Those cases have held that such a deed is not void but voidable by the incompetent person or his heirs even as against a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of such incompetence. See, e.g., Sewell v. Anderson, 197 Ga. 623, 624 hn. 8, 30 S.E.2d 102 (1944); Thornton v. Carpenter, 222 Ga.App. 809, 813(2)(d), 476 S.E.2d 92 (1996). In the case of a conveyance of county-owed property that was not properly recorded in the minutes as required by OCGA § 36–9–2, the deed to the immediate grantee may be voidable in that the county or the immediate grantee may seek to invalidate the conveyance (compare West v. Fulton County, supra); but as to a subsequent bona fide purchaser without notice of the failure to comply with the statute, the deed is not void.

” (Punctuation omitted.) Thornton v. Carpenter, 222 Ga.App. 809, 812(2)(b), 476 S.E.2d 92 (1996). See also OCGA § 10–6–141 (explaining that financial power of attorney does not give away all powers and that principal may still choose to handle his own affairs).

Thus, this argument presents no basis for affirming the trial court's ruling. See Thornton v. Carpenter, 222 Ga. App. 809, 814(2)(d) ( 476 S.E.2d 92) (1996). Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the trial court erred in granting the executors' motion for summary judgment.

And we cannot agree with the trial court that Weatherby did not present sufficient evidence to raise questions of fact regarding whether Barsk requested, authorized, or accepted the services he alleges he performed, whether those services had any value to Barsk, or whether those services were performed in his individual capacity rather than as an agent of Greystone Electric or the Douglas County Development Authority. Weatherby's affidavit establishes all those facts. Barsk's reliance upon Thornton v. Carpenter, 222 Ga. App. 809 ( 476 S.E.2d 92) (1996) to support his assertion that his denial that Weatherby performed the services or that he authorized or accepted them was sufficient to pierce Weatherby's pleadings in this regard is misplaced.Thornton involved the simple denial of an agency relationship. It has long been established that the denial of an agency relationship, made by a purported party thereto, is a statement of fact sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment when it is uncontradicted. Id. at 812 (2) (a).

"A bare assertion of the existence of an agency relationship, when made by an outsider to the alleged relationship, is not a statement of fact, but merely an unsupported conclusion of law." Thornton v. Carpenter, 476 S.E.2d 92, 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (alteration omitted). Hosch focuses exclusively on Salinas's actions as they relate to this issue, so we will too.

S.B. alleged no facts to support a plausible inference that Clinica was an agent of Tenet. S.B. provided only conclusory allegations that Tenet "utilized Clinica as its agent," that "Clinica's owner and operators . . . acted as agents of the hospitals," and that Tenet gave "explicit instructions" to Clinica. See Thornton v. Carpenter, 476 S.E.2d 92, 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) ("[A] bare assertion of the existence of an agency relationship, when made by an outsider to the alleged relationship, is not a statement of fact, but merely an unsupported conclusion of law."). And S.B. failed to allege facts to support a plausible inference that "the statements or conduct of [Tenet] reasonably cause[d] [her] to believe that [Tenet] consent[ed] to have . . . act[s] done on [its] behalf by [Clinica]."

) However, a “bare assertion of the existence of an agency relationship, when made by an outsider to the alleged relationship, is not a statement of fact, but merely an unsupported conclusion of law.” Thornton v. Carpenter, 476 S.E.2d 92, 94 (Ga.Ct.App. 1996); see S.B. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 732 Fed.Appx. 721, 724 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming district court's grant of motion to dismiss where plaintiff “provided only conclusory allegations that Tenet ‘utilized Clinica as its agent,' [and] that ‘Clinica's owner and operators . . . acted as agents of the hospitals'”). Furthermore, although Plaintiff baldly claims that Total Quality and Hard to Stop “controlled the time, manner and method of the actions of Defendant Shingles at all relevant times

Simply calling someone an agent does not make it so. A "bare assertion of the existence of an agency relationship, when made by an outsider to the alleged relationship, is not a statement of fact, but merely an unsupported conclusion of law." Thornton v. Carpenter, 476 S.E.2d 92, 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (quoting Young v. John Deere Co., 471 S.E.2d 19, 21 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996)) (finding that the trial court did not err in concluding that no genuine fact dispute existed as to an agency relationship where the plaintiff presented no evidence of such a relationship). In S.B. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., for example, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant hospital, through an agent clinic, made misrepresentations to her. 732 F. App'x 721, 724 (11th Cir. 2018) (per curiam).