Opinion
No. 00-D-1646-N
December 11, 2000
ORDER
Before the court is pro se Plaintiff Linda Thompson's Motion For Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO") With Immediate Hearing, which was filed December 6, 2000 and incorporates by reference various evidentiary materials previously filed with the court. On December 4, 2000, the court previously denied Plaintiff's motion for an ex parte TRO. After careful consideration of the arguments presented, the relevant law, and available evidence, the court finds that this instant Motion is due to be denied.
The court construes Plaintiff's pleadings as identifying three separate grounds for seeking a TRO. Specifically, Plaintiff seeks to restrain Defendant from allegedly injuring her via: (1) defamation and state law tortious conduct; (2) violation of her copyrighted materials; and (3) spoilation of evidence that may be used if this case proceeds to trial. The court declines to conduct a hearing with respect to any of these three alleged acts of misconduct.
The purpose of a TRO is to protect the movant from irreparable injury and to preserve the status quo until the district court renders a meaningful decision on the merits. See Canal Auth. of Fla v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 572 (5th Cir. 1974). Plaintiff must establish: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that the moving party will suffer irreparable injury in the absence of the injunction; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm the proposed injunction may cause the Defendant; and (4) that the injunction will not conflict with the public interest. See Johnson v. USDOA, 734 F.2d 774, 781 (11th Cir. 1984) (interpreting FED. R. CIV. P. 65(b)). The first element is necessarily the most significant of the four; it would be inequitable to enjoin conduct if the movant has little chance of success at trial. See Callaway, 489 F.2d at 576; Gonzalez v. Reno, 2000 WL 381901 at *1 (11th Cir. 2000). An appellate court reviews the district court's findings for an abuse of discretion. See Sierra Club v. Georga Power Co., 180 F.3d 1309, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999). With these principles in mind, the court turns to each of Plaintiff's claims, and finds that her Motion as a whole should be denied.
The Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit prior to October 1, 1981. See Bonner v. Prichard, 661. F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
Plaintiff's strongest claim is that Defendant is diluting and infringing upon her copyrighted materials. Plaintiff has presented evidence suggesting that she has applied for a copyright on a book in the making. However, Plaintiff has not presented actual evidence showing that she has been granted a copyright by the U.S. Copyright Office. In some situations, this lack of proof would not, in itself, be sufficient to defeat Plaintiff's claim. See, e.g., Wilson v. Mr. Tee's, 855 F. Supp. 679, 682 (D.N.J. 1994). However, the court finds no evidence suggesting that Plaintiff's copyright application will be granted in the immediate future. Thus, at this juncture, the court is reluctant to find that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the copyright claims. See, e.g., SportsMEDIA Tech. Corp. v. Upchurch, 839 F. Supp. 8, 9 (D. Del. 1993).
In making this decision, the court emphasizes that it does not find that is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction per se; it merely finds that the court's doubts about the same counsel strongly against delving too deeply into the merits of Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff may well have protectable materials, as defined by the Copyright Act of 1976. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (A)(a), 411. But at this point, the evidentiary record does not decidedly lead to that conclusion. Thus, the Motion is due to be denied with respect to Plaintiff's copyright claims.
The court notes that this section of the Act was recently amended.See Pub.L. 105-304, Title I, § 102(d), 112 Stat. 2863 (Oct. 28, 1998).
Plaintiff's two other claims need not detain the court long. First, the court reaffirms its previous findings on December 4, and notes that it is loathe to issue a TRO on matters touching upon First Amendment freedoms. At this point in this case, even if Plaintiff could show a likelihood of success on the merits, the public's interest in the wide, robust exchange of ideas would counsel against judicial intervention. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Cf. Carroll v. President Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). If the court could even begin to conceive of a situation when it would restrain First Amendment freedoms — and this is doubtful — this is not one of them. Second, Plaintiff has failed to produce any materials suggesting that Defendants intend to destroy any evidence in this case. See First Tech. Safety Sys. v. Depinet, 11. F.3d 641, 652 (6th Cir. 1993). Thus, the court refuses to conduct a TRO hearing with respect to the claims of tortious conduct or spoilation of evidence.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, it is CONSIDERED and ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion be and the same is hereby DENIED. The court notes that Plaintiff has not moved for a preliminary injunction, and the court, therefore, does not consider that issue. It is further NOTED that this case has been, and the same remains at the disposal of the Honorable Vanzetta Penn McPherson, United States Magistrate Judge, for further proceedings and determination or recommendation as may be appropriate.