This court has held that if an accused had the intent to commit the underlying offense at the time he murdered and the offense is committed immediately after the murder, he is guilty of murder while committing the underlying offense, and the capital murder statute still applies. It seems to be generally understood that it is impossible to say with certainty whether intercourse immediately preceded or immediately followed the murder of a female victim. Thompson v. State, 615 So.2d 129, 133 (Ala.Crim.App. 1993) (citations omitted). Because we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support Thompson's rape conviction, we need not reach the Ex Post Facto issue.
Cf. Tarver v. State, 761 So.2d 266, 268 (Ala. Crim.App. 2000) ("[W]e have repeatedly held that the procedural bars in Rule 32 apply equally to all cases, including those in which the death penalty has been imposed. See Nicks v. State, 783 So.2d 895 (Ala.Cr.App. 1999); Horsley v. State, 675 So.2d 908 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996); Thompson v. State, 615 So.2d 129 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 418 (1993)."). Keddie-Hill and Tillman cite Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 585 (Ala. 1990) (plurality opinion), in support of their argument that they may proceed with a civil class action to challenge the DNA database fee.
We have often stated that the procedural bars of Rule 32 apply with equal force to all cases, even those involving the death penalty. See Horsley v. State, 675 So.2d 908 (Ala.Crim.App. 1996), and Thompson v. State, 615 So.2d 129 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993). Hutcherson argues in his Rule 32 petition that he was denied a fair trial (he asserts several different constitutional grounds in support of this argument), that his guilty plea was improperly induced; that the trial court failed to comply with the procedural requirements for accepting a guilty plea, and that he was denied the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel (he cites 30 different grounds in support of this contention).
Also, we have repeatedly held that the procedural bars in Rule 32 apply equally to all cases, including those in which the death penalty has been impsoed. See Nicks v. State, [783] So.2d [895] (Ala.Cr.App. 1999); Horsley v. State, 675 So.2d 908 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996); Thompson v. State, 615 So.2d 129 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993)."
Also, we have repeatedly held that the procedural bars in Rule 32 apply equally to all cases, including those in which the death penalty has been imposed. See Nicks v. State, [Ms. CR-96-2446, October 1, 1999] ___ So.2d ___ (Ala.Cr.App. 1999); Horsley v. State, 675 So.2d 908 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996); Thompson v. State, 615 So.2d 129 (Ala.Cr.App.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 976 (1993). This claim is also procedurally barred because it could have been, but was not, raised on direct appeal. See Rule 32.2(a)(5), Ala.R.Crim.P.
Duren v. State, 590 So.2d 360 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), [aff'd] 590 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1594, 118 L.Ed.2d 310 (1992); Gibson v. State, 580 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990)." Thompson v. State, supra, 615 So.2d at 131. AFFIRMED.