Thompson v. Topsoe

2 Citing cases

  1. Bldg. Serv. Local 32 B-J Pension Fund v. 101 Ltd.

    115 A.D.3d 469 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 13 times

    Contrary to the dissent's view, the landlord cannot recover, as part of its counterclaim, damages it allegedly sustained as a result of the court's issuance of the preliminary injunction. “Absent proof of malice, not asserted here, there is no common-law or statutory right to recover damages sustained as a result of an improperly issued preliminary injunction” ( Thompson v. Topsoe, 237 A.D.2d 113, 113–114, 654 N.Y.S.2d 363 [1st Dept. 1997] ).

  2. Napoleon Art Prod., Inc. v. Laughlin

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 50176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)

    Having thus neutralized defendants at the court's discretionary phase, plaintiffs cannot now in good faith argue that defendants must also be deprived of a remedy because they were initially deprived of a voice. It is true that the general rule, derived from the common law (for genesis and evolution of this rule, see Gross v. Shields, 130 Misc 2d 641 [Sup Ct, NY Co, Greenfield, J, 1985]), is that a party who in good faith improperly obtains a restraint on another's actions is not liable for damages flowing from such restraint (see General Electric Company v. Metals Resources Group Limited, 293 AD2d 417, 419 [1st Dept 2002]; Honeywell, Inc. v. Technical Building Services, Inc., 103 AD2d 433, 435 [3rd Dept 1984]) other than by virtue of the contractual obligations imposed by an undertaking, if one is required to be posted (see Thompson v. Topsoe, 237 AD2d 113, 113-114 [1st Dept 1997]; RS Paralegal Recovery Services, Inc. v. Poughkeepsie Savings Bank FSB, 190 AD2d 660, 660-661 [2nd Dept 1993]). However, the key to this freedom to litigate issues with impunity is that the parties act in good faith.