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989); Farnham v. Nasby Agri-Systems, Inc., 437 N.W.2d 759 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989) (removable pipes in grain handling system); Citizens Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. of Red Wing v. General Elec. Corp., 394 N.W.2d 167 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986) (electrical component of light fixtures), pet. for rev. denied (Minn. Nov. 26, 1986); Kemp v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 390 N.W.2d 848 (Minn.Ct.App. 1986) (electrical cables running into electrical starter compartment); and Lovgren v. Peoples Elec. Co., Inc., 368 N.W.2d 16 (Minn.Ct.App. 1985) (electrical transformer vault), reversed on other grounds, 380 N.W.2d 791 (Minn.

Minnesota courts have further recognized that § 541.051 has a broad application to parties involved in the construction process. See Thorp v. Price Bros. Co., 441 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn.Ct.App.1989) (“§ 541.051 broadly applies to ‘any person performing or furnishing the design, planning, supervision, materials, or observation of construction or construction of’ an improvement”) (emphasis added).Indeed, finding inspection of the bridge's welding protected under § 541.051's two-year limitations period comports with the statute's intent.

In addition to the cases cited by the defendant, the Court considered a number of additional cases in which a statute of repose was applied to a conveyor system or similar industrial device. See Fuentes v. Continental Conveyor Equip. Co., Inc., 63 S.W.3d 518 (2001) (Continental Conveyor's supervision of the installation of a conveyor system, which illustrated that Continental intended to "bear the ultimate responsibility for the proper installation of Continental's conveyor belt system," was sufficient to bring Continental within the protection of the Texas statute of repose which protects only the individuals responsible for the annexation of personalty to real property); Reames v. Hawthorne-Seving, Inc., 949 S.W.2d 758 (Ct.App. 1997) (conveyor system which "technically could be moved [was] constructively annexed to the realty because [the owner] never intended to move it more than a few feet as necessary for its operations and never moved it for any other purpose"); Thorp v. Price Brothers Co., 441 N.W.2d 817 (Ct.App. 1989) (statute of repose applied to conveyor system); Stone v. United Engineering, 197 W.Va. 347, 475 S.E.2d 439 (1996) (statute of repose applied to "hotline" conveyor in aluminum plant); Cross v. Ainsworth Seed Co., 199 Ill.App.3d 910, 145 Ill.Dec. 927, 557 N.E.2d 906 (Ct.App. 1990) (statute of repose applied to conveyor in Illinois corn sorting plant that had been in place for approximately 18 years); Goad v. Buschman Co., 2008 WL 906173 (N.D.Okla. 2008) (statute of repose applied to three-story conveyor belt containing approximately 6,000 feet of conveyor).

Absent any indication that a Minnesota court would distinguish between a party which manufactures products used in the construction industry, e.g., fiberglass insulation, and a party which produces materials for a specific improvement, e.g., a stained-glass window, this Court will not make such a distinction. See Thorp v. Price Bros. Co., 441 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989) (Minn.Stat. § 541.051 applies to persons who design or manufacture improvements to real property, even if they are not involved in the construction process). Second, Minn.Stat. § 541.051 does not apply to Grace because the statute applies only to actions arising out the "defective and unsafe condition of an improvement to real property," whereas they have alleged that Grace's Mono-Kote products are merely "unsafe" and not "defective and unsafe."

Other courts have likewise looked to this same dictionary definition of the term "improvement" to determine whether the particular item is an "improvement to real property" within the meaning of a statute of repose. See, e.g., Krull, supra (gas control valve on a furnace which allegedly caused an explosion and fire fell within Iowa's statute of repose); Snow, 12 F.3d at 1161 (overhead crane designed for the plant where plaintiff injured was an improvement to real property under Massachusetts' statute of repose because the crane was intended "to be a betterment of real property enhancing [the facility's] capital value and making the property more useful and valuable"); syl. pt. 1, Thorp v. Price Bros., 441 N.W.2d 817 (Minn.Ct.App. 1989) ("[p]lant equipment consisting of a push rod welded onto the frame of a conveyor system, which is in turn welded and bolted to steel channel iron imbedded in the concrete floor of the plant, constitutes an 'improvement to real property' under [Minnesota's statute of repose]"); Windley v. Potts Welding Boiler Repair Co., 888 F. Supp. 610 (D.Del. 1995) (air preheater at power plant covered 26,700 square feet of heating surface and was thus central to plant's function and an improvement to real property under Delaware's statute of repose). See also Herriott, supra and Rose, supra (both of which rely on a similar definition of "improvement" as defined in Black's Law Dictionary).

The two-year statute of limitations begins to run when an actionable injury is first discovered, not when later inspection is performed to determine the nature of the condition. Thorp v. Price Bros. Co., 441 N.W.2d 817, 821 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989).

Regardless, enhancement of the capital value of real property is only one factor and need not occur for an improvement to constitute an improvement to real property under Minn. Stat. § 541.051, subd. 1(a), when, as here, "examination of the other factors . . . compels a conclusion that the [addition] is an improvement to real property." Thorp v. Price Bros. Co., 441 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn. App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989); see Nelson v. Short-Elliot-Hendrickson, Inc., 716 N.W.2d 394, 400 (Minn. App. 2006) (following Thorp), review denied (Minn.

Enhancement of monetary values, although a factor, is not essential. See Kline, 495 N.W.2d at 439; Thorp v. Price Bros. Co., 441 N.W.2d 817, 820 (Minn.App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989).

Similarly, enhancement of capital value is not necessarily required to make the shorter limitation period applicable, and this court has found that a swimming pool and conveyor system in a manufacturing plant were improvements to real property even though they did not increase the capital values of the buildings. See Kline, 495 N.W.2d at 439; Thorp v. Price Bros. Co., 441 N.W.2d 817, 819-20 (Minn.App. 1989), review denied (Minn. Aug. 15, 1989).