Opinion
No. 05-02-01013-CR
AFFIRM and Opinion Filed on May 28, 2003 Do Not Publish
On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F01-76402-TS.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant appeals his conviction for felony driving while intoxicated (DWI). Appellant pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea bargain conviction. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court assessed punishment at 10 years confinement, probated for five years, and a $2,000 fine. In a single issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to quash the indictment. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment. As a preliminary matter, we will address the State's contention that we have no jurisdiction over this appeal. A defendant in a plea-bargained felony case must file a notice of appeal that satisfies the extra-notice requirements of rule 25.2(b)(3). See Tex.R.App.P. 25.2(b)(3). The notice must state: (1) the appeal was for a jurisdictional defect; (2) the substance of the appeal was raised by written motion and ruled on before trial, or (3) the trial court granted permission to appeal. See Tex.R.App.P. 25.2(b)(3); Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). A notice of appeal that substantially complies with rule 25.2(b)(3) is sufficient to invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction. See Johnson v. State, 84 S.W.3d 658, 660 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). In this case, appellant's plea papers show he pleaded guilty with the understanding that he could appeal the trial court's ruling on his pretrial motion to quash the indictment. While appellant's notice of appeal does not expressly state the trial court granted "permission" to appeal, the notice of appeal was itself "approved" and signed by the trial court judge. We conclude the notice of appeal substantially complied with rule 25.2(b)(3). Therefore, we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See id. In his sole point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to quash the indictment. Prior to trial, appellant filed a motion to quash asserting one of the prior DWIs used to enhance his conviction to a felony was void. According to appellant, the prior DWI was void because the sentence assessed in that case was void. Specifically, appellant complains the sentence was less than the minimum allowed by law. The court of criminal appeals has recently stressed that very few irregularities will render a conviction void. See Ex parte McCain, 67 S.W.3d 204, 209 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002). Void convictions are those convictions in which the trial court lacked jurisdiction over the person or subject matter or in which the trial judge lacked qualification to act in any manner. See id. In this case, appellant has raised no irregularities or complaints regarding the power of the court to act with respect to his adjudication of guilt or any other irregularities with respect to that adjudication. He complains only that he benefitted by receiving a sentence less than that authorized by law. We conclude the illegal sentence did not render appellant's prior conviction void. Cf. Levy v. State, 818 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991) (remanding for punishment only when void sentence assessed); Russell v. State, 727 S.W.2d 92, 94 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, pet. ref'd) (affirming conviction after correcting judgment to delete illegal portion of sentence). We resolve the sole issue against appellant and affirm the trial court's judgment.