Opinion
00 C 1012
August 28, 2002
This is a case involving an allegedly defective motor home. On May 2, 2002, I issued an opinion granting defendants summary judgment with regard to a number of defects alleged.
The parties met before me on August 27, 2002, for a pre-trial conference during which plaintiff asked me to clarify my May 2 opinion. Specifically, plaintiff asks for the basis of my granting summary judgment on his implied warranty of merchantability and revocation claims.
However, my opinion was issued on May 2, 2002, and the first time that clarification of that opinion was discussed was almost four months later. Plaintiff requested clarification orally and off the record for the first time on August 27, 2002, during the pre-trial conference, approximately one week prior to the start of trial. Nevertheless, in an excess of caution, I have examined my ruling and the briefing on defendants' summary judgment motion.
Plaintiff raises valid points: that (1) implied warranty of merchantability under the Moss-Magnuson Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., is governed by Illinois Law, which was not addressed in my opinion; and (2) because some express warranty claims survived summary judgment, plaintiff could prevail on the implied warranty of merchantability and revocation claims.
After reviewing the briefing on defendants' summary judgment motion, it appears that defendants made a point-by-point analysis of each alleged defect in order to show that plaintiff could not show the presence of a manufacturing defect. However, this analysis only addresses plaintiff's claims against defendant Fleetwood for breach of express warranty, not against defendant Camp-Lands for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. While plaintiff criticizes defendants' approach in his response to defendants' summary judgment motion and lays out the applicable Illinois law with respect to the implied warranty claim, he does not present arguments necessary to show the existence of an issue of material fact with respect to the implied warranty claim. According to Illinois law, a product breaches an implied warranty of merchantability if it is "not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used." 810 ILCS 5/2-314(2)(c). To prove this breach, a plaintiff must show that the product was defective and that the defect(s) existed when the product left the defendant's control. Cosman v. Ford Motor Co., 285 Ill. App.3d 250, 255 (1996). To show a prima facie case that a product contained defects that were in existence when it left the manufacturer's control, a plaintiff must prove "that in the absence of abnormal use or reasonable secondary causes the product failed "to perform in the maimer reasonably to be expected in light of [its] nature and intended function.'" Tweedy v. Wright Ford Sales, Inc., 64 Ill.2d 570, 574 (1976). In his response to defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff did not argue that his use of the motor home was normal or that reasonable secondary causes did not exist. While I am willing to infer that it is plaintiffs contention that his use of the motor home was indisputably normal, defendants have argued both in their motion and reply that reasonable secondary causes do exist, and plaintiff has not provided any evidence that would show the absence of reasonable secondary causes other than the evidence of the alleged defects themselves. Had plaintiff requested a clarification of the May 2 opinion in a more timely manner, he might have been able to salvage his claim, but as it is, his request comes too late, and the argument is thus forfeited.
With respect to the revocation claim against defendant Camp-Lands, because 1 am affirming my granting of summary judgment for the implied warranty of merchantability claim, summary judgment for the revocation claim stands as well. However, because some of the express warranty claim against Fleetwood remains, I will vacate my opinion with respect to the revocation claim against Fleetwood only. Because the relief requested is equitable, it is an issue for this court, not a jury, and consequently, I am reserving this claim for the court in the event that plaintiff succeeds on his claim against Fleetwood.