A motion for judgment n.o.v. should only be granted in those limited cases where all of the evidence and the inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817 (2008). When ruling upon such a motion, the court does not weigh the evidence or make determinations of credibility and must not substitute its judgment for that of the jury merely because there are other inferences or conclusions that the jury could have drawn or because there are other results that the court believes are more reasonable.

A motion for judgment n.o.v. should only be granted in those limited cases where all of the evidence and the inferences therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817 (2008). When ruling upon such a motion, the court does not weigh the evidence or make determinations of credibility and must not substitute its judgment for that of the jury merely because there are other inferences or conclusions that the jury could have drawn or because there are other results that the court believes are more reasonable.

Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. DiMucci, 2015 IL App (1st) 122725 .................... 14, 18 NC Illinois Trust Co. v. First Illini Bancorp, Inc., 323 Ill. App. 3d 254 (3d Dist. 2001) ............. 19 Neumann v. Neumann, 334 Ill. App. 3d 305 (3d Dist. 2002) ....................................................... 18 Obermaier v. Obermaier, 128 Ill. App. 3d 602 (1st Dist. 1984) .................................................. 19 Prignano v. Prignano, 405 Ill. App. 3d 801 (2d Dist. 2010) ........................................................ 18 Riordan v. ASAP Expert Counseling, LLC, 2017 WL 2225223 (D. Kan. May 19, 2017) ....... 7, 11 RRK Holding Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 563 F. Supp. 2d 832 (N.D. Ill. 2008) ...................... 19 Sheth v. SAB Tool Supply Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 110156 ............................................... 13, 14, 16 Shiner v. Turnoy, 2014 WL 3907043 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2014) ..................................................... 7 Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill. App. 3d 813 (3d Dist. 2008) ........................................................... 21 Tully v. McLean, 409 Ill. App. 3d 659 (1st Dist. 2011) .......................................................... 13, 18 U.S. for Use & Benefit of Treat Bros. Co. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 986 F.2d 1110 (7th Cir. 1993) ............................................................................................ 15, 18 Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mut. Trading Corp., 63 F.3d 516 (7th Cir. 1995) ......................... 8 Statutes

In Illinois, "[i]t is well settled that an injured plaintiff may receive only one full compensation for his or her injuries." Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill.App.3d 813, 321 Ill.Dec. 284, 888 N.E.2d 1217, 1223 (2008) (citation omitted). In short, a plaintiff is not entitled to recover twice for the same injury. See Eberle v. Brenner, 153 Ill.App.3d 700, 106 Ill.Dec. 144, 505 N.E.2d 691, 693 (1987) ("An injured person is entitled to one full compensation for his injuries, and a double recovery for the same injury is against public policy."

Because there is not an indivisible injury, he argues neither collateral estoppel nor the single recovery rule apply. Plaintiff also argues that, even if certain of the injuries are identical, defendants have the burden of proving what portion of the jury award in the Keystone case is attributable to the claims for which they are liable. (Pl. Resp. at 29, citing Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill.App.3d 813, 321 Ill.Dec. 284, 888 N.E.2d 1217 (2008).) Plaintiff argues defendants cannot meet this burden because the Keystone jury “did not explain what injuries they were compensating Janusz for when they awarded him compensatory damages for the defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.”

The appellate court affirmed. 382 Ill. App. 3d. 813. We allowed defendant's petition for leave to appeal. 210 Ill. 2d R. 315.

We review a denial of JNOV de novo. Bruntjen v. Bethalto Pizza, LLC, 2014 IL App (5th) 120245, ¶ 32. JNOV should be granted only where all the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand." Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817 (2008). JNOV is not appropriate where reasonable minds might draw different inferences or conclusions from the facts.

already recovered by the plaintiff from other defendants, providing that those amounts derived from a single and indivisible injury to the plaintiff. Pasquale v. Speed Products Engineering, 166 Ill. 2d 337, 369 (1995); Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill. App. 3d 813, 820 (2008) aff'd, 237 Ill. 2d 100 (2010). The party seeking the setoff bears the burden of proving what portion of the prior judgment or settlement is attributable to the claim for which it has been found to be liable.

¶ 75 “A trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is subject to a de novo standard of review. [Citation.] A motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should only be granted in those limited cases where all of the evidence and the inferences there from, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, so overwhelmingly favor the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand.” Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill.App.3d 813, 817, 321 Ill.Dec. 284, 888 N.E.2d 1217 (2008). “In other words, a motion for judgment n.o.v. presents a question of law as to whether, when all of the evidence is considered, together with all reasonable inferences from it in its aspect most favorable to the plaintiffs, there is a total failure or lack of evidence to prove any necessary element of the [plaintiff's] case.

We review de novo a trial court's decision to deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Thornton v. Garcini, 382 Ill. App. 3d 813, 817 (2008), citing McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102, 132 (1999). The trial court may enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict only when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it so overwhelmingly favors the movant that a contrary verdict could not stand. Williams v. City of Chicago, 371 Ill. App. 3d 105, 106 (2007).