Thus, severance was discretionary rather than mandatory. The Supreme Court of Georgia's opinion in Thompson v. State , 302 Ga. 533, 541 (III) (A), 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017), relied upon by Sloan on appeal, does not mandate a contrary conclusion. In that case, the Supreme Court of Georgia addressed whether a subsequent attempted armed robbery of person in a car, committed three-and-a-half years after the charged offenses, could be admitted in a case charging the defendant with the murder of victims shot in their home during an apparent robbery.
(b) Absence of Mistake or Accident . The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that other acts evidence should not be admitted on this ground when the defendant "never claimed, nor was there any evidence to suggest, that the shooting was the result of an accident or mistake...." Brown v. State , 303 Ga. 158, 161 (2), 810 S.E.2d 145 (2018). See also Thompson v. State , 302 Ga. 533, 541 (III) (A) 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017) (trial court erred by admitting evidence of subsequent crime on this ground where there was "no allegation that [the defendant] accidentally or mistakenly ... stole [the victim’s] property"). The Eleventh Circuit has suggested that
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of Appellant's later acts to show motive. See id. ; Thompson v. State , 302 Ga. 533, 540, 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017) ; Brooks v. State , 298 Ga. 722, 726-727, 783 S.E.2d 895 (2016). (d) Intent
Consequently, whether the charged offenses resulted from an accident or mistake was irrelevant. See, e.g., Brown , 303 Ga. at 161-162 (2), 810 S.E.2d 145 (holding that the trial court erroneously admitted prior aggravated assault convictions to show absence of mistake or accident where the defendant never claimed, and there was no evidence to suggest, that the charged shooting was an accident or mistake); Thompson v. State , 302 Ga. 533, 541 (III) (A), 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017) (evidence of a subsequent armed robbery was inadmissible to show mistake with respect to the charged shootings and robberies because there was no allegation that the defendant "accidentally or mistakenly shot the victims or that he accidentally or mistakenly stole their property"); Parks , 300 Ga. at 306 (2), 794 S.E.2d 623 (a prior aggravated assault conviction was inadmissible to show knowledge or absence of mistake in a prosecution for murder and aggravated assault because the defendant's knowledge was not at issue in light of his justification defense, "and he made no claim that he accidentally or mistakenly shot the victim"); compare Thompson , 308 Ga. at 859 (2), 843 S.E.2d 794 (in a murder prosecution, evidence of the defendant's prior acts of violence toward family members was relevant to rebut his claim that his wife's death resulted from accident or mistake). The trial court therefore similarly erred in admitting the other acts evidence on th
We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence of other crimes for a clear abuse of discretion. Thompson v. State , 302 Ga. 533, 539-40 (III) (A), 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017) ; State v. Jones , 297 Ga. 156, 159 (1), 773 S.E.2d 170 (2015). For cases tried after January 2, 2013, the admissibility of other acts evidence is governed by OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), which provides:
The new Evidence Code specifically omitted course of conduct as a permissible purpose for other acts evidence. See Thompson v. State , 302 Ga. 533, 538 (III) (A), 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017). (Punctuation and emphasis omitted.)
Davis v. State, 272 Ga. 327, 329 (2), 528 S.E.2d 800 (2000). See also Thompson v. State, 302 Ga. 533, 543 (III) (B), 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017) (same).As this Court has previously explained:
Generally, we have found Rule 404 (b) errors harmless "where the properly admitted evidence ... was so strong that the prejudicial effect of the other-acts evidence had no significant influence on the guilty verdicts." Heard , 309 Ga. at 91 (3) (g), 844 S.E.2d 791 (collecting cases); see also Thompson v. State , 302 Ga. 533, 542 (III) (A), 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017) ("Where evidentiary error is deemed harmless, it is often true that the evidence was only ‘marginal’ to the prosecution's case.") (quoting Johnson v. State , 301 Ga. 277, 280 (2), 800 S.E.2d 545 (2017) ).
To be admissible to prove motive, the other-acts evidence "must be logically relevant and necessary to prove something other than the accused's propensity to commit the crime charged." Thompson v. State , 302 Ga. 533, 540 (III), 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). In denying Thomas's motion for new trial, the trial court concluded that the prior shooting was relevant to show motive because it showed Thomas's "willingness to resort to violence to resolve a petty squabble with another man about a woman — violence that would seem excessive and inappropriate to an ordinary person."
And in determining whether such an error is harmless, we assess the evidence from the viewpoint of reasonable jurors, not in the light most favorable to the verdicts. See Thompson v. State , 302 Ga. 533, 542 (III) (A), 807 S.E.2d 899 (2017). Here, we cannot say that the error was harmless, because the evidence of McIver's guilt of aggravated assault and felony murder was not overwhelming or even strong, and the evidence of criminal intent was disputed and circumstantial.