Opinion
A-12792
11-24-2021
JIM WAYNE THORNHILL, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Matthias R. Cicotte, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Clyde Ed Sniffen Jr., Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Trial Court No. 1KE-15-00255 CI Ketchikan, William B. Carey, Judge.
Michael L. Barber, Barber Legal Services, under contract with the Public Defender Agency, and Samantha Cherot, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Matthias R. Cicotte, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, and Clyde "Ed" Sniffen Jr., Acting Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
SUMMARY DISPOSITION
Jim Wayne Thornhill appeals from the superior court's denial of his application for post-conviction relief.
Thornhill was convicted in 2008 of one count of second-degree sexual abuse of a minor. He was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment with 6 years suspended (6 years to serve) and 9 years' probation.
AS 11.41.436(a)(3).
Thornhill was released on mandatory parole in 2011, with a condition to complete sex offender treatment. Thornhill's paroleconditions alsoprohibited him from having intentional contact with minors and viewing sexually explicit material.
The Alaska Board of Parole revoked Thornhill's parole in 2014. Thornhill was re-paroled several months later, and he reentered sex offender treatment in January 2015.
In May 2015, as part of his sex offender treatment program, Thornhill underwent a polygraph examination followed by an interview with his parole officer and therapist. During the interview, Thornhill disclosed that he had lied on the polygraph and that he had, in fact, had contact with minors. He was terminated from treatment the same day due to his noncompliant conduct during treatment and also due to his lack of progress in the program.
Thornhill's parole officer then filed a parole violation report, alleging that Thornhill violated parole by being discharged from sex offender treatment and also by having intentional contact with minors. Thornhill was taken into custody but was subsequently released pending his disposition hearing.
In October 2015, Thornhill was arrested for an additional parole violation when he was found in possession of sexually explicit material.
The parole board ultimately revoked Thornhill's parole and ordered Thornhill to serve the remainder of his sentence. The board did not find that Thornhill had violated his conditions for having intentional contact with minors. Instead, it based its decision on his discharge from sex offender treatment and on his possession of prohibited material.
Thornhill then filed an application for post-conviction relief, arguing that the May 2015 polygraph and interview violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and that the disclosures he made during the polygraph and interview accordingly should not have been considered by the board. Following an evidentiary hearing, the superior court denied Thornhill's application. The court found that Thornhill was not subject to an unconstitutional interrogation, and further, that there were independent grounds for the revocation - i.e., Thornhill's discharge from sex offender treatment and his possession of explicit materials. Thornhill now appeals this ruling.
Thornhill originally filed a writ of habeas corpus in the underlying criminal case, but the superior court converted his filing into an application for post-conviction relief.
We have reviewed the record, and the record supports the superior court's finding that the decision to discharge Thornhill from sex offender treatment was based on more than the disclosures he made following the May polygraph examination. Indeed, the record reflects that, in March 2015, Thornhill was put on probationary status in the sex offender treatment program due to "significant issues in the way that he had been engaging in treatment." The record also shows that Thornhill was reportedly making limited progress in the program at the time of his discharge. Thus, Thornhill's discharge from sex offender treatment was not based solely on the contested polygraph and interview.
More importantly, Thornhill does not challenge the board's finding that he violated a condition of his parole in October 2015 by possessing sexually explicit material. As the superior court correctly found, this violation constituted an entirely independent basis for Thornhill's parole to be revoked. We therefore agree with the court that Thornhill's parole was properly revoked for reasons unrelated to the contested polygraph examination and post-test interview, and we accordingly do not reach his constitutional claim on appeal.
We conclude that the superior court did not err in denying Thornhill's application for post-conviction relief.
The judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.