Opinion
Civil Action 23-3240
09-25-2023
ORDER
EDWARD G. SMITH, J.
AND NOW, this 25th day of September, 2023, after considering the application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 4) and complaint (Doc. No. 1) filed by the pro se plaintiff, Carolyn Mae Thompson (“Thompson”); and for the reasons set forth in the separately filed memorandum opinion, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. The application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. No. 4) is GRANTED. Thompson has leave to proceed in forma pauperis;
2. The complaint (Doc. No. 1) is DEEMED filed;
3. The complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
4. Thompson may file an amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. Any amended complaint must identify all defendants in the caption of the amended complaint in addition to identifying them in the body of the amended complaint, and shall state the basis for Thompson's claims against each defendant. The amended complaint shall be a complete document that does not rely on the initial complaint or other papers filed in this case to state a claim. When drafting her amended complaint, Thompson should be mindful of the court's reasons for dismissing her claims in her initial complaint as explained in the court's memorandum opinion. Upon the filing of an amended complaint, the clerk of court shall not make service until so ordered by the court;
5. The clerk of court is DIRECTED to E-MAIL and MAIL a blank copy of this court's current standard form to be used by a self-represented litigant filing a civil action bearing the above-captioned docket number. Thompson may use this form to file her amended complaint if she chooses to do so;
This form is available on the court's website at: https://www.paed.uscourts.gov/documents2/forms/forms-pro-se.
6. If Thompson does not wish to file an amended complaint and instead intends to stand on her complaint as originally pleaded, she may file a notice with the court within thirty (30) days of the date of this order stating that intent, at which time the court will issue a final order dismissing the case. Any such notice should be titled “Notice to Stand on Complaint,” and shall include the civil action number for this case; and
See Weber v. McGrogan, 939 F.3d 232, 241 (3d Cir. 2019) (“If the plaintiff does not desire to amend, he may file an appropriate notice with the district court asserting his intent to stand on the complaint, at which time an order to dismiss the action would be appropriate.” (quoting Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976))); In re Westinghouse Sec. Litig., 90 F.3d 696, 703-04 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding “that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed with prejudice the otherwise viable claims . . . following plaintiffs' decision not to replead those claims” when district court “expressly warned plaintiffs that failure to replead the remaining claims . . . would result in the dismissal of those claims”).
7. If Thompson fails to file any response to this order, the court will conclude that she intends to stand on her original complaint and will issue a final order dismissing this case.
See Weber, 939 F.3d at 239-40 (explaining that plaintiff's intent to stand on complaint may be inferred from inaction after issuance of order directing plaintiff to take action to cure defective complaint). The court also notes that the six-factor test announced in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984), is inapplicable to dismissal orders based on a plaintiff's intention to stand on his complaint. See id. at 241 n.11 (treating “stand on the complaint” doctrine as distinct from dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with court's order, which require assessment of Poulis factors); see also Elansari v. Altria, 799 Fed.Appx. 107, 108 n.1 (3d Cir. 2020) (per curiam). Indeed, an analysis under Poulis is not required when a plaintiff willfully abandons the case or makes adjudication impossible, as would be the case when a plaintiff opts not to amend his complaint, leaving the case without an operative pleading. See Dickens v. Danberg, 700 Fed.Appx. 116, 118 (3d Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“Where a plaintiff's conduct clearly indicates that he willfully intends to abandon the case, or where the plaintiff's behavior is so contumacious as to make adjudication of the case impossible, a balancing of the Poulis factors is not necessary.”); Baker v. Accounts Receivables Mgmt., Inc., 292 F.R.D. 171, 175 (D.N.J. 2013) (“[T]he Court need not engage in an analysis of the six Poulis factors in cases where a party willfully abandons her case or otherwise makes adjudication of the matter impossible.” (citing cases)).