The Act of 1851 contemplated primarily nothing more than the separation of the lands which were owned by individuals from the public domain. United States v. Morillo, 1 Wall. 706; United States v. Fossat, 20 How. 413; Meader v. Norton, 11 Wall. 442; Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming Co., 180 U.S. 72; Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238. The act did not intend to require tribal Indians to present their occupancy title to the Commission under penalty of its extinguishment.

The decree of confirmation and the resulting patent ascertained and settled the title conclusively between the United States and defendant. Act of March 3, 1851; Rodrigues v. United States, 1 Wall. 582, 588; United States v. Elder, 177 U.S. 116; United States v. Turner, 11 How. 667; Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 542, 543, 556; Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 252; United States v. Fossatt, 21 How. 445, 448; United States v. Workman, 1 Wall. 745; Los Angeles Milling Co. v. Thompson, 117 Cal. 594; s.c. 180 U.S. 72; Harvey v. Barker, 126 Cal. 262; s.c. 181 U.S. 481; Phillips v. Mound City Association, 124 U.S. 605. The reservation of the alleged easement should have been embodied in the decree and patent.

The Supreme Court in a direct appeal reversed the decisions, not on the ground that the Board or the District Court was without jurisdiction, but for the reason that it appeared from the showing made that the authority of the governor of California to grant unoccupied public lands could not be enlarged by the departmental assembly under Mexican law so as to empower him to dispose of lands of the Mission San Gabriel and of the Mission San Luis Rey. That these decisions cited are of no value to sustain appellant's position here fully appears in the case of Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming Milling Co., 180 U.S. 72, 21 S. Ct. 289, 291, 45 L. Ed. 432, in which case, as here, the lands involved were a part of the Ex-Mission of San Fernando, and the patent attacked was the very same one issued to De Celis which is here being assailed upon the same contention that "said commissioners were wholly without jurisdiction to adjudicate upon or to confirm said claim." The Supreme Court of the United States, however, confirmed the decision of the Supreme Court of California ( 117 Cal. 594, 49 P. 714), and sustained the jurisdiction of the Commission, and held the patent valid.

It is in thiseffect of the patent as a record of the government that itssecurity and protection chiefly lie." ( Beard v. Federy,supra, 70 U.S. at pp. 491-492 [18 L.Ed. at pp. 92-93], italics added; accord Dominguez De Guyer v. Banning (1897) 167 U.S. 723, 740-744 [42 L.Ed. 340, 345-347, affirming De Guyer v. Banning (1891) 91 Cal. 400, 402-404 [27 P. 761]; Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming M. Co. (1901) 180 U.S. 72, 77-80 [45 L.Ed. 432, 434-436, 21 S.Ct. 289].) In United States v. Coronado Beach Co., supra, 255 U.S. 472, the Supreme Court held that the owner of realty, including tidelands, which was acquired by a Mexican grant and subsequently confirmed in federal patent proceedings, could not be deprived of its property without just compensation.

The court held that all the interest of the United States, whatever it may have been, and everything connected with the soil or any portion of it, or everything lying over it or under it, was conveyed to the grantee by the United States in the patent process. In Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming Milling Co. (1901) 180 U.S. 72 [45 L.Ed. 432, 21 S.Ct. 289], an attempt was made to invalidate a federal patent under the Act of 1851 by asserting that Mexican law, at the time of the grant, gave the Governor of California no authority to dispose of certain land in question. The contention was that the Mexican grant was, in effect, void and that the federal patent was likewise void.

The appellants cite and rely upon a number of cases in which such a patent is referred to as having the effect of a quitclaim, as being conclusive against the government, and as being equally conclusive against parties claiming under the government by title subsequent. ( Beard v. Federy, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 478 [18 L.Ed. 88]; Knight v. United Land Assn., 142 U.S. 161 [12 Sup. Ct. 258, 35 L.Ed. 974]; United States v. Coronado Beach Co., 274 Fed. 230; Thompson v. Los Angeles F. M. Co., 180 U.S. 72 [21 Sup. Ct. 289, 45 L.Ed. 432]; De Guyer v. Banning, 167 U.S. 723 [17 Sup. Ct. 937, 42 L.Ed. 340].) The point relied upon by the appellants is sufficiently set forth in the case of Beard v. Federy, supra.

The 1851 Act was intended "to place the titles to land in California upon a stable foundation, and to give the parties who possess them an opportunity of placing them on the records of this country, in a manner and form that will prevent future controversy." Fremont v. United States, 17 How. 542, 553-554 (1855); accord, Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming Co., 180 U.S. 72, 77 (1901). California argues that since its public trust servitude is a sovereign right, the interest did not have to be reserved expressly on the federal patent to survive the confirmation proceedings.

"We are of opinion that these acts applied and were intended to apply to all claims, whether perfect or imperfect, in that particular resembling the California act; that the courts were bound to accept their provisions; and that there was no want of constitutional power in prescribing reasonable limitations operating to bar claims if the course pointed out were not pursued." See also Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming c. Co., 180 U.S. 72, 77, in which it was said in reference to the statute before us: "Every question which could arise on the title claimed could come to and receive judgment from this court.

The goal was "to place the titles to land in California upon a stable foundation, and to give the parties who possess them an opportunity of placing them on the records of the country, in a manner and form that will prevent future controversy." Fremont v. United States, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 542, 553-54, 15 L.Ed. 241 (1855); accord Thompson v. Los Angeles Farming and Milling Co., 180 U.S. 72, 77, 21 S.Ct. 289, 291 (1901). The land grants made by the Mexican government to Castillero and the Carrillos were confirmed under the provisions of the Act of 1851. United States v. Castillero, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 464, 16 L.Ed. 498 (1860); Manuelo Carrillo de Jones v. United States, (S.D.Cal., Dec. Term 1855) (unpublished).

" In Thompson v. Los Angeles F. M. Co., 180 U.S. 72, 76, 21 S.Ct. 289, 291, 45 L.Ed. 432, it is said: "The ultimate basis of the contention is that the court of private land claims had no jurisdiction to confirm the grant because the governor of the Californias had no power to convey the public land for a money consideration. That is to say, the grant being void it could not be the basis of a claim to lands 'by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican government.' * * *