Plaintiff also pointed to Illinois' recognition of the tort of interference with prospective economic advantage arising out of a business relationship. Thorne v. Elmore, 79 Ill. App.3d 333, 34 Ill. Dec. 846, 398 N.E.2d 837. Once again, the court required that there be some definite business expectancy. In Illinois, a plaintiff must have a, "reasonable expectancy of entering into a business relationship."

In evaluating the evidence, all reasonable inferences must be made in favor of the party opposing the motion for directed verdict. ( Thorne v. Elmore (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 333, 340, 398 N.E.2d 837, 844.) This same test is to be applied in reviewing the trial court's decision on a motion for a directed verdict.

• 3 Considering Wilmette's arguments as to count II against Starkman, we note initially that before a broker may recover a commission allegedly due him, he must prove that he has sold the property in question or procured a buyer ready, willing and able to purchase at the stipulated terms within the time of his authority ( Solomon v. Baron (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 255, 462 N.E.2d 756; O'Leary v. Crow (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 135, 376 N.E.2d 392). It is not enough that the broker was the first to bring the property to the attention of the ultimate purchaser; rather, it must be shown that the sale was the proximate result of his efforts. ( O'Leary v. Crow, 60 Ill. App.3d 135, 376 N.E.2d 392; Thorne v. Elmore (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 333, 398 N.E.2d 837.) Therefore, where there is an intervening instrumentality, such as new or independent negotiations, a broker will not be entitled to the commission merely because of his initial introduction of the ultimate purchaser to the property.

REG's Rights Under the Agreement Under Illinois law (cf. Thorne v. Elmore, 79 Ill.App.3d 333, 340-41, 34 Ill.Dec. 846, 853, 398 N.E.2d 837, 844 (1st Dist. 1979)) REG would be entitled to a commission from defendants: 1. if REG had an exclusive agency agreement with them and the property was sold while the Agreement was in effect; or

According to Garrett and Lauren W., Enichen's advice cannot be squared with the fact that "[t]he normal practice in real estate transactions is for the seller to pay the broker's commission." See Thorne v. Elmore, 79 Ill. App. 3d 333, 342 (1979). Garrett and Lauren W., however, cite no authority in support of their claim that Enichen's advice was required to be supported by authority.

• 4, 5 The denial of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict made pursuant to section 2-1202 of the Civil Practice Law (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1202) will be reversed when the evidence, viewed in its aspect most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on the evidence could ever stand. ( Runimas v. Howe (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 357; Thorne v. Elmore (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 333.) With the jury's exoneration of the named individual employees, the record is devoid of evidence of any conduct of the corporation itself or of any other employees not named as defendants which could sustain plaintiff's claims against K mart. Consequently, it may be said no contrary verdict for the plaintiff could ever stand.

• 1 Illinois recognizes actions for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage provided a plaintiff can establish (1) his reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship; (2) defendant's knowledge of his expectancy; (3) defendant's intentional interference which prevents his expectancy from ripening into a valid business relationship; and (4) damages to plaintiff as a result of such interference. ( Heying v. Simonaitis (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 157, 466 N.E.2d 1137; Tom Olesker's Exciting World of Fashion, Inc. v. Dun Bradstreet, Inc. (1973), 16 Ill. App.3d 709, 306 N.E.2d 549; Crinkley v. Dow Jones Co. (1978), 67 Ill. App.3d 869, 385 N.E.2d 714; Thorne v. Elmore (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 333, 398 N.E.2d 837.) Addressing defendant's contentions as to these elements, we commence with plaintiff's proof as to his reasonable expectancy of entering into a valid business relationship. Defendant initially argues that the trial court erred in refusing to enter a judgment notwithstanding the verdict because no "valid" business relationship could exist as a matter of law since any hoped-for contract with General Motors would have been unenforceable on grounds of plaintiff's fraudulent concealment in his application.

• 1-4 Upon review, a motion for a directed verdict should be affirmed if all of the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict could ever stand. ( Thorne v. Elmore (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 333, 398 N.E.2d 837.) The traditional elements of a negligence action which a plaintiff must establish are a duty to exercise care, a breach of that duty, proximate cause, and damages. ( McMillen v. Carlinville Area Hospital (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 732, 450 N.E.2d 5.) Under typical circumstances, a violation of a traffic law constitutes prima facie evidence of negligence. ( Mayfield v. City of Springfield (1982), 103 Ill. App.3d 1114, 432 N.E.2d 617.) A driver must yield the right-of-way to a police vehicle which is properly making use of an audible or visual signal.

• 8 We conclude that there was insufficient evidence adduced at trial to establish that defendant Cook extended plaintiff's finger while plaintiff's wrist was extended in violation of the applicable standard of care. Under the standard announced in Pedrick, where, as here, no contrary verdict based on the evidence could ever stand, defendants are entitled to a verdict in their favor. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of De Kalb County and enter judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of defendants. Hajeck v. Wyrick (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 210, 463 N.E.2d 1348; Lesperance v. Wolff (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 136, 398 N.E.2d 360; Thorne v. Elmore (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 333, 398 N.E.2d 837. Reversed.

The issue therefore has not been waived, as it was adequately raised in the post-trial motion and ruled upon by the trial court. See Thorne v. Elmore (1979), 79 Ill. App.3d 333, 339; see also Patur v. Aetna Life Casualty (1980), 90 Ill. App.3d 464, 466 (noting that a rationale for the waiver rule is that the trial court should be given the initial opportunity to appraise alleged errors and to determine whether a new trial is warranted). • 7 We find no merit in plaintiff's contention, however.