Opinion
24A-CR-488
10-15-2024
Torien R. Wilson Thornton, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Kurt A. Young Nashville, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Brown Circuit Court The Honorable Mary Wertz, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 07C01-2308-F2-306
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Kurt A. Young
Nashville, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana
Michelle Hawk Kazmierczak
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
FOLEY, JUDGE.
[¶1] Torien R. Wilson Thornton ("Thornton") pleaded guilty to dealing in a narcotic drug as a Level 2 felony and neglect of a dependent as a Level 5 felony and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of sixteen years with eight years executed and eight years suspended to probation. Thornton appeals her sentence raising the following two issues for our review:
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-1(a)(1), (e)(1).
I.C. § 35-46-1-4(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).
I. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Thornton; and
II. Whether Thornton's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[¶3] On August 28, 2023, Thornton sold 131 fentanyl pills weighing 15.04 grams to a confidential informant ("CI") for $1,200 in Nashville, Indiana. The sale took place in Thornton's blue Mercedes, with Thornton's three-year-old daughter present in the back seat. The CI sat next to Thornton's daughter in the backseat of the car during the transaction. After the transaction was complete, the CI exited Thornton's vehicle and got into a vehicle with an undercover police officer.
[¶4] Shortly thereafter, the Brown County Sheriff's Department arrived and arrested Thornton. During a search of Thornton's car, the police discovered an additional sixty-seven fentanyl pills in her purse. These pills weighed 8.31 grams. Also inside of her purse, Thornton possessed 34.88 grams of marijuana and a digital scale containing residue that smelled and looked like raw marijuana. A metal marijuana grinder and a marijuana cigarette were also found in the car's center console.
[¶5] On August 30, 2023, Thornton was charged with Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug, Level 3 felony possession of a narcotic drug, Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On December 12, 2023, Thornton entered into a plea agreement where she agreed to plead guilty to Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug and Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. The plea agreement capped the executed portion of the dealing in a narcotic drug sentence at thirteen years and the executed portion of the neglect of a dependent sentence at two years. The plea agreement also stated that whether the sentences would be served concurrently or consecutively would be left to the trial court's discretion. The trial court took the plea under advisement and ordered a presentence investigation report ("PSI").
[¶6] At the sentencing hearing on January 29, 2024, Thornton testified that the instant offense was her first time selling drugs, stating that she did it because she needed money, and the CI kept asking her. Thornton admitted to bringing her daughter along because she was "sneaking and going to make the money." Tr. Vol. 2 p. 61. She also testified that she was a student and made $58 per day providing care for her mother who suffers from a "hidden illness" disability that was "pretty stable" at the time. Id. at 56, 62. Thornton testified that she has custody of her daughter and did not receive any child support. She testified that the only drug she uses is marijuana and acknowledged that she tested positive for marijuana during a drug screening that she had to do for the Department of Child Services ("DCS").
[¶7] Thornton's mother, Cori Hammock ("Hammock"), testified she has a "hidden illness" that flares up sometimes but that she was not always immobile, requiring assistance. Id. at 44. Hammock testified that while Thornton was in jail after being arrested, she and Thornton's grandmother ("Grandmother") cared for Thornton's daughter. Grandmother also testified, stating that Hammock and Thornton's daughter have been living with her since Thornton's arrest.
[¶8] Sergeant Reid Thayer of the Columbus Police Department Narcotics Unit ("Sergeant Thayer") testified that the instant occurrence was not the first time that he had conducted a controlled buy from Thornton and stated that, one or two weeks prior, Thornton had sold thirty-two pills to the CI in Monroe County. Sergeant Thayer stated that Thornton's s daughter was present during that sale as well. He further testified that, based on information from the CI and evidence from text messages and audio/video recordings, Thornton had been selling fentanyl once or twice a week prior to her arrest. Sergeant Thayer believed that based on his experience all of this information demonstrated that Thornton had "most certainly done this before." Id. at 74.
[¶9] Thornton was nineteen years old at the time of the instant offense, and she reported living with her mother and still being her mother's dependent. In the PSI, Thornton claimed she sold the drugs in the instant offense to provide financial support for her daughter. The PSI indicated Thornton had some contacts with the juvenile justice system but no adult criminal history. The PSI noted that Thornton "was not forthcoming during her interview," would not provide the name of the individual who paid for her bond or attorney, and offered little information about her family. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 56. The PSI also indicated that she became defensive when talking about DCS programming and expectations, stating, "I take care of my child." Id. The PSI noted Thornton did not appear remorseful for her actions when interviewed and that she walked out of the interview before it was over, stating, "I will not be treated as an addict," and adding that the offense would have been "handled differently if it had occurred in a larger county." Id.
[¶10] In pronouncing Thornton's sentence, the trial court identified several aggravating factors:
As to Count 1, dealing in a narcotic drug, the presence of Thornton's three-year-old child during the commission of the
offense, which exposed her to fentanyl, a dangerous and deadly drug, and to the dangers inherent in dealing illegal drugs.
The amount of fentanyl delivered was over fifteen grams, which greatly exceeded the ten-gram minimum for a Level 2 felony.
Thornton possessed an additional 8.31 grams of fentanyl, indicating intent to deliver more.
Evidence of prior drug sales, including at least one with her daughter present in the car.
Thornton dealt drugs for profit rather than to support a personal addiction, thus furthering other people's drug addiction.Id. at 11. The trial court also found the following mitigating factors:
Thornton's guilty plea, acceptance of responsibility, and remorse for her actions.
Her lack of formal history of criminal convictions or juvenile delinquency.
Thornton's young age.
That imprisonment would result in an undue hardship to Thornton's family as a slight mitigator because imprisonment of a parent will virtually always have a negative impact on a family. The trial court observed that Thornton and her young child have a close bond such that the child will suffer from her mother's imprisonment, but the child has family to care for her.Id. at 11-12. The trial court specifically found that Thornton's mother was not a dependent. It considered Thornton's Indiana Risk Assessment Score indicating a low risk to reoffend, but specifically found it was not an aggravator or a mitigator. The trial court found no other mitigating factors and noted that no others were offered by the defense.
[¶11] In explaining the sentence, the trial court emphasized the seriousness of exposing a child to drug dealing activities and the danger posed by fentanyl. It also noted that while Thornton expressed remorse, it appeared to be more for getting caught than for the harm caused. The trial court accepted Thornton's guilty plea and sentenced her to sixteen years on the dealing in a narcotic drug conviction, with eight years executed and eight years suspended to probation and a concurrent two-year executed sentence on the neglect of a dependent conviction. Thornton now appeals.
The trial court initially imposed a four-year executed sentence for the neglect of a dependent conviction but later corrected the sentence to reflect that the sentence should be two years, consistent with the plea agreement. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 13.
Discussion and Decision
I. Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing
[¶12] Thornton first argues that the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing her because of its alleged improper choice of both aggravating and mitigating factors. The trial court has discretion in determining aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See generally Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 4903 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh'g, 875 N.E.2d 218 (Ind. 2007). We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of that discretion. Id. The trial court abuses its discretion by failing to enter a sentencing statement that includes a "reasonably detailed recitation of the . . . reasons for imposing a particular sentence." Id. If the sentencing statement "includes a finding of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, then the statement must identify all significant mitigating and aggravating circumstances and explain why each circumstance has been determined to be mitigating or aggravating." Id. "The reasons given, and the omission of reasons arguably supported by the record, are reviewable on appeal for abuse of discretion." Id. at 491.
A. Aggravating Factors
[¶13] Thornton asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in its finding of aggravating factors. She initially contends that the trial court did not assign proper weight to the aggravating factors found. However, the relative weight or value assignable to aggravators or mitigators is not subject to review on appeal. Id. To the extent Thornton argues that her prior instances of drug dealing were not supported by the evidence, we disagree. Sergent Thayer testified that, just one or two weeks prior to the instant offense, Thornton sold thirty-two fentanyl pills to the CI through a controlled buy in Monroe County. Further, the CI told Sergeant Thayer that prior to this, he was buying fentanyl once or twice a week from Thornton. Sergent Thayer believed that Thornton had "most certainly done this before" based on his experience, the CI's statements, and on text messages and audio/video recordings. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 74. Therefore, the trial court's finding that Thornton had previously sold fentanyl pills was supported by the evidence.
[¶14] Thornton next contends that the trial court abused its discretion in finding the presence of Thornton's child during the crime as an aggravating factor. She argues that in doing so the trial court impermissibly used one of her convictions, neglect of a dependent, as an aggravating factor for her other conviction, dealing in a narcotic drug. "Generally, the nature and circumstances of a crime is a proper aggravating circumstance." Gomillia v. State, 13 N.E.3d 846, 853 (Ind. 2014). In finding the presence of Thornton's three-year-old daughter during the drug deal as an aggravating factor with respect to the dealing conviction, the court was not relying on a material element of the crime of neglect of a dependent, but rather on all the particularized circumstances of her act of dealing in narcotics, specifically fentanyl, and such circumstances were valid aggravating factors. Additionally, the trial court specifically only found the presence of her young child was an aggravator as to Count 1, dealing in a narcotic drug, and not Count 3, neglect of a dependent.
[¶15] Here, the evidence revealed that the CI got into the backseat of Thornton's car and sat right next to Thornton's then-three-year-old child and proceeded to exchange money for 131 fentanyl pills weighing 15.04 grams. Thornton testified that she did not know the CI and that she brought her daughter with her because she was sneaking off to make money. Further, this was not the first time that she had exposed her daughter to drug dealing as the evidence demonstrated that she had brought the child in the car with her a week or two before when she sold drugs to the CI. The nature and circumstances of this crime clearly established that Thornton was in a position of having care and custody of her child and exposed her to numerous dangers in the commission of the crime, including exposing her to potentially dangerous individuals who were buying and selling drugs and to fentanyl, which is an extremely dangerous, life-threatening substance. This was therefore a valid aggravating factor, which the trial court properly found to be "incredibly serious and incredibly aggravating as it relates to Count 1." Tr. Vol. 2 p. 84.
[¶16] However, even if the finding of the presence of Thornton's child during the offense as an aggravating factor was error, we do not find that Thornton's sentence was an abuse of discretion. If a trial court abuses its discretion by improperly considering an aggravating circumstance, we need to remand for resentencing only "if we cannot say with confidence that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence had it properly considered reasons that enjoy support in the record." Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491. When we can "identify sufficient aggravating circumstances to persuade us that the trial court would have entered the same sentence even without the impermissible factor, [we] should affirm the trial court's decision." Morrell v. State, 118 N.E.3d 793, 796 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019), trans. denied. Here, the trial court found several valid aggravating factors, and Thornton does not challenge several of them, including that the amount of fentanyl sold was well over the statutory minimum and that she was also found in possession of an additional 8.31 grams of fentanyl, indicating that she intended to engage in further sales of the drug. Further, although the trial court found several aggravating factors, the sentence imposed was lower than the advisory sentence for a Level 2 felony, and thus, Thornton was not subjected to an aggravated sentence. We conclude that the trial court would have imposed the same sentence even without the challenged aggravating factor.
The offense of dealing in a narcotic drug is a Level 2 felony if: "(1) the amount of the drug involved is at least ten (10) grams." I.C. § 35-48-4-1(e)(1).
"A person who commits a Level 2 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between ten (10) and thirty (30) years, with the advisory sentence being seventeen and one-half (17 %) years." Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5.
B. Mitigating Factors
[¶17] Thornton also argues that the trial court erroneously overlooked several mitigating factors. When the defendant claims "the trial court failed to identify or find a mitigating factor," the defendant must "establish that the mitigating evidence is both significant and clearly supported by the record." Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. However, "[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist." Id. (quoting Fugate v. State, 608 N.E.2d 1370, 1374 (Ind. 1993)). Further, to the extent a defendant claims a court "abused its discretion in failing to give his proffered mitigating factor greater weight, this claim is not available for appellate review." Id. at 493-94. Indeed, "[t]he relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse." Id. at 491.
[¶18] Initially, Thornton contends that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to find that she suffered from several mental health issues, was dealing drugs to support her daughter, received no child support from the father of her child, and was the victim of sexual assault that resulted in her daughter being conceived. However, none of these proposed mitigators were argued at sentencing. "'If the defendant does not advance a factor to be mitigating at sentencing, this Court will presume that the factor is not significant, and the defendant is precluded from advancing it as a mitigating circumstance for the first time on appeal.'" Hollin v. State, 877 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind. 2007) (quoting Spears v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1161, 1167 (Ind. 2000) (citations omitted)). Thus, these arguments are waived.
[¶19] To the extent that Thornton argues that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not "address the fact that she was found to be at a low risk to reoffend," she is incorrect. Appellant's Br. p. 16. "[O]ffender recidivism risk assessment instruments do not function as aggravating or mitigating circumstances for the purpose of determining the length of sentence appropriate for each defendant." J.S. v. State, 928 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ind. 2010) (citing Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 575 (Ind. 2010)). In its oral sentencing statement, the trial court specifically noted that her Indiana Risk Assessment Score indicated that she had a low risk of reoffending. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 86. The trial court then correctly declined to treat it as an aggravating or mitigating factor and instead stated "it [was] just something [the court] can consider" when "trying to fashion a sentence." Id.
[¶20] As to Thornton's assertion that the trial court erred in not finding her employment as the caretaker of her mother, Hammock, or that Hammock was a dependent as a mitigator, we reiterate that "[i]f the trial court does not find the existence of a mitigating factor after it has been argued by counsel, the trial court is not obligated to explain why it has found that the factor does not exist." Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 493. The evidence at the sentencing hearing revealed that Hammock suffers from a "hidden illness" that flares up sometimes but that she was not always immobile, requiring assistance. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 44. Thornton testified that she worked as a caregiver for Hammock and that Hammock's disability was "pretty stable" at the time but could change from day to day. Id. at 55, 62. Hammock testified that while Thornton was in jail after being arrested, she and Grandmother cared for Thornton's daughter. The trial court was not required to find that Hammock was a dependent when the evidence demonstrated that Thornton lived with Hammock, and Thornton reported that she was still Hammock's dependent. Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 56. Nor was the trial court required to find Thornton's employment as a caregiver to Hammock as a mitigator.
[¶21] Further, to the extent Thornton claims the trial court abused its discretion in finding that her incarceration would cause undue hardship to her family as only a slight mitigator, this claim of insufficient weight is not available for appellate review. See Anglemyer, 868 N.E.2d at 491, 493-94. ("The relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found or those which should have been found is not subject to review for abuse.") Further, "[m]any persons convicted of serious crimes have one or more children and, absent special circumstances, trial courts are not required to find that imprisonment will result in an undue hardship." Nicholson v. State, 768 N.E.2d 443, 448 n.13 (Ind. 2002). While her sentence may impose a hardship on her daughter and other family members, Thornton has failed to identify special circumstances that render this hardship undue. While she was incarcerated after her arrest, Hammock and Grandmother cared for her child, and Hammock testified that she was able to care for herself while Thornton was incarcerated and that she is not always immobile. Grandmother testified that Hammock, Thornton, and her daughter have been living with Grandmother since Thornton's arrest. We, therefore, do not find any abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding regarding undue hardship as a mitigator.
[¶22] In light of the broad discretion afforded to trial courts in sentencing matters, we conclude that Thornton has not identified an abuse of sentencing discretion.
II. Inappropriate Sentence
[¶23] The Indiana Constitution authorizes appellate review and revision of a trial court's sentencing decision. See Ind. Const. art. 7, §§ 4, 6; Jackson v. State, 145 N.E.3d 783, 784 (Ind. 2020). "That authority is implemented through Appellate Rule 7(B), which permits an appellate court to revise a sentence if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the sentence is found to be inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Faith v. State, 131 N.E.3d 158, 159 (Ind. 2019).
[¶24] Our review under Appellate Rule 7(B) focuses on "the forest-the aggregate sentence-rather than the trees-consecutive or concurrent, number of counts, or length of the sentence on any individual count." Cardwell v. State, 895 N.E.2d 1219, 1225 (Ind. 2008). We generally defer to the trial court's sentencing decision, and our goal is to determine whether the defendant's sentence is inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012). "Such deference should prevail unless overcome by compelling evidence portraying in a positive light the nature of the offense (such as accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality) and the defendant's character (such as substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character)." Stephenson v. State, 29 N.E.3d 111, 122 (Ind. 2015).
[¶25] Here, Thornton was convicted of Level 2 felony dealing in a narcotic drug and Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent. She pleaded guilty to these two offenses pursuant to a plea agreement that capped the executed portion of the dealing in a narcotic drug sentence at thirteen years and the executed portion of the neglect of a dependent sentence at two years, leaving to the trial court's discretion whether the sentences would be served concurrently or consecutively. A person who commits a Level 2 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between ten and thirty years, with the advisory sentence being seventeen and one-half years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4.5. A person who commits a Level 5 felony shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between one and six years, with the advisory sentence being three years. I.C. § 35-50-2-6(b). Here, the trial court sentenced Thornton to sixteen years on the dealing in a narcotic conviction, with eight years executed and eight years suspended to probation and a concurrent two-year executed sentence on the neglect of a dependent conviction.
[¶26] When reviewing the nature of the offense, this court considers "the details and circumstances of the commission of the offense." Merriweather v. State, 151 N.E.3d 1281, 1286 (Ind.Ct.App. 2020). Looking to the circumstances of the instant offenses, Thornton drove to another county with almost 200 fentanyl pills, marijuana, and drug paraphernalia in her possession to sell fentanyl pills to a man she claimed to barely know while her three-year-old daughter was in the car with her. She sold the CI over 130 pills weighing over fifteen grams, which was significantly more fentanyl than the minimum necessary to elevate the dealing in narcotics charge to a Level 2 felony. After the transaction took place, Thornton still had over eight grams of fentanyl pills in her possession, which because she did not use fentanyl, indicated that she intended to sell these pills too. Not only did Thornton bring her daughter with her, but she also allowed the CI to get in the car and sit next to her daughter in the backseat during the drug transaction. Such actions by Thornton demonstrated a complete lack of concern about the safety and security of her child. Additionally, during a search of Thornton's Mercedes when she was arrested, the officers found an additional 8.31 grams of fentanyl, a large plastic baggie containing 34.88 grams of marijuana, and a digital scale with marijuana residue inside of Thornton's purse. They also found a metal marijuana grinder with residue and a marijuana cigarette in the center console of the car.
[¶27] Further, contrary to Thornton's assertion that this was her first time selling drugs, the evidence indicated differently. Sergeant Thayer testified that a controlled buy had been conducted with Thornton a week or two prior to the instant offense where she sold thirty-two pills to the CI in Monroe County. The CI told Sergeant Thayer that he was buying fentanyl once or twice a week from Thornton and based on the text messages and audio and video recordings, Sergeant Thayer believed that Thornton had "most certainly done this before." Tr. Vol. 2 p. 74. The amount of drugs she sold to the CI, along with the amount she had in her purse for future dealing of such a dangerous drug, demonstrated a lack of regard for the lives of others. Although Thornton tries to minimize her involvement in dealing drugs and also contends that she was selling drugs to support her daughter, she has not portrayed the nature of the offenses in a positive light, accompanied by restraint, regard, and lack of brutality. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.
[¶28] The character of the offender is found in what we learn from the offender's life and conduct. Merriweather, 151 N.E.3d at 1286. "A defendant's criminal history is one relevant factor in analyzing character, the significance of which varies based on the 'gravity, nature, and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.'" Smoots v. State, 172 N.E.3d 1279, 1290 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021) (quoting Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind.Ct.App. 2007)).
[¶29] As to Thornton's character, the evidence established that Thornton was nineteen years old at the time of the instant offenses, and although she had some contacts with the juvenile justice system, she had no adult criminal history. Thornton did plead guilty to two of her charged offenses. Although Thornton expressed remorse at the sentencing hearing, the trial court believed her remorse was "more in terms of being remorseful for getting caught than remorseful for the harm that [she] caused." Tr. Vol. 2 p. 85. This was supported by Thornton's attitude and actions during the interview for her PSI. She "was not very forthcoming during her interview" and became defensive when talking about DCS programming and expectations and walked out of the interview before it was over, stating that the offense would have been "handled differently if it had occurred in a larger county." Appellant's App. Vol. 2 p. 56. In her testimony at the sentencing hearing, Thornton repeatedly blamed the CI for her decision to sell fentanyl pills as she stated that the CI "kept asking" her to get him the pills so she finally acquiesced. Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 60, 61. Further, the evidence at sentencing indicated that Thornton lied about the scope of her criminal conduct, stating that this was the first time she sold fentanyl when there was testimony that she had previously sold fentanyl to the same CI. The evidence also revealed that Thornton continued to use marijuana during her pretrial release. All of these actions reflect poorly on her character. Although Thornton points to her young age, support of her daughter and other family members, she has failed to identify "substantial virtuous traits or persistent examples of good character" to support revising her sentence. Stephenson, 29 N.E.3d at 122.
[¶30] Thornton compares her case to that of Hubbert v. State, 163 N.E.3d 958 (Ind.Ct.App. 2021), trans. denied, where our court reversed and revised the defendant's sentence because, although he sold drugs in the parking lot of a public library, he only sold a small amount over the statutory minimum amount and the evidence established that his primary motivation in selling drugs was his addiction and that he was a low risk to reoffend. Id. at 960. However, we do not find the present case to be sufficiently similar to justify a revision of Thornton's sentence. Here, Thornton does not claim to have a drug addiction and stated that she was dealing drugs for a profit to provide financial support for her daughter. Further, unlike the defendant in Hubbert, Thornton sold a significantly larger amount of the fentanyl than was necessary to elevate the crime to a Level 2 felony, and she was found to be in possession of even more of the pills, which indicated an intent to sell again. We, therefore, decline to find the present case to be similar to Hubbert.
[¶31] Based on the facts in the record, Thornton has not shown that her sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and her character.
Conclusion
[¶32] We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its sentencing of Thornton and that her sentence is not inappropriate.
[¶33] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J. and Weissmann, J., concur.