Thompson v. Transfer Co.

8 Citing cases

  1. Kahle v. Plochman, Inc.

    85 N.J. 539 (N.J. 1981)   Cited 21 times
    In Kahle, the court held that the actions of the decedent, who took such drugs, were "committed under circumstances in which the decedent was devoid of normal judgment [and thus could] not [be] considered to be willfully, purposefully or intentionally self-inflicted[.]"

    See, e.g., Graver Tank Manufacturing Co. v.Industrial Commission, 97 Ariz. 256, 399 P.2d 664, 668 (Ariz. 1965); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Industrial Commission, 119 Ariz. App. 566, 582 P.2d 656 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1978); DelawareTire Center v. Fox, 401 A.2d 97, 100 (Del.Super.Ct. 1979), aff'd, 411 A.2d 606, 607 (Del. 1980); Jones v. Leon CountyHealth Department, 335 So.2d 269, 271 (Fla. 1976); Whiteheadv. Keene Roofing Co., supra; Harper v. Industrial Commission, 24 Ill.2d 103, 180 N.E.2d 480 (Ill. 1962); Thompson v. Lenoir Transfer Co., 48 N.C. App. 47, 268 S.E.2d 534, 536-37 (N.C.Ct.App. 1980); Petty v. AssociatedTransport, Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321, 328 (N.C. 1970); Saunders v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association, 526 S.W.2d 515 (Tex. 1975); Brenne v. Department of Industry,Labor Human Relations, 38 Wis.2d 84, 156 N.W.2d 497 (Wis. 1968). Under this test an employee's death by suicide is compensable if it is shown to be the result of the disturbance of mind caused by a work-connected injury and its consequences, such as severe pain, depression and despair, and is of such severity as to override normal rational judgment. See e.g., DelawareTire, supra, 411 A.2d at 607; Graver Tank, supra, 399 P.2d at 668.

  2. Thompson v. Cisson Construction

    377 S.C. 137 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 7 times

    Following Petty, the North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated the Commission's denial of benefits in a later workers' compensation case that involved suicide. Thompson v. LenoirTransfer Co., 48 N.C.App. 47, 268 S.E.2d 534 (1980). Recognizing that Petty established "mental derangement may be caused by the consequences of the injury, including pain and despair, as well as by the injury itself," the LenoirTransfer court remanded the case for consideration of evidence that a direct causal connection between the accident and the suicide existed.

  3. Kelly v. Advanced Homecare, Inc.

    595 S.E.2d 813 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)

    "`[T]he exclusion of evidence, including the testimony of witnesses, cannot be held prejudicial when the record fails to show what evidence would have been introduced or what testimony would have been given by the witness.'" Thompson v. Lenoir Transfer Co., 48 N.C. App. 47, 52, 268 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1980) (citation omitted). "`The burden is on the appellant not only to show error, but that the alleged error was prejudicial and amounted to the denial of some substantial right.'"

  4. Elmore v. Broughton Hospital

    334 S.E.2d 231 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)

    Id. at 429, 173 S.E.2d at 330. More recently this issue was addressed in Thompson v. Lenoir Transfer Co., 48 N.C. App. 47, 268 S.E.2d 534, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 405, 273 S.E.2d 450 (1980). In that case John H. Thompson injured his leg in an automobile accident in the course of his employment.

  5. Thompson v. Lenoir Transfer Co.

    72 N.C. App. 348 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985)   Cited 10 times

    In their principal assignments of error, defendants contend that the Commission erred in allowing plaintiff to "introduce into evidence" the transcript of the first hearing and in denying their motion to further depose Dr. Brown. In our previous opinion, Thompson v. Transfer Co., 48 N.C. App. 47, 268 S.E.2d 534, disc. rev. denied, 301 N.C. 405, 273 S.E.2d 450 (1980), the mandate of this court was as follows: The opinion and award of the Commission is vacated and the cause is remanded to the Industrial Commission for a rehearing to: (1) determine the admissibility of Dr. Brown's answer to the hypothetical question propounded by counsel for plaintiff, and, if the answer is admissible, to properly consider such testimony; (2) to consider testimony of lay witnesses concerning decedent's pain and depression which tend to establish a direct causal relation between the accident and the suicide; and (3) to make appropriate additional findings of fact and awards as may be consistent with this opinion and the facts found upon remand.

  6. Ballenger v. Burris Industries

    66 N.C. App. 556 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 34 times
    Providing that we can declare when proffered evidence "does not constitute any sufficient competent evidence on which to base a denial of" a workers’ compensation claim

    Therefore, the findings of fact that claimant's injury and convalescence did not aggravate his preexisting disease and that he would be disabled as a result of the disease had he not broken his leg must be set aside. Furthermore, we note that the absolute nature of these findings totally ignores the directly conflicting statements in the testimony of the two other expert medical witnesses, Dr. Sanders and Dr. Nesbit. As this Court observed in Thompson v. Transfer Co., 48 N.C. App. 47, 53, 268 S.E.2d 534, 538, cert. denied, 301 N.C. 405, 273 S.E.2d 450 (1980), "it is one thing for the commissioner to reject evidence as being incredible, but it is another to say that evidence does not exist at all." In this case, we find a considerable amount of competent evidence which would tend to show that the progress of claimant's preexisting disease was aggravated or accelerated by his accidental injury:

  7. Fayne v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc.

    282 S.E.2d 539 (N.C. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 17 times
    In Fayne v. Fieldcrest Mills, Inc., 54 N.C. App. 144, 282 S.E.2d 539 (1981), disc. rev. denied, 304 N.C. 725, 288 S.E.2d 380 (1982), it held that a plaintiff who had received compensation for a back injury, and who subsequently suffered a disabling neurotic depressive reaction, which medical evidence indicated was directly related to and caused by the back injury, was entitled to additional compensation for the disabling mental condition.

    WEBB, Judge. It has been held in this state that if an employee receives an injury which is compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act and as a result of pain and suffering from this injury he becomes so deranged that he commits suicide, the death is compensable under G.S. 97-38. Petty v. Transport, Inc., 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321 (1970) and Thompson v. Transfer Co., 48 N.C. App. 47, 268 S.E.2d 534 (1980). We believe under the holdings of these cases that if an employee receives an injury which is compensable and the injury causes her to become so emotionally disturbed that she is unable to work, she is entitled to compensation for total incapacity under G.S. 97-29.

  8. Smith v. Mecklenburg Paving Inc.

    I.C. No. 079996 (N.C. Ind. Comn. Sep. 1, 1996)

    Thus where the injuries suffered by the deceased resulted in the loss of normal judgment and he became dominated by a disturbance of the mind which was directly caused by his injury and its consequences, his subsequent suicide is not willful within the meaning of the Act. Petty v. Associated Transport, 276 N.C. 417, 173 S.E.2d 321 (1970); Thompson v. Lenoir Transfer Co., 48 N.C. App. 47, 268 S.E.2d 534, Cert. denied, 301 N.C. 405, 273 S.E.2d 450 (1980). 3. As the decedent's widow, Plaintiff is entitled to these benefits under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-39.