McMurray, P.J., and Phipps, J., concur. See Montgomery v. State, 204 Ga. App. 534, 536 (2) ( 420 S.E.2d 67) (1992) (motion to suppress untimely when made at the close of the state's case); see also Thompson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 18, 20-21 (2) ( 392 S.E.2d 732) (1990) (motion to suppress untimely when filed on the day of trial). JOHNSON, Chief Judge.
But no matter how the filing at issue was styled, the trial court acted within the ambit of Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1, which permits trial courts to refuse to consider untimely motions. See Roberson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 379 (1) ( 393 S.E.2d 516) (1990); see also Thompson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 18, 20 (2) ( 392 S.E.2d 732) (1990). 3. The trial court did not err by denying Johnson's motion for directed verdict of acquittal.
As noted above, attorney Ward was appointed after arraignment, at or before which time motions are required to be filed. Ellis v. State, 216 Ga. App. 232, 233 (1) ( 453 S.E.2d 810) (1995); Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.1. While appellate counsel notes that a motion to file thereafter may be made, granting or denying such a request is within the discretion of the trial court. USCR 31.1. Denial of such a motion is not error. Ellis v. State, supra; Thompson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 18, 20 (2) ( 392 S.E.2d 732) (1990). Therefore, failure to make such a motion was not a deficient performance.
' [Cit.]" Thompson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 18, 21 (2) ( 392 S.E.2d 732) (1990). If defendant's argument were accepted, a defendant could simply choose to have the jury rather than the judge decide the search and seizure issue by failing to raise it in a timely manner — an unacceptable result under OCGA § 17-5-30. For these reasons, defendant's first enumeration of error is without merit.
The record reveals, however, that the court did inquire of Willey and his counsel after the jury had been excused if they were ready to proceed with sentencing. Counsel responded in the affirmative and the court gave every available opportunity to introduce evidence. There was no error. Thompson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 18, 21 (3) ( 392 S.E.2d 732) (1990). 5. Finally, Willey contends that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance.
The court having complied with OCGA § 17-10-2 (a), there is no need for remand under these circumstances. Thompson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 18, 21 (3) ( 392 S.E.2d 732) (1990); compare Raymond v. State, 168 Ga. App. 487, 488 ( 309 S.E.2d 669) (1983). 14. Finally, defendant contends his motion for new trial on the basis of delay in completion of the transcript should have been granted.
Accordingly, we find no error with the trial court's decision to sentence appellant without conducting a pre-sentence investigation. Thompson v. State, 195 Ga. App. 18 (3) ( 392 S.E.2d 732) (1990). Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in considering his prior criminal record in aggravation of his sentence when such evidence had not been made known to appellant prior to trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-2 (a). Prior to imposing the sentence the trial judge asked the probation officer if he was familiar with appellant's prison record, and the probation officer responded that he knew that appellant had been on probation on several occasions and that his probation had been revoked.