Thompson v. U.S. Dept., Housing Urban Dev.

Full title: CARMEN THOMPSON, et al., v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN…

Court: United States District Court, D. Maryland

Date published: Nov 21, 2002

CIVIL ACTION NO. MGJ-95-309 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2002)

Opinion

CIVIL ACTION NO. MGJ-95-309

November 21, 2002

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

PAUL W. GRIMM, United States Magistrate Judge.

Pending and ripe for decision is the Plaintiffs' motion for an interim award of attorney's fees, which the Federal Defendants¹ and Local Defendants² oppose. Judge Garbis referred this dispute to me for a report and recommendation (Paper No. 242), and it has been fully briefed. (Papers No. 217, 226, 227, 238, 255, 256 and 268).

1 The Federal Defendants are the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") and the Secretary of HUD.

2 The Local Defendants are the Housing Authority for Baltimore City ("HABC"), the Executive Director of HABC, and the Mayor and City Council of the City of Baltimore.

Plaintiffs seek an interim award of attorney's fees, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, with respect to four phases of the case: (1) the issuance of the partial consent decree (the "PCD Phase"); (2) the enforcement of that decree (the "PCD Enf. Phase"); (3) the successful appeal Plaintiffs prosecuted concerning the Local Defendants' efforts to modify the decree, as it pertained to the Hollander Ridge/Cherry Hill public housing facilities (the "HR/CH Phase"); and (4) the attorney's fees sought in connection with this fee petition (the "FP Phase"). Plaintiffs seek fees for the work done by the ACLU attorneys who initially brought this suit, as well as the Washington D.C. law firm of Jenner and Block ("JB"), which entered its appearance after suit was filed and assisted in the PCD, PCD Enf. and FP phases of this litigation.

Plaintiffs originally sought $1,118,483.00 in attorney's fees for the ACLU, based on the 1995 version of the attorney's fee guidelines adopted by this Court at Appendix B of the Local Rules. Plaintiffs subsequently amended this request to adjust it upwards when the July 2001 amendments to Appendix B took effect. Relying on these most recent guidelines, Plaintiffs seek $1,233,305.00 in fees. (Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum (hereinafter "Pls.' Reply"), Paper No. 238 at 19-20). Plaintiffs also seek $41,952.01 with respect to expenses incurred by the ACLU in litigating this case.³

3 In addition to recovering attorney's fees, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 allows recovery for expenses associated with the litigation. See, e.g., Daly v. Hill, 790 F.2d 1071, 1084 (4th Cir. 1986) ("The great weight of authority in this circuit and others clearly establishes that a prevailing plaintiff is entitled to compensation for reasonable litigation expenses under § 1988."). These types of expenses may include "secretarial costs, copying, telephone costs and necessary travel." Trimper v. City of Norfolk, 58 F.3d 68, 75 (4th Cir. 1995).

With respect to JB's fees, Plaintiffs originally sought $525,901.25, calculating these fees based on the 2000 Laffey rates that have been adopted for litigation such as this in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.⁴ Plaintiffs subsequently also sought an upwards adjustment for JB based on the 2001 Laffey rates that became effective on June 1, 2001. As for JB's expenses, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement in the amount of $61,632.64.⁵

4 "The Laffey Matrix was established, and is updated, by the Department of Justice, to reflect the prevailing market rate for attorneys by years of practice pursuant to Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), overruled in part on other grounds by Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Hodel, 857 F.2d 1516 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc)." Oil Chemical Atomic Workers Intern. Union AFL-CIO v. U.S. Dept. of Energy, 141 F. Supp.2d 1, 9 n. 13 (D.D.C. 2001).

5 The Defendants attack as excessive the expenses incurred by Plaintiffs' counsel. The Court's review of these expenses and the amounts sought is found at Appendices 4 and 5 attached hereto.

Additionally, Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for attorney's fees and expenses pertaining to the filing of this petition by the law firm of Brown, Goldstein Levy ("BGL") in the amount of $55,436.25, which reflects initial fees and expenses in the amount of $38,737.50 for preparation of the fee petition memorandum and Plaintiffs' reply and $16,698.75 representing subsequent fees and expenses pertaining to the petition from April 3, 2001, to June 21, 2001.⁶

6 The Defendants do not dispute the ability of the Plaintiffs to recover reasonable fees associated with the filing and defending of this fee petition. The Court's analysis of the fees sought by BGL and the amount allowed is found at Appendix 3 attached hereto.

The parties have indicated that they do not wish to have a hearing on this motion. Therefore, having considered the filings and the argument of counsel, I recommend that Judge Garbis partially grant and partially deny Plaintiffs' motion. For the reasons explained below, I also recommend that the following attorney's fees and expenses to be paid to the Plaintiffs:

Atty's Fees Atty's Fees Atty Fees Expenses to Expenses Total to ALCU to JB Expenses to ALCU to JB BGL _______________________________________________________________________________________________ Local $705,738.05 $293.299.46 $29,510.71 $21,809.10 $35,135.39 $1,085,492.60 Defs. Fed. $274,612.95 $85,991.82 $22,456.93 $16,944.88 $11,098.67 $411,105.25 Defs. _______________________________________________________________________________________________________ Grand total: $1,496,597.85.

BACKGROUND

The background of this case relevant to this motion is succinctly set forth in pages one through five of Judge Garbis' Memorandum and Order disposing of the Federal Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, which is incorporated herein. (Paper No. 279). It is sufficient to state that the following claims filed by the Plaintiffs against the Federal Defendants still are viable: Count I (5th Amendment claim and 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim), Count III (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 claim, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d), and Count VI (Administrative Procedure Act claim, 5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.).⁷

Judge Garbis' ruling regarding the Federal Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings significantly impacts the outcome of this motion. The Federal Defendants argued that, for the reasons stated in their motion for judgment on the pleadings, this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' § 1982 and Title VI claims. Thus, Defendants argued that Plaintiffs could not seek to recover attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 but instead had to rely on the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), as the statutory basis for the recovery of any attorney's fees. (Federal Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Petition, Paper No. 227 at 7-12) (hereinafter "Fed. Defs.' Resp.")). Judge Garbis rejected the Federal Defendants' subject matter jurisdiction challenge. (August 30, 2001, Memorandum and Order, Paper No. 279 at 8-22). Accordingly, because 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) states relevantly

[i]n any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections . . . 1982, . . . title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs. . . . (emphasis added)

the Plaintiffs, if qualified, are entitled to attorney's fees pursuant to market rates, which are presumptively reasonable, rather than the EAJA's significantly lower statutory rates. And, of equal importance because the EAJA is not applicable, the Federal Defendants may not avoid the payment of attorney's fees by demonstrating that their defense of this action was "substantially justified," as that phrase is defined under the EAJA.⁸ See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Clay Printing Co., 13 F.3d 813, 815 (4th Cir. 1994) (award of attorney's fees to party which prevails in litigation against the United States is mandatory unless the government can demonstrate that its position was "substantially justified," which means justified to degree that could satisfy a reasonable person or having a reasonable basis both in law and in fact); Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he government has the burden of proving that its litigation position was substantially justified."); Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 735 F.2d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that EAJA section prohibiting award of attorney's fees if government's position was substantially justified not applicable because of 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which allows a fee to be awarded against the federal government if plaintiff prevails on civil rights claim).

8 Indeed, the Federal Defendants concede that "section 1988 authorizes a court, in its sound discretion, to award fees to prevailing parties in actions to enforce certain specific statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1982 . . . and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq. . . ." (Fed. Defs.' Resp. at 7).

In addition to the remaining unresolved claims against the Federal Defendants, the following claims are pending against the Local Defendants: Count I (violations of the 5th, 13th, 14th amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1982, and 1983); Count II (violation of the Fair Housing Act, Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq.); Count III (violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; Count IV (violation of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437p); and Count V (violations of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5304(b)(2)).

DISCUSSION A. Prevailing party.

The first step in resolving this motion is to determine whether the Plaintiffs are "prevailing parties" for purposes of § 1988. This occurs if they obtained actual relief on the merits of their claim that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the Defendants' behavior in a manner that produces a direct benefit to the Plaintiffs. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1992). The Supreme Court repeatedly has stated that a consent decree is one example of the type of relief that satisfies the prevailing party test. See, e.g., Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. WVA Dep't of Health and Human Resources, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 1840 (2001); Farrar, 506 U.S. at 111; Texas State Teachers Ass'n. v. Garland Independent School Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93 (1989); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129-130 (1980).⁹

9 As explained in Buckhannon, 121 S.Ct. at 1840, a consent decree, although not always including a defendant's admission of liability, satisfies the prevailing party test because it is a court-ordered "chang[e] [in] the legal relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant." quoting Texas State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 792-93(1989).

The prevailing party test, as articulated by the Supreme Court and applied to consent decrees, has been adopted in this Circuit. See, e.g., Brinn v. Tidewater Transp. District Comm'n, 242 F.3d 227, 234 (4th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Lawrimore, 121 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1997); Statewide Reapportionment Advisory Committee v. Beasley, 99 F.3d 134, 136 (4th Cir. 1996) (The determinative factor to be a prevailing party is the existence of a material alteration of the legal relationships between the parties, such as manifested by an enforceable judgment, consent decree or settlement); S-1 and S-2 v. State Bd. Of Ed. Of N.C., 21 F.3d 49, 51 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (relief on the merits need not be in the form of a judgment but also may include comparable relief through a consent decree).

The Federal Defendants, to their credit, do not argue that the Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties as to them, at least with respect to the PCD phase. The Local Defendants, however, devote the majority of their opposition to arguing that the Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties. (Local Defendants' Opposition, Paper No. 226 at 8-19 (hereinafter, "Local Defs.' Opp."); Local Defendants' Sur-reply, Paper No. 256 at 1-6 (hereinafter, "Local Defs.' Sur-reply")). Local Defendants' arguments, however, are unpersuasive and without merit.

As for the PCD phase, even the most cursory reading of the partial consent decree (Paper No. 55) demonstrates that it fits squarely into the definition of the type of material alteration of the rights between the parties contemplated by the Supreme Court in its definition of a prevailing party. The decree identifies specific duties that the Local Defendants were obligated to fulfill,¹⁰ all of which were enforceable to the benefit of the Plaintiffs. The Local Defendants argue that these obligations do not amount to the type of relief needed to make the Plaintiffs prevailing parties for purposes of the PCD phase because the Local Defendants already planned to do them before the suit was filed. As such, the Local Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs succeeded in obtaining only a promise to do that which the Local Defendants already were going to do. (Local Defs.' Opp. at 10-11). This argument, supported by after-the-fact, self-serving affidavits of former officials of HABC is, even if taken at face value, irrelevant. Although the partial consent decree may have included actions that the HABC already planned to take, the decree made them legally enforceable and gave the Plaintiffs the right to enforce them in the event that, as occurred with respect to the Hollander Ridge and Cherry Hill Developments, the Local Defendants subsequently took actions contrary to what was agreed to in the consent decree. In short, the Plaintiffs clearly are prevailing parties against the Local Defendants with respect to the PCD phase of the litigation.

10 For example, § 3.1 et seq. sets forth specific duties of the Local Defendants with respect to Section 8 housing vouchers; § 4.1 et seq. identifies the Local Defendants' obligations regarding the Fairfield Homes Replacement Housing Plan; § 5.1 et seq. requires the Local Defendants to prepare a redevelopment plan for Lafayette Courts in a specific manner that includes development of home ownership units; § 6.1 et seq. identifies duties imposed on the Local Defendants regarding redevelopment plans for the Lexington Terrace, Flag House Courts and Murphy Homes developments that would include allowing residents to participate in the plan development; § 8.2.3 obligates the Local Defendants to attempt to obtain additional funding if needed for mobility counselors to assist the residents of the housing programs in relocating. Moreover, the affidavit of Barbara Samuels, one of Plaintiffs' counsel, details the many ways in which the partial consent decree imposes significant, legally enforceable obligations on the Local Defendants to the benefit of the Plaintiffs. (Pls.' Reply, Exh. 19, Decl. of Barbara Samuels at ¶¶ 3-8, 10-17). Thus, there can no serious argument that the partial consent decree did not impose legal burdens on the Local Defendants — with concomitant benefits to the Plaintiffs — sufficient to meet the definition of the type of relief required to support a finding that the Plaintiffs were prevailing parties against the Local Defendants with respect to the PCD phase of the litigation.

Similarly, the Local Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties with respect to the PCD Enf. Phase of the case is without merit. Other courts, including the Supreme Court, have held that a prevailing party in a discrimination case can obtain attorney's fees for appropriate time¹¹ spent in monitoring and enforcing a consent decree. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council, 478 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1986) (recognizing that, in the context of § 1988 post-judgment monitoring of a consent decree, such monitoring is a compensable activity for which a prevailing party may recover a reasonable attorney's fee); Walker v. HUD, 99 F.3d 761, 767 (5th Cir. 1996) (plaintiffs were entitled to seek recovery of attorney's fees associated with post-consent decree monitoring and enforcement); Gates v. Rowland, 39 F.3d 1439, 1449-51 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming award of attorney's fees pursuant to § 1988 for monitoring of a consent decree); Eirhart v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 996 F.2d 846, 850 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that district court had discretion to award attorney's fees for successful efforts and to implement consent decree); Duran v. Carruthers, 885 F.2d 1492, 1495 (10th Cir. 1989) (the "consent decree [is] only the beginning, and counsel for the plaintiffs have a continuing duty and responsibility to make sure that defendants comply, and continue to comply, with the decree"); Northcross v. Bd. Of Education of the Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624, 637 (6th Cir. 1979) (holding that monitoring consent decree was compensable under § 1988 because these services were "essential to the long-term success of the plaintiff's suit").

11 The Local Defendants also criticize the amount of the fees sought by the Plaintiffs in connection with the PCD Enf. Phase of the litigation. These arguments are addressed in the Court's analysis of the fees claimed with respect to this Phase. See Appendices 1 and 2 to this memorandum.

This result not only is sound legally, but it is fundamentally logical as well. Discrimination on the basis of race in public housing has been illegal for many years. Yet, despite the existence of long-standing constitutional, statutory and judicial pronouncements of this legal fact, discrimination-free housing placement for the residents of public housing is nothing more than a dream without the aid of enforcement lawsuits to identify and redress illegal behavior. It follows that when, as here, a housing discrimination lawsuit results in a consent decree requiring specific remedial action, the promises contained in the decree also amount to nothing more than a dream for the residents of the affected communities if there is not effective monitoring and enforcement of the agreement to insure compliance. The monitoring and enforcement activities become the very sine qua non of the obligations to remedy past discriminatory activity, without which the residents may come to view the decree as just one more unfulfilled dream, or worse.¹² Moreover, there can be little doubt of the legitimate need for Plaintiffs to monitor the Local Defendants' compliance with the consent decree, given the record of their sluggish performance.¹³ To be sure, the amount of attorney's fees recoverable must be reasonable, measured against the standards identified in a legion of cases resolving contested fee petitions, but the bedrock fact is that the Plaintiffs clearly are entitled to recover for appropriate monitoring and enforcement activities.¹⁴

12

These memories come back to haunt me, haunt me like a curse. Is a dream a lie if it don't come true, or is it something worse?

Lyrics from Bruce Springsteen's song The River, http://www.xs4all.n1/-maroen/engels/lyrics/theriver.htm.
This point is all the more compelling when one reads the statements in the affidavits of former residents of public housing developments, who describe the hope of the public housing residents of Baltimore for a new life under the changes obtained by the partial consent decree. (Pls.' Reply, Exh. 6, Decl. of Issac Neal, named plaintiff and former resident of Lafayette Courts; Exh. 11, Decl. of Harry Karas, a former resident of Broadway Homes at ¶¶ 4-5).
In addition, the Baltimore Sun recently quoted Lawrence Campbell, a former tenant at Lexington Terrace, one of the housing developments covered by the partial consent decree. Mr. Campbell stated that Julius Henson, the former Baltimore Housing Commissioner, "told us to dream, dream about what this neighborhood could be [but] he didn't tell us . . . that the dream meant we wouldn't be included." Walter F. Roche, Jr., Housing Reform's Victims, Balt. Sun, September 24, 2001, at A1, A4.

13 Defendants' slow progress in complying with the Consent Decree has been documented. For example, in a report to the Court from Special Master Perkins, dated November 20, 2000, Master Perkins states:

[A]lthough there has been notable progress with the redevelopment of the Lexington and Lafayette sites, progress on the desegregative elements of the Decree has been extremely slow.

(Pls.' Reply, Exh. 19K at 3; see also Pls.' Reply, Exh. J, October 8, 1997, report from Special Master Gilchrist stating that "little progress has occurred"). In addition, Federal Defendant HUD recognized the Defendants' inability to move expeditiously as recently as January 2001 when it

acknowledge[d][that] the HABC has a daunting task in relocating and placing families in non-impacted census tracts. It does not appear, however, that the HABC has placed any urgency or dedicated appropriate management resources to accomplish this task . . . In summary, the HABC has not adequately administered or provided sufficient oversight to ensure the Special Section 8 Voucher component of the Thompson consent decree is successfully implemented. Consequently, public housing residents continue to be racially and economically segregated within defined areas of the City of Baltimore.

(Pls.' Reply, Exh. 19N at 8; see also Pls.'Reply, Exh. 19, Decl. of Barbara Samuels at ¶¶ 33-46).

14 Local Defendants particularly object to the activities of Plaintiffs' counsel in connection with the negotiations and motions practice that took place during the PCD Enf. Phase as a result of the efforts of the Local Defendants to modify the partial consent decree with respect to the Lexington Terrace residences. Plaintiffs opposed this, but the Court ultimately ruled that the modification proposed by the Local Defendants would be allowed. In doing so the Court noted the Plaintiffs objections but allowed the modification because, "as a practical matter, on this occasion, the matter is a fait accompli." (March 20, 1998, Order, Paper No. 101). The Court's reluctant ruling hardly was a ringing endorsement of the merits of the Local Defendants' position or the methods employed by them to achieve the modification of the decree.
The Local Defendants' objection to this portion of the PCD Enf. fees is unpersuasive. First, as they concede, the Plaintiffs have not sought reimbursement for the work done on their opposition to the Local Defendants' motion to modify the decree because that opposition was unsuccessful. (Local Defs.' Opp. at 20 n. 13). Second, the time spent by Plaintiffs' counsel negotiating with the Local Defendants in an effort to dissuade them from their proposed modification rationally was connected with their efforts to preserve an obligation of the Local Defendants imposed by the consent decree. More importantly, as the Plaintiffs point out, their negotiations did produce benefits for the Plaintiffs. (Pls. Reply, Exh. 19, Decl. of Barbara Samuels at ¶¶ Accordingly, the fees sought by the Plaintiffs for their activities unrelated to the unsuccessful opposition to the Local Defendants' motion to modify reasonably are recoverable.

Further, the Local Defendants' argument that the Plaintiffs are not prevailing parties with respect to the Hollander Ridge/Cherry Hill appeal also is meritless. The Fourth Circuit's opinion, Thompson v. U.S. Dept. of Housing Urban Develop., 220 F.3d 241 (4th Cir. 2000), that reversed this Court's Order modifying the partial consent decree at the Local Defendants' request, amply demonstrates that the victory achieved by the Plaintiffs was more than symbolic and clearly sufficient to entitle them to prevailing party status and the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees.

Finally, neither the Federal nor Local Defendants contest the Plaintiffs' assertion that they are entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees incurred in connection with prosecuting this fee petition motion, as this is a well-established principle in this circuit. See, e.g., Ganey v. Garrison, 813 F.2d 650, 652 (4th Cir. 1987); Daly, 790 F.2d at 1080; Stacy v. Stroud, 845 F. Supp. 1135, 1145 (S.D.W. Va. 1993).

In sum, Plaintiffs clearly have established their status as prevailing parties, for purposes of § 1988, with respect to each of the four areas of this fee petition.¹⁵

15 Plaintiffs do not assert that they are prevailing parties with respect to the Federal Defendants regarding the HR/CH Phase of the litigation, and only claim prevailing party status as to the Federal Defendants with respect to a small portion of the PCD Enf. Phase. The Federal Defendants contest this allocation, and the resolution of this dispute is contained within the Court's chart analyzing the detailed time submissions. See Appendices 1 and 2 to this Memorandum.

B. Timeliness of the pending motion.

Local Defendants contend that the Plaintiffs' motion for fees is premature; Federal Defendants argue that it is too late. Both are wrong. Plaintiffs are not required to wait until this case is concluded before seeking a partial payment of attorney's fees, as interim fee awards are authorized. See, e.g., Buckhannon, 121 S.Ct. at 1841-42 (the legislative history of § 1988 evidences congressional intent to permit the interim award of counsel fees when a party has prevailed on the merits on at least some of its claims) (quoting Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 758 (1980) (per curiam)); Texas State Teacher's Assn, 489 U.S. at 791 (plaintiffs may seek fees either pendente lite or at the end of the litigation); Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 284 (1989) ("We note also that we have recognized the availability of interim fee awards under § 1988 when a litigant becomes a prevailing party on one issue in the course of the litigation."); Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 723 (1974) ("To delay a fee award until the entire litigation is concluded would work substantial hardship on plaintiffs and their counsel, and discourage the institution of actions despite the clear congressional intent to the contrary. . . . A district court must have discretion to award fees and costs incident to the final disposition of interim matters."). Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' fee petition is not premature with respect to the four litigation phases covered by their motion. Similarly, the Federal Defendants' reliance on Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d)(2)(B) to support their argument that the fee petition is too late is misplaced. Rule 54(d)(2)(B) requires claims for attorney's fees to be made by motion within fourteen days after the entry of the "judgment." The Federal Defendants contend that the "partial consent decree" constituted a judgment, and the Plaintiffs missed the fourteen day deadline after its entry. (Fed. Defs.' Resp. at 13-14). This analysis is without merit.

Rule 54(a) defines "judgment" as decisions that are appealable. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(a)("`Judgment' as used in these rules includes a decree and any order from which an appeal lies."); 10 C. Wright, A. Miller, M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2651 (2d ed. 1983) ("judgment" means only final judgments and appealable interlocutory orders). The partial consent decree, aptly titled because it is not a final resolution of all Plaintiff's claims, is not a judgment that is appealable. There having been no judgment within the meaning of Rule 54, Rule 54(d)(2)(B) simply does not apply. Thus, the motion for attorney's fees was timely filed.

C. The Lodestar Calculation.

Section 1988 grants this Court discretion to award a prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee. This is done by determining the lodestar amount, which is the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation multiplied by an hourly rate that also is reasonable.¹⁶ Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546, 565 (1986) (The lodestar amount is "the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate."); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983); EEOC v. Service News Co., 898 F.2d 958, 965 (4th Cir. 1990); Sutton v. Smith, 2001 WL 743201 *1 (D.Md. June 26, 2001) ("A court's award of reasonable attorney's fees is the product of the reasonable hours expended multiplied by a reasonably hourly rate."). Once determined, this figure will represent a reasonable fee for purposes of § 1988, except perhaps in cases of exceptional success.¹⁷ Buffington v. Baltimore County, Md., 913 F.2d 113, 127 n. 11 (4th Cir. 1990); Costar Group, Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 106 F. Supp.2d 780, 787 (D.Md. 2000). In determining the lodestar amount, the trial court is aided in exercising its discretion¹⁸ by evaluating the twelve well-known factors articulated in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974) and adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Barber v. Kimbrell's, Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 (4th Cir. 1978).¹⁹

16 In determining an hourly rate that is reasonable, a court considers whether "the requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience, and reputation." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 890 n. 11 (1984).

17 The Plaintiffs do not seek an enhancement of their attorney's fees on the basis of having achieved an exceptional result.

18 The Fourth Circuit has recognized that the trial court is in the best position to determine a reasonable fee through the exercise of its discretion because of this court's "superior understanding of the litigation and the desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters." Daly, 790 F.2d at 1078-79. Accordingly, because of the unique vantage point of the trial court to evaluate and resolve the inherently factual issues raised in fee petitions, appellate courts are reluctant to second guess that resolution, even if they would have exercised their discretion differently, unless there is an abuse of proper discretion. Id. at 1079. See also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437 (1983) (district courts have discretion when awarding fees and expenses); Dotson v. Chester, 937 F.2d 920, 933 (4th Cir. 1991) ("Fee awards under § 1988 may not be disturbed unless the district court abused its discretion."); Buffington, 913 F.2d at 130; Ganey, 813 F.2d at 652.

19 The twelve factors are:

(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to properly perform the legal service; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.

Johnson, 488 F.2d at 717-19.

In addition, it is the trial court's duty to determine in the first instance which of the Johnson factors are relevant to the determination of a reasonable fee in a particular case. Daly, 790 F.2d at 1075-76. In making this determination, I conclude that the most relevant Johnson factors are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the case; (3) the skill needed properly to perform the legal services required by the case; (5) the customary fee; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the undesirability of the case; and (12) awards in

1. Time and Labor Required, Novelty and Difficulty of the Issues, and Skill Needed.

Plaintiffs' complaint was ambitious in scope. It alleged intentional race discrimination by the Local and Federal Defendants spanning approximately seventy-five years. It is fifty-six pages long, the majority of which consists of detailed factual averments supporting the Plaintiffs' allegations. Obviously, substantial and challenging legal and factual research preceded the filing of this case.

The docket sheet reflects that the path of this case has been anything but simple. It is thirty-seven pages long, at present, and consists of 280 filings. Even a casual look through the docket reflects the complexity of this litigation. No fewer than two requests for preliminary injunctions have been litigated. Class certification has been sought and challenged. Third parties have sought to intervene, and this has been challenged. A complex partial consent decree has been negotiated, subjected to a public fairness hearing, and approved by the court. A special master was appointed, following expensive submissions from the parties regarding the appropriateness of doing so, and the functions of the special master if appointed. Motions in limine and discovery motions have been filed, briefed and resolved. Motions to find the Local Defendants in noncompliance with the partial consent decree have been filed and opposed, as have motions to modify the decree, which, in one instance, resulted in an interlocutory appeal to the Fourth Circuit. The Local Defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment, which was opposed, as was the Federal Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings. Finally, this fee petition has been filed and aggressively litigated.

The partial consent decree is seventy-five pages long, exclusive of exhibits, and took more than a year to negotiate, finalize and approve. Thereafter, when surrounding jurisdictions raised objections to the effect that the decree could have on them, further negotiations were required to keep it from being challenged. The terms of the partial consent decree are tailored to address issues unique to the Baltimore public housing conditions and are anything but boilerplate.

Against this backdrop, the Defendants' arguments that this litigation is simple and could have been launched from a "canned" complaint borrowed from public housing litigation in other states are unworthy of serious consideration. Defendants' arguments were rebutted convincingly by the exhibits attached to the Plaintiffs' reply memorandum, which detailed the complexity of this case, as well as the time and skill needed to prosecute it with the success that the Plaintiffs have achieved to date. (Pls. Reply, Exh. 12, Decl. of Florence Wagman Roisman at ¶¶ 7-27; Exh. 17, Decl. of Michael M. Daniel at ¶¶ 1-14).²⁰ Indeed, a February 21, 1995, memorandum from the City Solicitor of Baltimore to the Baltimore Board of Estimates requesting more than $400,000 in funding to hire outside counsel to defend against this lawsuit described the litigation this way:

20 Contrary to the arguments of the Federal Defendants that the Roisman and Daniel Declarations merit little weight (Fed. Defs.' Sur-Rebuttal, Paper No. 255, at 4-5 and n. 2), the Court finds that they are entitled to great weight. Professor Roisman has extensive knowledge about public housing discrimination cases filed in this country and has herself handled such cases. (Pls.' Reply, Exh. 12, Decl. of Florence Wagman Roisman at ¶¶ 2-5). Similarly, Mr. Daniel is an experienced lawyer practicing poverty law and has extensive experience litigating public housing discrimination cases. (Pls.' Reply, Exh. 17, Decl. of Michael M. Daniel at ¶¶ 1-6). Perhaps most telling is the fact that the Federal Defendants offer no affidavits from more experienced or credible practitioners in rebuttal. Instead, they simply attempt, without success, to undermine the credibility of Plaintiffs' declarants.

[t]his is very sophisticated, complex federal litigation for which the Law Department has no expertise or capacity to defend. Accordingly, the Solicitor proposed to retain its present outside counsel, described as "one of the largest and most prestigious litigation firms in Maryland . . ."

(Pls.' Reply, Exh. 26 (Memo dated February 21, 1995)). Such an admission makes the Local Defendants' present characterization of the case difficult to accept as having been made with the candor that the Court is entitled to expect. (See e.g., Local Defs.' Opp. at 30 ("This case does not contain novel issues.")).

Accordingly, the first, second and third Johnson factors clearly support the award of interim attorney's fees.

2. Experience, Reputation and Ability of the Attorneys, and the Undesirability of the Case.

Neither the Local nor Federal Defendants attack the experience, reputation or ability of the Plaintiffs' counsel, which are, simply put, first rate.²¹ (See Pls. Reply, Exh. 12, Decl. of Florence Wagman Roisman at ¶¶ 20-22 (describing attorneys' qualifications); Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Petition for Attorney's Fees (hereinafter "Pls.' Memo."), Paper No. 217, Ex. 3A, Resumes of JB attorneys).

21 Indeed, when lawyers of this caliber are opposed by those of equal quality and experience, such as the attorneys representing the Local and Federal Defendants, in a complex and contentious case, it is not difficult to anticipate that the case will be long and hard fought, as this one has been, which unavoidably impacts the hours spent by both sides on the litigation and the attorney's fees that may be recovered by the prevailing party as a consequence.

The Local Defendants' conclusory argument that litigation such as this is "very desirable" (Local Defs.' Opp. at 34), has no foundation in reality and is rebutted by Ms. Roisman's declaration, as well as by common sense. (Pls.' Reply, Exh. 12, Decl. of Florence Wagman Roisman at ¶¶ 18-19). Undertaking a case of this magnitude on behalf of the least privileged and influential of Plaintiffs, whose financial resources are nonexistent, with the knowledge that the Defendants will be government entities with far greater resources and represented by competent and zealous counsel, and that the case will be prolonged, and the outcome by no means certain, virtually precludes representation by attorneys other than public interest organizations such as the ACLU, or large law firms such as JB, with the resources and sense of professional duty to embark on such a daunting commitment. Thus, the ninth and tenth Johnson factors also strongly support the award.

3. The Customary Fee and Awards in Similar Cases.

With respect to the ACLU, the Plaintiffs seek compensation based on the presumptively reasonable attorney's fees Guidelines adopted by this Court at Appendix B of the Local Rules. With respect to the fees sought for JB, they seek compensation based on the Laffey rates, approved by for use in civil rights cases by the federal courts in the District of Columbia.²² While there are issues that must be resolved about whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to current guidelines/Laffey rates, as opposed to historical ones, and whether Plaintiffs may even seek Laffey rates on behalf of JB, discussed infra, there can be no doubt that the rates they seek are "customary," in the sense that they have been approved by both this District and the District of the District of Columbia.²³ Similarly, the few reported appellate decisions involving comparable cases, Young v. Pierce, 822 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1987) (authorizing more than 2,500 hours at the then market rate of $150 per hour) and Walker, 99 F.3d at 761 (authorizing substantial attorney's fee award at hourly rates including $275 an hour for a more experienced attorney and $175 an hour for a lesser experienced one), support fees in the range requested by the Plaintiffs, provided the hours sought pass this Court's review for reasonableness. Accordingly, the fifth and twelfth Johnson factors support the recommended fee award.

22 Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 746 F.2d 4, 11-13 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

23 In addition to being court-approved rates that the Plaintiffs seek for the work done by the ACLU — under the guidelines of this court — the fees also are below "market" rates charged by Baltimore lawyers of comparable skill, experience and reputation for their paying clients. (Pls.' Reply, Exhs. 14 and 15, Decls. of Rick Reid and Ralph S. Tyler.).

4. Principles Governing the Calculation of Reasonable Attorney's Fees. a. Specificity Required.

The prevailing party bears the burden of providing this Court with sufficiently detailed time sheets to justify the hours for which an award is sought. This generally consists of an itemized listing of hours and expenses and a short description for each entry explaining how the time was spent. See, e.g., Fair Housing Council of Greater Washington v. Landow, 999 F.2d 92, 97-98 (4th Cir. 1993) (burden is on fee applicant to show which hours are recoverable); Costar, 106 F. Supp.2d at 788 (Fee applicant has burden of proving hours by submitting contemporaneous time records that reveal all hours for which payment is sought and explaining how the hours were allocated to specific tasks. The court may reduce the number of hours awarded if documentation is vague or incomplete.); West Virginians for Life, Inc. v. Smith, 952 F. Supp. 342, 345 (S.D. W. Va. 1996) ("The fee applicant bears the burden of producing detailed time sheets sufficient to justify the amount of hours he claims to have expended."); Stacy, 845 F. Supp. at 1143 (time entries must be sufficient to document the hours worked and show that they are not excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary). It is not required, however, that the applicant submit minutely detailed records in support of a fee request; rather, the emphasis is on whether there is sufficient detail. Daly, 790 F.2d at 1080.

While the fee applicant is under a primary duty to provide sufficient detail to justify a requested attorney's fee award, the party or parties opposing such an award have a concomitant duty to specify with particularity the basis for their objections. To allow this Court to evaluate the objection fairly, this requires sufficiently detailed references to the challenged time entries and explanation for the basis of the challenge. See Stacy, 845 F. Supp. at 1145 (bare assertions by the defendants that certain requests were seemingly excessive are insufficient grounds to disallow time properly spent).

Both Local and Federal Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the detail of the time records submitted by Plaintiffs with their fee petition. In this regard, the time records submitted for the ACLU total 195 pages, and JB's submitted time records total thirty-nine pages. (Pls.' Memo., Exhibits 2B and 3C). The time records are detailed, and each time entry is coded, as required by Guideline 1.b, to help identify the phase of the litigation process to which it relates. Further, at the request of this Court, Plaintiffs submitted several reorganized versions of the time sheets, designed to be a chronological entry by litigation phase, for each of the four phases, to further facilitate the Court's review. Given the sheer volume of the time records, the detail contained therein, and the coding and reorganization that was done, the Court is convinced that, on the whole, the bills are sufficiently detailed to permit reasonable review. In instances where this was not so, identified in the Court's analysis of the fees, contained at Appendices 1 and 2 hereto, the Court has not hesitated to reduce the fees to adjust for insufficient detail.

What is sauce for the goose, however, is sauce for the gander. The Court is forced to note — with disapproval — the too-frequent practice of both the Local and Federal Defendants to challenge the Plaintiffs' petition with their own insufficient detail. Both tended to identify a select few examples of entries or "practices" that were objected to and then make sweeping assertions that the cited defects were representative of a more pervasive problem and demanding that the Court make wholesale reductions. For example, the Federal Defendants presented one chart listing a "few examples" of what was characterized as the Plaintiffs' "practice" of seeking fees for paralegals performing routine office work and another chart listing a "few examples" of alleged duplication of effort in bills submitted by Plaintiffs. (Fed. Defs.' Resp. at 34-35). The Local Defendants, providing only one specific example, objected to "all instances where Plaintiffs seek an award of fees for issues upon which they did not prevail," and stated that "[i]dentifyng other examples will require sifting through all of plaintiffs' counsel's uncollated time records." (Local Defs.' Sur-reply at 5 n. 5). The Local Defendants did not undertake this task, but apparently expected this Court to do so.

This will not do. It is not the Court's burden to sift through literally hundreds of pages of billing records to look for similar instances of allegedly improper billing entries when the challenging parties have not thought the effort sufficiently important to undertake themselves. As the Court's analysis of the billing records reflects, it has conducted an independent, detailed analysis of the time records and has not hesitated to reduce either individual entries or make wholesale percentage reductions of billing categories when, in its judgment, this was necessary. The Local and Federal Defendants are forewarned that with respect to any future interim bills that are submitted by the Plaintiffs, the Court will not review any challenged entry in the bill unless the challenging party has identified it specifically and given an adequate explanation for the basis of the challenge.²⁴

24 Where there are multiple time entries that are challenged for the same reason, the objecting party should organize its analysis to group all examples together, in a manner that facilitates review by this Court.

b. The Exercise of Billing Judgment.

A party seeking an award of attorney's fees under § 1988 also must demonstrate that it has exercised "billing judgment," meaning that it has excluded from the fee petition hours that were not reasonably necessary, excessive time entries, and redundant or duplicitous entries. Daly, 790 F.2d at 1079; Costar Group, 106 F. Supp.2d at 789 (the "Court must ensure that the prevailing attorneys have exercised `billing judgment.' Billing judgment consists of winnowing the hours actually expended down to the hours reasonably expended. Time that is `excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary' should be excluded.").

The Federal Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs have failed to exercise billing judgment. (Fed. Defs.' Resp. at 38-39). The Plaintiffs strongly disagree. (Pls.' Memo. at 10-11; Pls.' Reply at 29-30). The Plaintiffs excluded from the fee petition more than 3162.6 hours of attorney work by the ACLU, totaling $477,914.17, contained within ninety-nine pages of billing records. (Pls.' Memo., Exh. 2C). They also excluded $484,990.00 in attorney's fees of JB, by seeking reimbursement at Laffey rates, instead of JB's higher market rates billed to their "paying" clients. (Id., Exh. 3D). In addition, the attorneys retained by Plaintiffs to handle this motion reduced their bills by ten percent. (Id., Decl. of Andrew Freeman, Exh. 22, ¶ 2).

The Federal Defendants claim, in generalized, unspecific assertions, that the Plaintiffs' reduction of nearly one million dollars in fees does not demonstrate billing judgment because the hours represented activities for which they did not prevail or activities for which they could not bill a client in the first instance. A review of the detailed billing records submitted by the Plaintiffs shows that this characterization simply is untrue.

The ACLU's deleted time represents legal research, fact investigation, administrative activities relating to the investigation and research that preceded the filing of the complaint, consultations with clients, administrative work, co-counsel conferencing, communications with opposing counsel, settlement discussions, client discussions, discovery activities, administrative activities related to the case, co-counsel conferences, settlement negotiations, work related to motions practice, conferences with expert witnesses and other discovery, decree drafting, travel, research and the drafting of pleadings. (Pls.' Memo., Exh. 2C at 1-21, 24-25, 28-29). While there were instances of activities for which the Plaintiffs arguably could not legitimately seek recovery of attorney's fees in the first instance, such as activities associated with press conferences (See Id. at 23, January 30 and 31, 1995, time entries of M. Ruffner), the overwhelming majority of the excluded time does relate to activities the deletion of which from the fee petition demonstrates the exercise of billing judgment.

This also is the case for the reductions of JB's bills, as the lowering of the fee sought for work that was included in the activities for which recovery of fees is sought amounts to an exercise of appropriate billing judgment,²⁵ as well as the "across the board" ten percent reduction of the fees sought for BGL in connection with this motion. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have more than demonstrated the exercise of proper billing judgment in connection with this motion.

25 In addition, as can be seen from the Court's analysis of the fee requests, Appendices 1 and 2, the Court has not hesitated to further prune from the hours allowed time that was excessive, redundant or unreasonable.

c. Appropriate hourly rates for the ACLU and JB fees.

Prevailing parties are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney's fees calculated at market rates.²⁶ Daly, 790 F.2d at 1080-81; Costar Group, 106 F. Supp.2d at 787 (fee applicant bears burden of demonstrating that requested rates are in line with those prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, expense and reputation). Congress did not intend that § 1988 would require an award of lesser rates to nonprofit legal services organizations, such as the ACLU, than recoverable by private practitioners, such as JB. Blum, 465 U.S. at 894-95; Buffington, 913 F.2d at 129 ("private firms and nonprofit legal service organizations should be treated equally in setting hourly rates under § 1988").

26 As state previously in this Memorandum, at 4-5, the plaintiffs are entitled to recover market rates, rather than the much lower EAJA rates, against the Federal Defendants.

In addition, in cases such as this one that have been pending for many years, courts are authorized to award attorney's fees against parties other than the federal government at current, rather than historic, market rates, to compensate for the dilution of value that payment years after performing the service causes. Daly, 790 F.2d at 1081 (use of "historic" rates to determine fee without taking into account the effect of a delay in payment erodes the value of the fee that would have been reasonable if paid when services were rendered and thus would not be a fully compensatory fee). Therefore, the Local Defendants' argument that any fees awarded against them must be at historic, rather than current rates, is not meritorious, and current rates are both authorized and justified by the fact that payment will come many years after the performance of a majority of the activities represented in the fee petition.

With respect to the Federal Defendants, however, it is clear that historic, not current rates, must be used. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310 (1986); National Wildlife Fed. v. Hanson, 859 F.2d 313, 318 (4th Cir. 1988). Plaintiffs essentially concede that historic rates must be used with respect to any award of attorney's fees against any of the Federal Defendants sued in a non-individual capacity. (Pls.' Reply at 25). They persist in arguing, however, that as to the Federal Defendants sued in their individual capacity, such as the Secretary of HUD, fees may be recovered at current rates. (Id.). The vitality of this argument, however, was extinguished by Judge Garbis' ruling that the defense of sovereign immunity would insulate the individual Federal Defendants from liability. (Order of August 30, 2001, Paper No. 279, at 8 n. 10). Thus, the fees awarded against the Federal Defendants must be calculated at historic, not current, market rates.

With regard to the ACLU fees, Plaintiffs seek to recover these fees based on the presumptively reasonable hourly rates approved by this Court in Appendix B to its Local Rules. Accordingly, as to the attorney's fees of the ACLU chargeable against the Local Defendants, the rates allowed will be the current version of the Guidelines, adopted in July 2001.²⁷

27 The Guidelines provide the following rates:

a. Lawyers admitted to the bar for less than five years: $135-170.

b. Lawyers admitted to the bar for five to eight years: $150-225.

c. Lawyers admitted to the bar for more than eight years; $200-275.

d. Paralegals and law clerks: $90.
Md. Local Rules, Appendix B (3).

As for JB's fees, the Plaintiffs seek compensation using the Laffey rates adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit, which are higher than the guidelines adopted by this Court but lower than the current market rates in the District of Columbia. The Defendants oppose this and argue that, for purposes of calculating the hourly rates, Baltimore rates, not Washington rates, must apply. Resolution of this dispute turns on what is referred to as the "locality rule" governing attorney's fee awards.

The "locality rule" provides that the "community in which the court sits is the first place to look to in evaluating the prevailing market rate." Montcalm Pub. Corp. v. Virginia, 199 F.3d 168, 173 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc. v. Caperton, 31 F.3d 169, 179 (4th Cir. 1994)); National Wildlife Fed'n, 859 F.2d at 317. However, "[i]f a matter is so complex or specialized that `no attorney, with the required skills, is available locally,' a court may, of course, award fees for counsel located elsewhere." Montcalm, 199 F.3d at 173 (quoting Rum Creek Coal Sales, Inc., 31 F.3d at 179).

The Local Defendants have submitted an affidavit from a Baltimore attorney, James Carbine, to support their position that Plaintiffs could have located a Baltimore firm to undertake this case instead of JB. (Local Defs.' Opp., Exh. G, Decl. of James Carbine at ¶¶ 16-17). The Plaintiffs, however, have demonstrated more persuasively that the ACLU did undertake reasonable efforts to locate a Maryland firm, was unsuccessful in such undertaking, and therefore turned to a Washington D.C. firm for representation. For example, Plaintiffs offered two declarations from Susan Goering, the Executive Director of the ACLU. Her first declaration, attached as an exhibit to the fee petition, detailed the ACLU's unsuccessful efforts to locate a Maryland firm to take this case. (Pls.' Memo., Exh. 1, Decl. of Susan Goering at ¶¶ 4-9). Ms. Goering's supplemental declaration further explained the difficulty of locating a Baltimore firm to undertake this case and stated that in nine other civil rights cases the ACLU was unable to locate a Maryland firm to assist and had to resort to out-of-state attorneys to take the cases. (Pls.' Reply, Exh. 20, Decl. of Susan Goering at ¶¶ 5-9). In addition, Theodore Sherbow, a former partner of Mr. Carbine, stated in his declaration that the firm where he and Mr. Carbine worked in 1995 when this case began would not have undertaken a pro bono case such as this one, given its size and scope. (Id., Exh. 13, Decl. of Theodore Sherbow at ¶ 7). Finally, Plaintiffs' offered the declaration of Jonathan Smith, Executive Director of the Public Justice Center, who detailed the difficulty of public interest legal organizations in locating Maryland law firms to undertake complex pro bono civil rights cases. (Id., Exh. 16, Decl. of Jonathan Smith at ¶ 4).

As for the complexity and scope of this case, the analysis of the Johnson factors above already has shown that this case is a large, complex piece of litigation, which would entail a substantial commitment of time and resources from any law firm representing the Plaintiffs. The Court finds that this complexity contributed to the difficulty the ACLU experienced in locating a Baltimore firm to take on this case and thus justified turning to Washington, D.C. for outside counsel. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is appropriate to award attorney's fees for the time reasonably expended by JB representing the Plaintiffs at Washington, D.C. market rates. The Court further finds that Plaintiffs adequately have demonstrated that the federal courts in Washington, D.C. employ the annually adjusted Laffey Matrix rates in determining market rates.²⁸

28 These rates for the years 2000-2001 and for 2001-2002 have been calculated by the Department of Justice as follows:
2000-2001 2001-2002
20 + yrs. $350 $360
11-19 yrs. 305 315
8-10 yrs. 250 260
4-7 yrs. 205 210
1-3 yrs. 165 170

paralegals/ law clerks 90 95

(Pls. Memo. Exh. 3B and attachment to September 7, 2001, letter to the Court from Andrew Freeman reflecting 2001-2002 rates). For reasons discussed at Appendix 5, the Court used the 2000-2001 rates, not the 2001-2002 rates, as the appropriate hourly rates for JB's fees.

d. Percentage Reduction of Hours Sought.

As already noted, § 1988 permits the award of a reasonable attorney's fee. This Court is charged with determining whether the time entries included in the fee petition are reasonable, as well as whether the hourly rates sought are reasonable. It is well settled in this Circuit that the district court enjoys wide discretion in making these determinations. See, e.g., Daly, 790 F.2d at 1078-79. Further, where litigants have submitted fee applications that are too vague to permit the district court to determine whether the hours claimed reasonably were spent, the petitioner runs the risk that the fees sought will be reduced by the court. See, e.g., Costar Group, 106 F. Supp.2d at 788. In making such downward adjustments, courts frequently have reduced entire fee applications, or portions thereof, by a stated percentage to accommodate for excessive vagueness, or to address some other deficiency, such as redundant time entries, failure to exercise billing judgment, or excessive number of hours sought. See, e.g., Walker, 99 F.3d at 770 (fifteen percent reduction in fee petition to compensate for failure to exercise billing judgment); Leroy v. City of Houston, 831 F.2d 576, 586 (5th Cir. 1987) (reducing award by thirteen percent); Carr v. The Fort Morgan School District, 4 F. Supp.2d 998, 1003 (D.Colo. 1998) (fifteen percent overall reduction of attorney's fees sought to account for excessive time spent by attorneys with clients, excessive trial preparation, duplicative time entries, and insufficient detail); Uzzell v. Friday, 618 F. Supp. 1222, 1226-30 (M.D.N.C. 1985) (twenty-five percent reduction of one portion of fees claimed to eliminate the possibility of duplicative or unreasonable time; thirty-five percent reduction of one portion of fees claimed because of insufficiency of information provided to court for review).

In reviewing the voluminous time records submitted in support of this fee petition, the Court often has reduced portions of the fee requests by stated percentages to adjust for some factor that made the amount claimed by Plaintiffs, in its totality, unreasonable. These adjustments are detailed in the Court's analysis of the fees sought for the ACLU and JB, Appendices 1 and 2.

e. Apportionment of Fees Between Defendants Joint and Several Liability.

Because this Court has determined that Plaintiffs are prevailing parties entitled to recover a specific amount of fees, I will now turn to the issue of how these fees should be apportioned. The Plaintiffs assert, without providing much detail regarding their basis for such assertion, that the fees they seek should be apportioned jointly and severally against the Defendants. Although a few courts have imposed joint and several liability with respect to fee apportionment matters, I conclude that apportioning fees jointly and severally would not be equitable; instead, as discussed below, each group of the Defendants will be responsible for a specific percentage rate of fees with respect to each of the four Phases of this case.

It is clear that there is no simple routine method for the allocating of fees; as such, the courts have employed several different procedures. One method is simply to divide the fees equally among the defendants. See, e.g., Wilson v. Stocker, 819 F.2d 943, 950-52 (10th Cir. 1987) (affirming equal apportionment of fees); Dunten v. Kibler, 518 F. Supp. 1146, 1159 (N.D.Ga. 1981); Vulcan Soc'y of Westchester County, Inc. v. Fire Dep't of City of White Plains, 533 F. Supp. 1054, 1064 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) but see Grendel's Den v. Larkin, 749 F.2d 945, 959 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that district court "abused discretion by simply dividing the burden equally"); Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 657 F.2d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981) (expressly rejecting pro rata method as obviating the court's discretion and not ensuring a fair result).

Another method, and one the Court finds to be equitable and practical, is the apportionment of fees primarily according to each defendant's percentage of culpability and other objective factors. See, e.g., Grendel's Den, 749 F.2d at 959 (one defendant responsible for twenty-five percent of fees; other defendant responsible for seventy-five percent of fees); Jose v. Ambach, 669 F.2d 865, 871 (2d Cir. 1982) (fees apportioned eighty percent to the city and twenty percent to the state); Crosby v. Bowling, 683 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1982); Dean v. Gladney, 621 F.2d 1331, 1339-40 (5th Cir. 1980) (relative culpability); Rogers v. Int'l Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975) (looking to relative responsibility and ability to pay as bases for determining apportionment); Spell v. McDaniel, 616 F. Supp. 1069, 1115 (E.D.N.C. 1985), aff'd in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 824 F.2d 1380 (4th Cir. 1987). Finally, imposing joint and several liability, as a method of apportionment, has been utilized when "two or more defendants actively participated in a constitutional violation." Herbst v. Ryan, 90 F.3d 1300, 1305 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Walker, 99 F.3d at 772-73 (joint and several liability appropriate because of "single indivisible injury"); Koster v. Perales, 903 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1990); Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 712 F.2d 165, 169 (5th Cir. 1983).²⁹ Recognizing the inherent difficulty in deciding a fair apportionment allocation, the Eleventh Circuit in Council for Periodical Distributors Associations v. Evans, 827 F.2d 1483, 1488 (11th Cir. 1987), emphasized that, regardless of the method used, "`district courts should make every effort to achieve the most fair and sensible solution that is possible'" without encouraging "a complex mini-litigation on attorney's fees." (quoting Grendel's Den, 749 F.2d at 960). Moreover, similar to the discretion a trial court has with respect to the amount of a fee award, here too a trial court has wide discretion on how to divide liability for attorney's fees. Evans, 827 F.2d at 1487-88; Grendel's Den, 749 F.2d at 959-60.

29 Other methods of apportionment include: awarding fees in the same proportion as a jury assessment of actual damages, apportioning fees based on the amount of time spent by the plaintiff in preparing the case against the defendant, or a combining of methods. See, e.g., Southeast Legal Defense Group v. Adams, 657 F.2d 1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1981); Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 604 F. Supp. 1275, 1294 (N.D.Ohio. 1985); Strama v. Peterson, 561 F. Supp. 997, 1001 (N.D.Ill. 1983); Vulcan Society of Westchester County v. Fire Dept. of City of White Plains, 533 F. Supp. 1054, 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).

Thus, recognizing the less-than-perfect means for arriving at an "efficient and fair" rate of apportionment, this Court finds the factors enumerated in Grendel's Den, 749 F.2d at 960, relevant in making such a determination. In Grendel's Den, the court looked to the nature of the injury, whether it was singular in nature and who caused it; the amount of time the Plaintiffs had to spend litigating against the respective defendants; and, of the least importance, the ability of the defendants ability to pay. Id. Applying these factors in this case, this Court holds that the fee award should not be jointly and severally chargeable against the Defendants. As explained in Council for Periodical Distributors Association, 827 F.2d at 1487, imposing joint and several liability for fee awards, while typical, is not a hard and fast rule even in cases where two or more defendants actively participate in a constitutional violation.

As discussed infra, this Court concludes first that the attorney's fees chargeable against the Federal and Local Defendants for the PCD phase should be divided equally, that is fifty-fifty, as to each group of Defendants. Second, an equal division of the fees should also apply to the small percentage of the PCD Enf. Phase determined by this Court to be fairly chargeable against both the Federal and Local Defendants. For the remaining portion of fees generated in the PCD Enf. Phase, the Local Defendants will be solely responsible for these fees. Third, fees generated with respect to the HR/CH Phase will be charged solely against the Local Defendants, as the Federal Defendants were not involved in this Phase. Finally, as for the FP Phase, a different percentage rate of apportionment between the two groups of Defendants is appropriate, as Plaintiffs were not required to expend equal time in developing their claims for attorney's fees against the Federal and Local Defendants. Thus, a fair allocation with respect to this phase requires that the Local Defendants be responsible for seventy percent of the fees and the Federal Defendants be responsible for the remaining thirty percent.

From my review of the complaint, the partial consent decree, the docket sheet entries and Court record, and the briefings from the parties, a number of observations in support of my allocation of fees can be made. The complaint demonstrates that both the Federal and Local Defendants are identified as having been extensively involved for nearly seventy-five years in the allegedly discriminatory policies attacked by the complaint. Further, both the Federal and Local Defendants extensively were involved in the negotiation of the partial consent decree, which imposed significant duties and obligations on both. Moreover, both Local and Federal Defendants signed the decree. The docket entries and Court file demonstrate that both the Federal and Local Defendants actively have been involved in the litigation of this case in general, although the Federal Defendants were not the target of most of the PCD Enf. Phase and were not involved in the HR/CH Appeal Phase.

The Local Defendants argue that it would be unfair to award attorney's fees against them because they share the same goals as the Plaintiffs. (Local Defs.' Sur-Reply at 6). Also, they argue that the Federal Defendants should be required to pay, jointly and severally, with regard to all portions of any fee award, because the Federal Defendants are in a better position to pay than the Local Defendants. (Id. at 9). Because § 1988 allows the Court to determine a reasonable attorney's fee and vests in the Court broad discretion when doing so, the Local Defendants are, in essence, making an equitable appeal not to have to pay because they assert that it would be unfair for them to have to do so.

In a very undeniable sense, there is an element of unfairness in requiring a local jurisdiction to pay scarce public revenues as an attorney's fee award in civil rights litigation successfully brought against it to redress illegal discriminatory activity of long departed public officials. Federal courts cannot be unmindful of the fact that ordering a city to pay an attorney's fee award that may be in the hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars imposes a financial burden that will have real consequences on the current residents of the city. For presently-serving public officials, the requirement to pay a substantial attorney's fee award means that the funds must come from other agencies and programs, from a budget that already is insufficient to meet all the demands imposed upon it.

Such an argument must be responded to by pointing out the obvious — that Congress, by enacting § 1988, has made the decision that, without the ability to award attorney's fees to parties that successfully have brought civil rights litigation against government agencies, these lawsuits simply will not be filed, and illegal discrimination will not be exposed and stopped. Discrimination lawsuits such as this one are filed on behalf of people without power, influence or money, against those that have all of these resources, to vindicate rights that evidence a great nation and are glowingly guaranteed in constitutions and statutes, but which, in real life, all too often do not exist as promised for all that they are intended to encompass.

In a time of profound concern about external threats to national security, attention of public officials cannot be directed outwardly alone, but must focus inwardly as well. Domestic conditions of our own making, if unredressed, can pose threats to shared values of this country as do external conditions whose creation are significantly beyond our control. One need only read the Declarations of Harry Karas and Isaac Neal, residents of Baltimore's public housing, to understand this point. How can large numbers of public housing residents, geographically, educationally and economically segregated for generations because of their race, and denied the benefits afforded to non-minority citizens, be expected perpetually to ignore what they know is both unfair and illegal before they irreparably lose faith in the ability or will of those who govern to do what is right and legally mandated?

It may be true that those who have to pay attorney's fees in cases such as this are not the ones that caused the problems that have been present over an extended period of time and reflective of beliefs and practices that no longer are tolerated. The Court does not doubt that the Local Defendants share the same goals as the Plaintiffs. But sharing these goals and fulfilling them are not one and the same, and it is the fulfillment of these goals that this suit was brought to accomplish. The success achieved by the Plaintiffs that is embodied in the obligations imposed on the Local Defendants by the partial consent decree and its enforcement will, if implemented, make tangible progress in realizing these shared goals. When that occurs, the benefits that will inure to the City of Baltimore will, without question, be worth the cost — including the attorney's fees award. For this reason, if no other, they must be awarded.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Plaintiffs' Interim Motion for Attorney's Fees be partially granted and partially denied.

ACLU Fees

(Appendix 1)

A. Billing Phase B. Amount Sought C. Comments D. Amount Allowed 1. A. Partial Consent 988.6 hours 295.8 hours sought for A. Total hours allowed Decree (PCD), Case $158,486 (at 2001 "research" related for LD FD EACH, Development (CD) phase guidelines rates) activities, or 29.9% of entire following downward (p. 1-34) portion. Entries often are adjustment:. vague, and cryptic, making Goering: 63.1 x .5 x .85 review difficult. Example: p. =26.8 2-3, entries for 7/16-22, Montgomery: 37.6 x.5 x 7/28-8/2. Contrast with .85 =15.98 entry at p. 31, 11/16/95-a Samuels: 356.1 x .5 x .85 short description, yet one = 151.3 that permits meaningful Ruffner: 48.9 x .5 x .85 review. Downward =20.7 adjustment of 25% required Bryant: 25.7 x .5 x .85 for time claimed for =10.9 Cuthbert LaMaster Cohen: 1.0 x .5 x .85 =.4 because of excessively vague Cuthbert: 138.2 x .5 x .75 entries. As for remainder of = 51.8 time sought, 15% downward Dagnel: 166.1 x .5 x .85 adjustment needed to = 70.5 compensate for insufficiently La Master: 54.9 x .5 x .75 specific entries. Current = 20.55 guidelines rates (2001) Ruffner: 85.7 x .5 x .85 = allowable for fees against 36.4 Local Defendants (LD) to Smith: 11.3 x .5 x .85 = compensate for delay in 4.8 payment ($250/hr for [Total paralegals for FD Goering, Montgomery, LD each = 195.3] Samuels; $225/hr for Sullivan; $200/hr for B. LD responsibility, Staudenmaier; $165/hr for using above hours and Ruffner Bryant; $75/hr rates described in for paralegals/clerks). previous column: Historic rates required for $66,563.00. FD, the 1995 guidelines rates supply historic rates C. FD responsibility, ($225/hr Goering, using above hours and Montgomery, Samuels, rates described in $200/hr for Sullivan; previous column: $190/hr for Staudenmaier; $59, 449.5. $150/hr Ruffner and Bryant; $65/hr. for paralegals D. Total Allowed : /clerks). Proper $126,012.5 apportionment between LD and FD is 50/50 at above hourly rates. 2. PCD Pleadings (PL) 275.9 hrs at 2001 Generic entries such as A. Amount allowed (p. 35-40) guidelines rate "draft complaint", "edit against each defendant $69,915 complaint" and "revise following downward and edit complaint" are adjustment: pervasive. While Goering: 10.4 x.5 x.85 = complaint is 56 pgs long, 4.4 and clearly drafting and Montgomery: 26.2 x.5 editing it was a complex x.85 = 11.1 endeavor, a total of 275.9 Samuels: 216.1 x .5 x .85 hours amounts to 6.8 = 91.8 weeks at 40hr/week, Dragnel: 8 x .5 x .85 = which is excessive even 3.4 for such an involved Ruffner: 10.2 x .5 x .85 = project. A downward 4.3 adjustment of 15% for Smith: 5 x .5 x .85 = 2.1 this phase is required. (Total Paralegals 9.8) Allocation is LD 50%, at B. Allowed against LD 2001 guidelines rates, (using the rates FD 50%, at historic rates. described in section 1. C. above, which will be used for the remainder of this chart): C. Allowed against FD (using rates described in section 1.C above, which will be used for the remainder of this chart): $24,779.5 D. Total allowed: $2,339.5 3. PCD Interrogatories 361 hrs at 2001 Explanations contain A .Amount allowed (IN) (p. 41-52) guidelines rate frequent entries that don't against each defendant $65,994.5 appear to be allocated following downward properly to "document adjustment: discovery", but which Goering: 6.6 x .5 x .85 = otherwise appear to be 2.8 legitimate billings Montgomery: 88.2 x .5 x (example: p. 50, .85 = 37.4 9/9,11,12 entries). Samuels: 102.5 x .5 x .85 Billing descriptions are = 43.5 very brief and at times Ruffner: 48.8 x .5 x .85 = cryptic, making 20.7 meaningful review Bryant: 6 x .5 x .85 = 2.5 difficult. A 15% Cohen: 61.9 x.5 x.85 = downward adjustment is 26.3 needed to compensate for Ruffner: 43.2 x.5 x.85 = this. Allocation is LD 18.3 50%, FD 50%. Current Smith: 3.8 x.5 x.85 = 1.6 rates for LD, historic for (Total Paralegals 48.7). FD. B. Allowed against LD: $27,993. C. Allowed against FD: $25,103. D. Total allowed: $53,096. $27,993. 4. PCD Depositions 76.4 hrs Entries show some A. Amount allowed (DE) $17,000 at current questionable use of against each Defendant (p. 52-54) guidelines rates (2001) resources, such as highest following adjustment to billing attorney preparing Samuels time: deposition notices (see, Montgomery: 16.6 x .5 = e.g. p. 53, 5/3-5 Samuels 8.3 entries). Disallow 10 Samuels: 47.8 — 10 = 37.8 hours of Samuels' time to x .5 = 18.9 compensate. Allocation Ruffner: 9.7 x .5 = 4.8 50% LD, at current Smith: 2.3 x .5 = 1.1 guidelines rates, 50% FD (Total paralegal 5.9) at historic rates. B. Allowed against LD: $7,242.5 C. Allowed against FD: $6,503.5 D. Total allowed: $13,746. 5. PCD Motions (MO) 465 hrs at 2001 Time entries frequently A. Amount allowed (p. 56-70) guidelines rates too terse to permit against each defendant $108,921.5 effective review. following adjustment of (Examples: p. 55 12/7, 9, 15%: 20- "research merits"; p. Goering: 2.1 x .5 x .85 = 59 1/24 Montgomery .8 entry "supporting Montgomery: 242.2 x .5 x documents-PI motion"). .85 = 102.9 Also instances of Samuels: 170.8 x .5 x .85 questionable use of = 72.5 highest billing attorney's Ruffner: 15.6 x.5 x .85 = time (example p. 64, 6.6 3/23/95 Montgomery, at Bryant: 17 x .5 x .85 = $250/hr, "prepared index 7.2 to appendix). Some Cohen: 4.5 x.5 x .85 = entries too cryptic to 1.9 decipher (example p. 68, Ruffner: 7.6 x .5 x .85 = 9/2-5 Cohen entries "L. 3.2 Henderson Research", Smith: 5.2 x .5 x .85 = 2.2 "writing up report on (Total paralegals 14.5) Henderson"). Downward B. Allowed against LD: adjustment to entire $46,226.50. portion of bill of 15% C. Allowed against FD: required to compensate. $41,577.50. Allocation: 50% to LD at D. Total allowed: 2001 guidelines rates; $87,804.00. 50% to FD at historic rates. 6. PCD Hearings (HE) 33.7 hrs at 2001 Although there are A. Amount allowed (p. 70-71) guidelines rates instances where more against each defendant: $8,425 than one attorney Goering: .9 x .5 = .4 attended a conference Montgomery: 14.8 x .5 = (see: p. 71, 7/20/95 and 7.4 8/16/95entries for Samuels: 18 x .5 = 9 Samuels Montgomery), B. Allowed against LD: this is not unusual, nor $4200. unjustified in a case of C. Allowed against FD: this magnitude and $3780. complexity. No D. Total allowed: downward adjustment is $7980. necessary. Allocation is 50% LD at 2001 guidelines rates, 50% to FD at historic rates. 7. PCD Trial 20.2 hrs at 2001 No downward adjustment A. Amount allowed Preparation (TP) (p. guidelines rates required. Allocation is against each defendant: 71-73) $4,164. 50% LD at 2001 Samuels: 12 x .5 = 6 guidelines rates, 50% FD Ruffner: 6.1 x .5 = 3 at historic rates. Ruffner: 2.1 x .5 = 1 B. Allowed against LD: $2070. C. Allowed against FD: $1865. D. Total allowed: $3935. 8. PCD ADR/Settlement 981.2 hrs at 2001 Review of time entries A. Amount allowed as to (AD) (p. 73-107) guidelines rates shows some time each defendant: $240,984 duplication, although Goering: 31.6 x .5 x .80 much is excusable given = 12.6 the complexity of the Montgomery: 327.1 x .5 x litigation. Nonetheless, .80 = 130.8 some reduction is Samuels: 592.9 x .5 x .80 required to compensate = 237.1 for this (example: p. 73, Ruffner: 9.6 x .5 x .80 = 7/12/94 entries for 3.8 Goering Samuels). Bryant: 7.7 x .5 x .80 = 3 There are numerous Ruffner: 12.3 x .5 x .80 = examples-more than 4.9. 60-of conferences among B. Allowed against LD: plaintiffs' counsel $96,344.5. regarding settlement C. Allowed against FD: issues (examples: p. 73, $86,696. 10/14, 11/4, 17, 18 D. Total allowed: entries; p. 74, 12/14 $183,040.5. Samuels entries, p. 75 12/19,29 and 1/10, 13, 16 Samuels entries;). While meeting with co-counsel appropriately may be billed, if not excessive, care must be taken not to over-conference, even if only one of the conference participants bills for the time. Some downward adjustment is needed to the conferences billed. Finally, there are instances of terse or cryptic entries that do not allow reasonable review (examples: p. 103 3/5 Samuels entries; p. 105 4/4 Ruffner Samuels entries, 4/12, 15, 17 Samuels entries). Overall downward adjustment of 20% needed to compensate for all of the above. Allocation is 50% LD at current, 2001 guidelines rates, 50% FD at historic rates. 9. B. PCD Enforcement 308 hrs. jointly from FD Source of plaintiffs' A. "J" Hours Allowed (PCD/Enf.) Case LD ($68,342.25 at allocation of hours as (allocated 50% FD, 50% Development (CD) current rates) AND between LD only and LD LD) p. 108-146. 1288.8 hrs. from LD only FD is Samuels Montgomery: .6 x .5 x .65 ($250, 162.25 at current Declarations Ex. 2 and = .19; rates). 19, Ex. X. However, Samuels: 261.4 x .5 x .65 when reviewing the = 84.8; individual entries in the Sullivan: 8.8 x .5 x .65 = billing records, the 2.8; descriptions provide very Staudenmaier: 6.9 x .5 x little information to .65 = 2.2; justify why the particular Bryant: 2.8 x .5 x .65 = entry was designated "J" .9. (joint) or "L" (LD only). 1. Allowed against LD Similarly, the Samuels (current rates): $ 22,385. declarations contain little 2. Allowed against FD by way of detailed (historic rates) explanation of why these $20,159.20. allocations were made. 3. Total "J" entries Example: p. 108, 6/27/96 allowed: $42,544.20. Samuels entries .7 hrs. "TC w/E. Alexander re B. "L" Hours allowed comments to Murphy (allocated 100 % against RFQ", allocated "J". LD) Compare with entry of Montgomery: 18.6 x .75 same day that states = 13.9; "Review and draft Samuels: 457.8 x .75 = comments on Murphy 343.3; RFQ", which is Sullivan: 11.6 x .75 = designated "L". Both 8.7; deal with the Murphy Staudenmaier: 82.7 x .75 Homes RFQ, one is joint, = 62; the other LD Bryant (att'y): 49.5 x .75 only-leaving the Court to = 37.1; have to speculate as to Bryant (paralegal): 61.9 why. To compensate for x .75 = 46.4. this lack of sufficient 1. Amount allowed detail, a 10% reduction of against LD (current the "J" bills will be guidelines): $112, 715. imposed. Also, LD and FD C. Total PCD/Enf./CD challenge the entries in allowed (including both the PCD/Enf. Bills on the total "J" and "L" basis that much of the billings): work reflected in the bills $155,259.20. was administrative, not legal, and therefore not warranting billing at attorney rates. The billing entry descriptions insufficient detail to permit the court to discern whether the activities justify billing a attorney rates. To compensate, a 25% reduction to all time, both "J" and "L" will be imposed. Total reduction for "J" time is 35%; for "L" is 25%. LD hours will be allowed at current guidelines rates, FD hours at historic rates (the 1995 guidelines). 10. PCD/Enf. (PL) 1.3 hrs. "J" sought; 9.1 No downward adjustment A. "J" hours allowed. (p. 146) "L" hrs. sought (total necessary. FD hours Samuels: 1.3 x .5 = .65. 10.4 hrs.) for total of allowed at historic rates, 1. Allowed against LD: $2,600 at current rates. LD hours at current $162.5 (current rates). rates. 2. Allowed against FD: $146.25 (historic rates). 3. Total $308.75 B. "L" hours allowed. Montgomery: 5; Samuels: 4.1 Total: 9.1 hrs at current rates: $2275. Total FD LD: $2,583.75 11. PCD/Enf. (IN) 3.7 hrs. "J" sought; 96.2 No downward adjustment A. "J" hours allowed. (p. 147-150) hrs "L" sought (total: for "J" hours. As for Samuels: 3.7 x .5 = 1.85. 99.9 hrs.), for total of "L" hours, descriptions 1. Allowed against LD $18,932.50 at current at times do not fit well (current rates: $462.5. rates. into category of "IN", but 2. Allowed against FD generally enough detail (historic rates): $416.25. to permit determination 3. Total "J" hrs.: of appropriateness of $878.75. hours sought. (Example: 11/11-15 entries for B. "L" hours allowed. Sullivan). Some billing Samuels: 13.6 — 3.7 (J for senior attorney time hrs.) = 9.9 x .9 = 8.9; that should have been Sullivan: 53.4 x .9 = 48; done by more junior Staudenmaier: 5.4 x .9 = attorney, or paralegal 4.86; (example: 3/30 entry for Bryant: 5 x .9 = 4.5; Sullivan "Preparation of Bryant (paralegal): 22.5 document log letter x .9 = 20.25. Total mailing"). Total allowed against LD at downward adjustment current rates: required: 10%. $17,390.75. Total FD LD: $18,269.5. 12. PCD/Enf. (DE) .7 hrs. sought against LD No downward adjustment "L" hours allowed: (p. 150) only, at current rates. required. Samuels: .7 against LD Total sought $175. only at current rates: $175. 13. PCD/Enf. (MO) 263.1 hrs. sought at "J" hrs.: disallow 1.3 A. "J" hrs. allowed. (p. 151-159) current rates, totaling hrs. for 1/13/98 entry for Samuels: 7.8 x .5 = 3.9. $62,465. "J" hrs. Sullivan, as duplicative. 1. Allowed against LD sought: 9.1 hrs. for total "L" hrs.: many entries (current rates) : $975. of $2,242.50; "L" hrs. excessively vague; 2. Allowed against FD sought 254 hrs. for total frequent meeting w/co- (historic rates): $877. of $60,222.5. Current counsel for conferences. 3. Total "J" hrs. rates sought for both. While not improper, this allowed: $1,852.50. is duplicative, and some reduction is necessary B. "L" hrs. allowed. (examples: 2/14,17/97 Montgomery: 91.5 x .85 3/4/97 Montgomery = 77.7; entries; 5/19, 27/97 and Samuels: 77.8 — 7.8 ("J" 6/6/97 Montgomery hrs.) x .85 = 59.5; entries; 6/9/97 Sullivan Sullivan: 55.2 — 1.3 ("J" entry). Multiple "draft" hrs disallowed) x .85 = and "revise" entries that 45.8; were so vague that Staudenmaier: 38.6 x .85 effective judicial review = 32.8. was hindered (examples: Total allowed against LD 3/28-29/97, 4/3/97, at current rates: $51,165. 5/7,9,15-19/97, 7/1/97 Montgomery entries). Total FD LD allowed: Total downward $53,017.50. adjustment required: 15%. 14. PCD/Enf. (HE) 18.7 hrs. sought, totaling No downward A. "J" hrs. allowed. (p. 159-161) $4,290. "J" hrs. sought: adjustment for "J" hrs. Samuels: 2.5 x .5 = 2.5, for total of $625; 4/29/99 entries for 1.25. "L" hrs sought 16.2 hrs, Staudenmaier Samuels 1. Allowed against LD for total of $3,665. refer to same conference at current rates: $312.50. w/ Judge Garbis. 2. Allowed against FD Staudenmaier billed 3.0 at historic rates: $281.25. hrs., Samuels billed 1.9 3. Total J hrs. allowed: hrs. Reduce $593.75. Staudenmaier time to 1.9 hrs. (reduction of 1.1 B. "L" hrs. allowed. hrs.) No other Samuels: 8.8 — 2.5 ("J" adjustments necessary. hrs.) = 6.3; Sullivan: 4.4; Staudenmaier: 5.5 — 1.1 = 4.4. Total allowed against LD at current rates: $3,445. Total "J" and "L" time allowed: $4,038.75. 15. PCD/Enf. (TP) 1.2 hrs. totaling $300 No downward "L" hrs. allowed: (p. 160) sought against LD only, adjustments needed. Samuels: 1.2 hrs. at current rates. Total allowed against L at current rates: $300. 16. PCD/Enf. (TR) .4 hrs sought against LD No downward adjustment "L" hrs. allowed: (p. 160) only, at current rates, needed. Staudenmaier: .4. totaling $80. Allowed against LD at current rates: $80. 17. PCD/Enf. (AD) 161.3 hrs. against LD at Eliminate 4/26/99 "L" hrs. allowed. (p. 160-166) current rates, totaling Staudenmaier entry of .3 Samuels: 72.6 — 1.9 = $35,890. hrs. as duplicative. 5/26, 70.7; 27 /99 Samuels entries Staudenmaier: 88.7 — .3 "t/c Broadway resident = 88.4. leader, .5 hrs. each too Allowed against LD at vague, eliminate. Same current rates: $35,355. for 5/18/99 .9 hrs. Samuels entry "t/c Broadway resident leader". Total reductions: .3 hrs. for Staudenmaier, 1.9 hrs. for Samuels. 18. PCD/Enf. (AP) 10.2 hrs. sought at All hrs. sought appear to "L" hrs. allowed. (p. 166) current rates against LD deal with CH/HR appeal, Staudenmaier: 10.2 — 2 = only, totaling $2,080. which only indirectly 8.2. relates to PCD/Enf. phase Allowed against LD at (i.e. CH/HR appeal was current rates: $1,640. to enforce original terms of PCD, against the revision ordered by the Court). The time sought appeared reasonable, with one adjustment. Also, the work done appears appropriate. 2.0 hrs billed by Staudenmaier on 5/3/00 must be eliminated as duplicative. 19. C. Hollander 108.8 hrs. at current Many entries for Hours Allowed against Ridge/Cherry Hill rates sought against LD telephone conferences LD at current rates. (HR/CH) Appeal (CD) only for total of with class members, the Samuels: 62.4 hrs x .85 (P.167-173) $22,942.50. explanation for which are = 53; vague. While some Staudenmaier: 19.2 hrs conferencing is .x .85 = 16.3; unavoidable in such a Bryant: 19.5 hrs. x .85 = large case, all of it should 16.5; not be billed (examples: Robinson: 7.7 hrs. x .85 Samuels 7/18, 8/18, = 6.5. 10/14,10/20 1997; L. Bryant entries for Total allowed against 7/1,21,28, LD: $19,501.05. 8/26,9/1,9/25,10/5,10/7, 12,19-27 1998). Some instances of non-lawyer tasks billed by senior lawyers (Samuels 12/3/97 entry "obtained IG audit re HOPE VI and Hollander Ridge". Frequent co-counsel conferences (Staudenmaier 6/1/98,7/23, 9/1 1998, 2/11/99. Contrast with Samuels 9/11/97 entry, for which no charge was billed). Some duplication of effort in billings. (2/18/99 Samuels Staudenmaier entries re edit/revise letter to HUD). Overall, many entries were vague, making review more difficult. Reduction of 15% required to in the billing for this section. Hours are to be billed at current rates, to LD only. 20. HR/CH (IN) 164.1 hrs. at current Samuels entries for Hours allowed against (p. 173-176) rates sought against LD 7/20-26 1998 total 18 LD at current rates. only. Total sought: hrs., 2.25 days, to draf Samuels: 40.5 hrs. x .8 $33,370. Rule 34 request, by a = 32.4; senior attorney charging Staudenmaier: 98.6 hrs. $250/hr. This is x .8 = 78.8; excessive. Bryant (att'y): 22 hrs. x Frequent co-counsel .8 = 17.6; conferencing Bryant(paralegal): 3 hrs. (Staudenmaier 8/20, 9/9, x .8 = 2.4. 9/11,9/14,9/22,10/6-7, Total allowed against 10/14 1998; Samuels LD: $26,696. Staudenmaier 10/15/98 entries). Some duplicative billing (9/18-21 1998 Bryant, Staudenmaier, Samuels entries all apparently reviewing same documents; 10/20-22 1998 Samuels/Staudenmaier entries summarizing apparently same documents). Many entries vague, making review difficult. Overall downward adjustment of 20% required to compensate. All billing allowed against LD only at current rates. 21. HR/CH (DE) 125.6 hrs. at current Many entries for Hours allowed against (p. 176-179) rates sought against LD co-counsel conferencing LD. only, for a total of (examples: Staudenmaier Samuels: 31.2 hrs. x .8 $26,680. 8/21, 10/22, 10/23, = 24.9; 10/26,28 1998; Samuels Staudenmaier: 94.4 hrs. 10/7/98). x .8 = 75.5. Some duplicative billing Total allowed: $21,344. (examples 11/8/98 ("assist Susan P. in depo. prep"), 11/13, 17 1998 Samuels entries assisting others). Overall, billing entries often vague, making review difficult. Total downward adjustment of 20% required. Hours allowed are against LD only at current rates. 22. HR/CH (MO) 145.7 hrs. sought against Many co-counsel Hours allowed against (p. 179-185) LD at current rates for conferencing (examples: LD at current rates. total of $30,795. Staudenmaier entries: Samuels: 40.1 hrs. x .8 7/15,23,29 1998, = 32; 8/17,18,19,21,31 1998, Staudenmaier: 98.6 hrs. 9/8,11,14,16,25 1998, X .8 = 78.8; 10/12,13,19,20 1998, Bryant: 7 hrs. x .8 = 5.6. 11/6/98,1/30/99,2/4/99). Some duplicative billing Total allowed: $24,636. (Staudenmaier: 7/23/98 Samuels 7/23/98 editing of apparently same JB draft), 7/28/98 Staudenmaier 7/29/98 Samuels entries editing apparently same brief, 11/16/98 Staudenmaier review of memo by another att'y, 11/18/98 Samuels review of outline by another att'y). Overall billing entries frequently vague, making review difficult. 20% downward adjustment needed to compensate. Time allowed against LD only at current rates. 23. HR/CH (TP) 221.1 hrs. at current Co-counsel Time allowed against LD (p. 185-188) rates sought from LD conferencing at current rates. only for total of $48,310.(Staudenmaier 11/23,24 Samuels: 85.5 hrs. x .95 1998, 12/1,2 1998, Smith = 81; 11/30/98, Samuels Staudenmaier: 132.6 hrs. 12/1/98). x .95 = 125.9; Some duplication of Bryant: 3 hrs. x .95 = work by others (Samuels 2.8; 11/27/98, 12/7/98). Smith: 0.2 hrs x .95 = While present, above .19 hrs. examples not pervasive. Total allowed: Overall time entries for $45,894.50. this section are more clearly recorded, permitting more accurate assessment of reasonableness of discrete tasks, as they relate to the trial preparation phase of this billing section. Accordingly, overall downward adjustment of only 5% required. Time allowed is against LD only, at current rates. 24. HR/CH (TR) 38.7 hrs. at current rates No downward adjustment Time allowed against LD (p. 189) sought against LD only needed. at current rates. for total of $8,775. Samuels: 20.7 hrs.; Staudenmaier: 18 hrs. Total allowed: $8775. 25. HR/CH (AD) 12.7 hrs. at current rates No downward adjustment Time allowed against LD (p. 189) sought from LD only, for needed. at current rates. total of $3,175. Samuels: 12.7 hrs. Total allowed: $3,175. 26. HR/CH (AP) 131.7 hrs. at current Many instances of co-counsel Hours allowed against (p. 190-193) rates sought from LD conferencing LD at current rates. only, for a total of (Staudenmaier Samuels: 4.7 hrs x .8 $26,575. 3/30/99,4/13/99, 5/7/99, =3.7; 6/7,7 1999, 7/27/99, Staudenmaier: 127hrs. — 10/1,11,23,25,29 1999, 5.2(6/21/99 entry) x .8 = 12/5,16 1999). Also, 97.4 frequent "draft, revise, edit, and review" entries, Total allowed: $20,413. that were vague, and difficult to review for reasonableness (Staudenmaier 6/15-18, 1999, 8/9-10/1 1999 10/3-7 1999, 10/8,23,25,26-29 1999, 12/6,7-16 1999, 4/12-5/3 2000). One entry, Staudenmaier, 6/21/99 of "4th Cir. Brief", at 5.2 hrs. was so vague as to make review impossible, requiring disallowance of the entire entry. Overall, the entries tended to be vague, making review for reasonableness difficult. In addition to deleting the 6/21/99 Staudenmaier entry, an overall 20% reduction is required. Amount allowed is against LD only, at current rates. 27. D. Fee Petition (FP) 113.5 hrs. at current If reasonable, time spent A. Calculation of hrs. (p. 194-195) rates sought from both by Pls' counsel in allowed. FD LD, for a total of preparation of fee $12,402.5 petition is recoverable. 1. LD Pls seek allocation Samuels:11.8 hrs x .9 between FD LD on a =10.6 x .7 = 7.42; 50-50 basis. However, Staudenmaier: 14.6 hrs. this is not appropriate x .9 =13.1 x.7 = 9.19; given the fact that the FD Robinson: 57 hrs. x .7 = had more limited 39.9; involvement in the case Smith: 30.1 x .7 = 21.07 than the LD. A more Total, at current rates: reasonable allocation $8,265.75 to LD would be 70% LD, 30% FD. 2. FD Most of the time billed Samuels: 10.6 hrs. x .3 = was paralegal time, and 3.1; based on the amount of Staudenmaier: 13.1 x. .3 time the Court itself has =3.9 had to expend on the fee Robinson: 57 x .3 = 17.1; petition, the amounts of Smith: 30.1 x. 3 = 9. time sought by Pls Total: $2,979 at appears reasonable, with historic rates to FD a 10% downward adjustment to compensate 3. Total LD and FD: for co-counsel $11,244.75. conferencing, and research entries that were too vague (Staudenmaier 8/9, 10, 17 2000. Samuels 9/23,24 2000). LD hours should be charged at current rates, FD hours at historic rates.

Jenner Block Fees (Appendix 2)

A. Billing Phase B. Amount Sought C. Comments D. Amount Allowed A. 1. Partial Consent 244.75 hrs. at 2000 Multiple conferences A. Calculation of hours Decree (PCD) (CD) Laffey Rates against LD with co-counsel planing allocated to LD/FD each, (p. 1-5) FD jointly, for a total "strategy", etc. Some of following 40% reduction: of $41,121.25. this is necessary, but Podolsky: 8 x .6 x .5 = Although plaintiffs cannot be billed fully 2.4; amended their request to (examples: Verrilli Nadler: 8.5 x .6 x .5 = seek the 2000/01 Laffey entries: 7/21, 8/22, 23, 2.5; rates, once adopted by 25, 29 1995; Donahue Verrilli: 32.5 x .6 x .5 = the District of Columbia entries: 7/28, 31, 8/8, 10, 9.75; U.S. Attorneys' Office (in 18, 21, 9/12 1995; Barash: 18.5 x .6 x .5 = August, 2001), this Barash entries: 8/9, 21, 5.55; additional adjustment is 9/18 1995; Nadler Donahue: 35.75 x .6 x .5 not warranted. First, as entries: 9/5/95). = 10.7; for the FD, historic, not Some billing at lawyer Cothran: 62.5 x .6 x .5 = current rates are rates for administrative 18.75; warranted. However, as functions (Verrilli 8/4/95; Amrine: 34.25 x .6 x .5 = to LD, while current Amrine 5/25/95). 10.2; rates measured at the Vague "review" and Anderson: 44.74 x .6 x .5 2000 Laffey rates are "edit" entries, making = 13.4. reasonable to effective review difficult compensate for delay in (Verrilli 4/26, 28 1995; B. Allocated to LD at payment, as discussed in Barash 5/5, 8/1 1995; 2000 Laffey rates: the Court's Cothran 5/12, 14, 18, 20- $12,308. memorandum, the 2000 21, 23, 25-26, 30, 6/2, 5 Laffey rates, which are 1995; Amrine 5/16, 6/22 C. Allocated to FD at much higher than the 1995). historic Laffey rates guidelines rates Some reduction is (95-96 rates, as clear authorized by this Court needed to compensate for majority of time billed for the ACLU, do not above. J B is seeking after 5/31/95, the warrant an additional rates under the Laffey commencement time for upward adjustment to the matrix for Washington 95/96 rates): $11,213.75. 2000/01 Laffey rates, D.C. rates. While which took effect on appropriate in this case D. Total LD FD 6/1/01, simply because because of the adequate authorized: $23,521.75. the time needed to decide showing of necessity to the attorneys' fee dispute obtain Washington D.C. spanned the changeover counsel, the Laffey rates from the 99/2000 rates to are substantially higher the 00/01 rates. Thus, that the guideline rates for all J B calculations applicable to Baltimore for which LD are firms. Although entitled allocated hours, the to rates much closer to 99/2000 Laffey rates, not those charged to private the 00/01 rates, will be clients, J B is under a authorized. concomitant duty to exercise the same care in billing and in describing the activities billed that they would use for their own clients, to effect economy and avoid duplication. Moreover, in such cases, the bills need to justify, not just describe services rendered. This is deficient here. A 40% reduction is required to compensate. Allocation of 50-50 between LD and FD is appropriate, however LD hours will be at 2000 Laffey rates, while the allocation against FD must be at historic Laffey rates. 2. PCD (PL) 2 hrs. sought at 2000 No downward adjustment A. Allocation of time fo (p. 5) Laffey rates against needed. Allocation 50-50 LD and FD each: LD/FD jointly, for total of LD/FD, LD at 2000 Cothran: 2hrs x .5 = 1 $300.00. Laffey rates, FD at hr. historic Laffey rates B. Allocated against LD (94/95 rates). (2000 Laffey rates): $150.00. C. Allocated against FD (94/95 Laffey rates): $140. D. Total: $290.00. 3. PCD (DE) 241.5 hrs. sought jointly Many instances of co- A. Allocation of hrs. to (p. 5-8) against LD/FD at 2000 counsel conferencing LD FD each, following Laffey rates, for total of (Barash 5/22, 8/3,4, 9/5- 25% downward $57,640.00 8, 1995; Donahue 8/3,30, adjustment: 9/7, 10 1995; Verrilli Podolsky: 59.5 x .75 x 8/30, 9/1, 4, 5, 7, 12 .5 = 22.3 hrs.; 1995). Verrilli: 48.25 x .75 x .5 Time entries at times too = 18 hrs., vague to allow Nadler: 12.5 x .75 x .5 = determination whether 4.6 hrs.; there was duplication of Barash: 53 x .75 x .5 = effort (Verrilli 8/24/95 19.8 hrs.; Podolsky 8/25/95 Donahue: 52.75 x .75 x .5 entries-same 30(b)(6) = 19.7 hrs.; deposition, or different Amrine: 1.5 x .75 x .5 = ones worked on?). Lack of detail in .5 hrs.; explanation in time Anderson: 14 x .75 x .5 entries regarding = 5.2 hrs. significance of various B. Allocated to LD at depositions taken, without 2000 Laffey rates: which it is difficult to $21,517. gauge reasonableness of C. Allocated to FD at time spent in preparation 95/96 Laffey rates: and taking of deposition $19,323. (Barash entries re Rubin D. Total: $40,840. deposition of 5/7-31, 8/11 1995-28 hrs. total on this deposition. Reasonableness of charge depends on importance of deponent's testimony to the case, yet no information to enable this determination. Also 9/6/95 Podolsky entries of 8 hrs. on Henson, Campbell, Rabin depositions; also Donahue 9/8-11/95 entries of 26.5 hrs. re Markowski deposition). Total downward adjustment of 25% needed to compensate. Allocation is 50-50 LD (2000 Laffey rates)/FD (95/96 rates, as nearly all time is post 5/31/95). 4. PCD (MO) 141.75 hrs. at 2000 Some duplication of A. Allocation of Hrs. to (p. 8-10) Laffey rates sought jointly effort (Verrilli 6/7/95 LD FD each, following from LD FD for total (preparation of 5% reduction: of $32,432.50. supplemental preliminary Verrilli: 17 x .95 x .5 = 8 injunction motion), and hrs.; 6/8/95 Donahue entry Podolsky: 52.75 x .95 x (preparation of .5 = 25 hrs.; supplemental PI motion), Barash: 1 x .95 x .5 = 7/3/95 Donahue entry. .47 hrs.; Some co-counsel Donahue : 20.25 x .95 x conferencing (Verrilli .5 = 9.6 hrs.; 6/12/95; Donahue Cothran: 50.75 x .95 x .5 8/25/95). = 24.1 hrs. Some excessively vague B. Allocated to LD (2000 entries (Podolsky 8/29, Laffey rates): 9/5 1995 entries). $15,360.35. Overall, detail is C. Allocated to FD sufficient and (95/96 Laffey rates): conferencing is at a $14,048. 45. minimum. Only5% D. Total: $29,408.80. reduction is needed. Allocated 50-50 LD (2000 Laffey rates)/FD (95/96 Laffey rates, as majority of work is post 5/31/95). 5. PCD (HE) 2.5 hrs at 2000 Laffey No downward adjustment A. Allocation of hours (p. 10) rates sought jointly from needed. jointly to LD and FD. LD FD for total of Allocation 50-50 LD Verrilli: 2.5 x .5 = 1.25 $762.50. (2000 Laffey rates)/FD hrs. (95/96 Laffey rates) B. Allocated to LD (2000 Laffey rates): $381.25. C. Allocated to FD(95/96 Laffey rates): $343.75. D. Total: $725. 6. PCD (AD) 385.25 hrs at 2000 Laffey Entries reflecting co- A. Allocation of hrs. (p. 10-15) Rates sought jointly counsel conferencing, jointly to LD (2000 Laffey against LD FD for a although understandable rates) FD(95/96 Laffey total of $112,311.25 with respect to the rates), following 20% settlement negotiations reduction: that took place in this Nadler: 19.5 hrs. x .8 x phase, nonetheless .5 = 7.8; require adjustment Podolsky: 132.75 hrs. x (examples: Barash .8 x .5 = 53.1; 9/21/95, Verrilli 10/3-17, Verrilli: 195.5hrs. x .8 x 10/25, 11/12, 15 1995, .5 = 78.2; 3/13/96). Barash: 1.5 hrs. x .8 x .5 Entries reflect = .6; duplication of effort w/o McLaughlin: 33.5 hrs. x sufficient explanation of the role each attorney .8 x .5 = 13.4; played, to justify the Donahue: 2.5 hrs. x .8 x overlap (9/21/95 Verrilli .5 = 1. and Nadler entries re B. Allocated against LD settlement negotiations (2000 Laffey rates): with defendants; $44,924.5. Podolsky entries of 11/16, C. Allocated against FD 17, 20-22, 27-28, 30 1995 (95/96 Laffey rates): and Verrilli entries for $40,451.5. 11/16, 20-21, 26-27, 30 D. Total: $85,376. 1995). Excessively vague entries (Podolsky 10/19, 24, 31, 11/14, 16, 20-22 1995, 2/28/96, 3/1, 4, 6, 11, 15, 4/8 1996 entries stating "worked on settlement" w/o any detail to enable review for reasonableness, Verrilli 12/14, 19 1995). Downward adjustment of 20% required to compensate. Allocation 50-50 to LD (2000 Laffey rates), FD (95/96 Laffey rates, as almost all entries between 5/31 95 and 6/1/96). 7. B. Hollander 305.25 hrs. at 2000 1.Although the A. Allocation of Ridge/Cherry Hill Laffey rates sought from breakdown of work documented hrs. sought (HR/CH) (CD) LD ONLY for total of submitted by plaintiffs on from LD only at 2000 (p. 15-16) $40,793.75 6/7/01 seeks 305.25 hrs. Laffey rates. for a total of 10 Podolsky (38.5 hrs. timekeepers, the claimed, 14 hrs. chronological chart documented): 14 — 4hr. submitted by plaintiffs on Reduction = 10 hrs.; 6/7/01, pursuant to the Bracy (33 hrs. sought, 2 Court's instructions, only hrs. documented): 2 hrs.; documents 63.25 hrs. by Chiapetta (57 hrs. 6 timekeepers. No time claimed, 9.5 entries appear on the documented): 9.5 hrs.; chronological chart for: Cotter (55.25 hrs sought, Young (21.25 hrs.), 4 hrs. documented): 4 Satoskar (27 hrs.), Perez hrs.; (38.75 hrs.), and Lewis Kirkpatrick (5.25 hrs. (19 hrs.). Further, the sought, and documented): time documented on the 5.25 hrs.; chronological chart for Mathis (10.25 hrs. the 6 timekeepers whose sought and documented): time was documented on 10.25 hrs. the chronological chart B. Amount allowed was less than the hours against LD using 2000 claimed on the Laffey rates (with $90/hr breakdown. Further, the allowed for paralegal rates sought for Chiapetta, but $70/hr. paralegals Cotter, For paralegals Cotter, Kirkpatrick, and Mathis Kirkpatrick and Mathis, were only $70/hr., less because that is all that than the 2000 Laffey plaintiffs claimed): rates. The Court $5,673. requested the breakdown of work and chronological charts because the original time records submitted by plaintiffs combined all 4 billing categories, and multiple subcategories into one chronological chart, making effective and time efficient review very difficult. The Court will only evaluate the time submitted in the format requested, and at the rates claimed by the plaintiffs. 2. Podolsky entries of 10/7/98 (2hrs) (co-counsel conferencing) and 10/16/98 (2 hrs.) (excessively vague) will be eliminated. Total downward adjustment: 4 hrs of Podolsky's time. 8. HR/CH (DE) 86.25 hrs. at 2000 Laffey 1. Eliminate Satoskar A. Hours allowed: (p. 16-17) rates sought from LD 8/26/98 co-counsel Podolsky: 46 hrs. — 5.1 only for total of conferencing entry (.25 adjustment = 40.9; $20,051.25 hrs) (unnecessary Bracey: 20.75 hrs. — 4.25 duplication); and Bracey adjustment = 16.5; 11/15/98 entry of 4.25 Satoskar: .25 hrs — .25 hrs. (excessively vague). adjustment = 0; 2. Insufficient detail Young: 1.25; regarding certain Chiapetta: 13 hrs., deposition preparation to Cotter: 4hrs.; permit effective review, Mathis: 1 hr. requiring a 15% B. Total allowed based reduction for these on foregoing hours at entries: Podolsky 2000 Laffey rates against 9/15,25,28, 11/4,6,9,10 LD only: $17,583.25. 1998 (total for these entries = 34 hrs. x .85 = 28.9 (reduction of 5.1 hrs, when added to unreduced time entries of 12 hrs for Podolsky, total authorized for her is 40.9 hrs.) 9. HR/CH (MO) 167.75 hrs at 2000 Laffey 1. Excessive co-counsel A. Allowed against LD (p. 17-20) rates sought from LD conferencing (examples: only at 2000 Laffey rates, only for total of Satoskar 6/22,25, subject to total reduction $29,711.25 7/14,15,23,27,29-30 of amount claimed of 1998; Young 7/14,15,23- 20%: 29; Bracey 7/14,15,28). Podolsky: 27 hrs; 2. Overlap of activities Bracey: 17 hrs; billed without sufficient Satoskar: 66.75 hrs; detail to enable effective Young: 28.5 hrs; review for reasonableness Chiapetta: 12 hrs; (examples: 7/21-23 1998 Olson: 2 hrs; 7/22-24 1998Young Cotter: 11 hrs; 7/23/98 Podolsky work on Mathis: 3.5 hrs. same opposition motion; B. $29,711.25 sought x 7/27/98 Satoskar and .80 + $23,769 allowed Podolsky work on same against LD only, brief; 7/28-29 1998 calculated at 2000 Laffey Young, Bracey, Satoskar rates. Podolsky work on same brief; 7/29-30 1998 entries for Young, Satoskar, Bracey, Podolsky, work on same brief. 3. Excessively vague time entries: 7/24, 26 1998 ("worked on opposition; worked on discovery; worked on preliminary injunction" — 5 hrs. Insufficient detail to assess what was done, and reasonableness. Total reduction: 20%. 10. HR/CH (TP) 522.75 hrs. sought Inadequate detail to Total allocated against (p. 20-23) against LD only at 2000 enable reasonableness LD at 2000 Laffey rates: Laffey rates, for a total of review of many time 522.75 hrs., for a total of $103,533.75 entries: Podolsky 11/11, $103,533.75 x .85 = 14, 15 1998 (8 hrs $88,003.68. worked on expert discovery, Henderson deposition and trial preparation, with no breakdown of reach category; 11/15, 18-30, 12/2-3 1998-more than 100 hrs. trial preparation entries without any detail to enable reasonableness evaluation; Fallow entries regarding research inadequately detailed to enable effective review (11/17-25, 27-28 1998 (49 hrs.)) To compensate, overall reduction of 15% of bill sought. 11.HR/CH (AD) 6.25 hrs. sought from LD No adjustment required. Total allowed against LD (p. 23) only at 2000 Laffey rates, at 2000 Laffey rataes: for total of $1,606.25. $1,606.25. 12. HR/CH (AP) 334.25 hrs. sought 1. Extensive co-counsel Amount allowed against (p. 24-29) against LD only at 2000 conferencing: Smith 2/4, LD at 2000 Laffey rates: Laffey rates, totaling 6/30, 10/25 1999; Bracey 334.25 hrs, or $71,578.75 $71,578.75 3/22,29, 4/26, 5/13 1999; x .85 = $60,841.93. Podolsky 3/30, 4/26, 6/30, 7/8, 10/23, 11/4, 12/5, 1999, 2/9 2000; Goldman 10/1,22 1999, 2/9 2000; Freedman 2/4/2000. 2. Excessively vague entries making effective review difficult: Bracey 4/28, 30, 5/3,21,26,28 1999; Podolsky 4/30, 5/5,13,14, 6/29, 10/25-28 1999; Goldman 10/7, 8 12-13, 20,22,26-29,31, 12/11-14,17 1999. Goldman Podolsky entries between 4/18-5/4 2000 regarding preparation for argument (more than 40 hrs.). Clearly some conferencing at this phase was justified, and reasonable preparation for argument. But the frequent excessively vague entries made effective review much more difficult, warranting an overall 15% reduction in the amount claimed. C. 13. Fee Petition 19.25 hrs. at 2000 Laffey Cavanaugh entries of A. Allocated against LD (FP) rates sought on 50-50 1/22, 24 1999 (9.75 hrs. at 2000 Laffey rates (70% (p. 29) basis from LD and FD, for legal research on of allowed hrs.): totaling $3,933.75 attorneys fees) is $1,181.25. eliminated as duplicative B. Allocated against FD of work by counsel at historic Laffey rates representing plaintiffs in (30% of allowed hrs.): fee petition. $471.37. Time allowed: C. Total allowed: Verrilli: 1/7, 3.5 hrs (for $1,652.62. FD at historic,96/97 Laffey rates, for LD at 2000 Laffey rates); Podolsky: 12/16/97, 1 hr. (97/98 historic Laffey rates for FD, 2000 Laffey rates for LD); Chiapetta: 4/99-1/00 3.5 hrs. (2.5 hrs. at 99/00 historic Laffey rates, 1 hr. at 98/99 Laffey rates, average of the 98/99 99/00 Laffey rates for paralegals is $87.50/hr. As allocated to FD, 2000 Laffey rates for LD). 50-50 allocation between LD and FD is not appropriate, given that vast majority of work billed by Jenner Block was allocated to LD only. Proper allocation is 70% LD, 30% FD.

BGL Fees Expenses (Appendix 3)

Amount Sought Analysis Allocation From 8/1/00-4/3/01: (A) Vague Entries: Authorized award Examples: from initial $37,633.50 (fees) submission: $ 1,104.00 (expenses): 11/14/00 "fee petition" 16 hrs. 11/15/00 "fee petition" 12.5 hrs. $33,870.15 Total: $ 38,737,50 4/01/01 "reply brief" 17 hrs. + 1, 398.75 4/02/01 "reply brief" 10.5 hrs. $35,268.90 (reflects 10% reduction and 10 Total: 56 hrs. hour reduction of time attempting Allocation: to get records ("Initial Difficult to evaluate reasonableness of these entries, submissions") and 10 hours spent even when considering them in conjunction with LD: 60% by paralegal on same). Freeman declaration. FD: 40% Source: Pls' Reply, Exh. 22, Decl. (B) Detailed billing not organized into billing (Note: An initial of Andy Freeman categories as specified by Local Rules making allocation of 50/50 analysis more difficult. would have been reasonable, but (C) Initial portion of bill deals with FOIA requests because rebutting and efforts to obtain records. It appears that this is LD's opposition the time that was deleted (10 hours attorney 10 memo involved hrs. paralegal) but Court cannot tell for certain as more effort than deleted time is not particularized. rebutting FD's opposition, LD (D) Possible overlap of activities without sufficient should be detail to allow it to analyze appropriateness of responsible for doing so. For example: 2/19/01 ADF and CCB more fees and entries re: conf. call with co-counsel. expenses.) Overall reasonable (E) Adjustment needed: 10% across the board allocation: reduction on fees to compensate for deficiencies: $37,633.50 x. .9 = $33,870.15; no reduction as to $35,268.90 x.60 = expenses. $21,161.34 (LD) $35,268.90 x .40 = 14,107.56 (FD) From 4/4/01-6/21/01 (A) Time reasonable; no downward adjustment Approved Amt: $ 15,300.00 (fees) required. Additional time reasonably spent on $ 1,398.75 (expenses) activities including court-initiated request for $15,300.00 (fees) additional information and court-ordered 1,398.75 (exp) Total: $16,698.75 settlement negotiations in effort to settle atty's fees $16,698.75 claim. Source: Pls.2d Supplemental Time Allocation: 50/50: Records filed June 22, 01, with Decl. of Andy Freeman LD: $8,349.37 FD: 8,349.37 Grand Total: Grand Total: $52,933.50 (fees) 2,502.75 (expense) $ 51,967.64 $55,436.25 LD: $ 29,510.71 FD: $ 22,456.93

Expense Reimbursement Sought By ACLU (Appendix 4)

Category Reimbursement Sought Comment 1. Copies (p. 1-4, Ex. 23 to Pls.' $4,056.46 Jointly from FD LD; Amounts claimed seem reasonable, Reply Memo, Paper No. 238) $501.15 from LD only (HR/CH as does requested allocation. phase); Total: $4552.61 Grant as requested (FD LD allocated on 50-50 basis for "Joint" amount): $2,028.23 to FD LD each; $501.15 to LD only. 2. Exhibits (p. 5) $1,416.50 Jointly from FD LD Appears reasonable, approved as requested, FD LD responsible, on 50-50 basis (unless otherwise stated the phrase "approved as requested" means allocated to FD LD on 50-50 basis): $708.25 to FD LD each. 3. Experts (p. 5-6) $25,218.78 Jointly from FD LD; While the amounts sought for $4,085.25 from LD only, for experts do not seem excessive for HR/CH phase; Total: $29,304.03 litigation as involved as this, the supporting material provided by Pls. does not contain sufficient information to allow the court meaningfully to evaluate the request. Accordingly, a 25% reduction will be imposed. Approved: $25,218.78 x .75 = $18,914.08 FD LD 50-50 basis, or $9,457.04 each; $4,085.25 x .75 = $3,063.93 LD only 4. Long Distance Phone Charges $2,637.91 Jointly from FD LD; Approved as requested: $1,318.95 (p. 7-11) $23.22 from LD only (HR/CH FD LD each; $23.22 LD only. phase); Total: $2,661.13 5. Mail/Postage (p. 11-19) $1,909.91 Jointly from FD LD; Approved as requested: $954.95 $310.55 from LD (HR/CH phase); FD LD each, $310.55 LD only. Total: $2,220.46 6. Messenger (p. 19-22) $319.93 Jointly from FD LD; Approved as requested : $159.96 $293.75 LD only (HR/CH phase); FD LD each; $293.75 LD only. Total: $ $613.68 7. Parking/Travel (p. 22-28) $2,486.92 Jointly from FD LD; 7/6/94 $19.95 4/18/95 $23.59 $314.12 LD only (HR/CH); Total: entries (Total of $39.54) for "food $2,801.04 for plaintiff meeting" disallowed as personal expense unrelated to appropriately reimbursable expense, such as providing refreshment to opposing counsel at, for example, a meeting to discuss settlement or a discovery dispute. Allowed amount: $2,447.38 from FD LD 50-50, or $1,223.69 each; $314.12 LD only 8. Other (p. 2) $275.68 Jointly from FD LD Expenses for neighborhood profiles, maps. Approved as requested: $137.84 FD LD each. 9. Research (p. 28-29) $154.95 Jointly from FD LD. Expense for maps, census tract, housing plans and documents. Approved as requested: $77.47 FD LD each. 10. Transcripts (p. 29) $1,757.00 Jointly from FD LD; Approved as requested : $878.50 $ 284.50 from LD only (HR/CH) FD LD each; $284.50 each. 11. Service of Process (p. 28) $33.00 LD only (HR/CH) Subpoena for deposition. Approved as requested: $33.00 LD only. 12. Witness Fees (p. 30) $40.00 LD only Witness fee for deposition. (HR/CH) Approved as requested: $40.00 LD only. Total: FD: $16,944.88 LD: $21,809.10

Expenses sought by Jenner Block (Appendix 5)

Amount sought:

$61,632.64 representing a 1/3 reduction of the expenses incurred of $73,395.47. The reduction was to "back out" expenses unrelated to the PCD, HR/CH and FP portions of the case. The itemization does not attempt to allocate the fees sought between the FD and/or the LD.

Supporting Materials Provided and Analysis:

Pls.' Memo., Exh. 3, Podolsky Decl.; Pls.' Reply Memo, Exh. 24 (itemized listing of expenses). This itemization is a chronological listing of expenses, not segregated by litigation phase or task, by type of charge, and devoid of any explanation of the nature and purpose of the charge. This lack of detail makes review for reasonableness very difficultv and warrants a twenty-five percent reduction across the board to compensate. This results in the following calculation: $61,632.64 x .75 = $46,224.48. With this reduction, the amount sought is reasonable. In this regard, it is noted that the Podolsky declaration verifies that the photocopy charges were assessed at the $.15/page authorized by the Guidelines of this Court.

Allocation:

Plaintiffs do not identify the allocation of J B's fees sought as against the FD and/or LD. However, the expenses sought only relate to the PCD and HR/CH Phases. As for the PCD phase, this Court already has determined that the FD and LD are to be held liable on a fifty-fifty basis. Similarly, the LD only are to be held liable for the HR/CH phase. A review of the billing records submitted by JB in support of the attorney's fees request reflects a total of $511,842.50 was sought for these two phases. Of that amount, $244,567.50, or 48 % represented work on the PCD phase, and $267,275.00, or fifty-two percent for the HR/CH phase. Application of these percentages to the approved expenses produces the following result:

$46,244.48 x 48% = $22,197.37 for PCD phase,

allocated to FD and LD fifty-fifty = $11,098.67 each

$46,244.48 x 52% = $24,036.72 for HR/CH phase,

allocated to the LD only.

Final allocation: $ 35,135.39 against LD

$ 11,098.67 against FD.