Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 02-3198-CM
December 18, 2003
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Petitioner was convicted on multiple drug-related charges in two separate trials on April 24, 1998, Case No. 98 CR 98, and August 21, 1998, Case No. 97 CR 427. Petitioner appealed her convictions, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions. This matter comes before the court on petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1).
I. Legal Standard
Given that petitioner filed after implementation of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), AEDPA's amendments to the habeas statute apply, which have modified the role of federal habeas courts. Mollett v. Mullin, 348 F.3d 902, 909 (10th Cir. 2003). The court can grant relief from petitioner's state court conviction if the decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The court is also empowered to grant the habeas petition if the conviction "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Id. The state court's "determination of a factual issue," however, "shall be presumed to be correct," and the petitioner carries "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." Id. § 2254(e)(1).
The Supreme Court, in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), explained the effects of AEDPA on a federal habeas court's review of a petition for relief from a state court conviction. A state court's decision "will certainly be contrary to our clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases," or "if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from our precedent." Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06. A federal habeas court should grant relief only where "the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409-10.
II. Analysis
A. Jury Instructions
Petitioner contends that both state trial courts committed clear error by failing to include certain jury instructions.
A habeas petitioner seeking relief from a state court conviction based upon an erroneous jury instruction carries a heavy burden. Lujan v. Tansy, 2 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 1993). The petitioner must demonstrate that the erroneous instruction `"by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.'" Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1977) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). Petitioner's burden is not met where she demonstrates that `"the instruction is undesirable, erroneous, or even `universally condemned.'" Id. (quoting Cupp, 414 U.S. at 146). Indeed, "[t]he burden of demonstrating that an erroneous instruction was so prejudicial that it will support a collateral attack on the constitutional validity of a state court's judgment is even greater than the showing required to establish plain error on a direct appeal." Id. Moreover, petitioner in this case faces an even more difficult task because "[a]n omission, or an incomplete instruction, is less likely to be prejudicial than a misstatement of the law." Id. at 155.
1. Possession Instruction
Petitioner first contends that the state trial courts in both her convictions failed to provide an instruction on the definition of possession pursuant to Kansas law.
Petitioner is not clear as to the legal basis upon which she rests her claim of clear error. If, as the court suspects, she alleges that the trial courts erred under state law, then this court cannot properly review her claim. A petitioner who asserts violation of state law rights, rather than federal rights, may not obtain habeas relief. Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982). Even were plaintiff alleging that the omitted instruction violated her federal rights, the court concludes that she has not met her burden to show that the error so infected her entire trial that the conviction violated her due process rights. Henderson, 431 U.S. at 154.
2. Drug Tax Stamp Instruction
In her August 21, 1998, jury trial, petitioner was convicted of, among other offenses, possession of methamphetamine without tax stamps affixed. Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by omitting an instruction to inform the jury that an essential element of the offense was that she had the opportunity to affix the tax stamps.
Again, petitioner does not assert that this alleged omission violated her federal rights. The court nevertheless concludes that the omission did not deprive her of any rights protected under federal law.
3. Unanimity Instruction
Next, petitioner seeks relief based upon her allegation that the state trial court in her April 24, 1998, conviction failed to properly instruct the jury that their verdict should be unanimous. Petitioner does not indicate in her habeas petition what federal rights are implicated by this alleged failure, but she did raise the implication of a deprivation of her Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights in her appeal to the Kansas Court of Appeals.
"A general instruction on the requirement of unanimity suffices to instruct the jury that they must be unanimous on whatever specifications they find to be the predicate of the guilty verdict.'" United States v. Linn, 31 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Sasser, 971 F.2d 470, 477 (10th Cir. 1992)). In this case, the trial judge instructed that "[y]our agreement upon a verdict must be unanimous." State of Kan. vs. Rebecca Dale Thompson, Case No. 98 CR 98, 85. The court, therefore, concludes that the trial court sufficiently instructed the jury on the necessity of a unanimous verdict, and that petitioner suffered no deprivation of constitutional due process or other federal rights.
B. Admissibility of Drug Evidence
Finally, petitioner contends that the state trial court in her August 21, 1998, conviction erred by admitting certain drug evidence in her case.
Petitioner's allegation, however, relates to whether the evidence was properly admitted pursuant to Kansas law. A federal habeas court cannot review a state court's decision interpreting that state's evidentiary law. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991) ("In ruling that McGuire's due process rights were violated by the admission of the evidence, the Court of Appeals relied in part on its conclusion that the evidence was `incorrectly admitted . . . pursuant to California law.' Such an inquiry, however, is not part of the federal court's habeas review of a state conviction." (citation omitted)). Petitioner's assertion raises an issue of state law, and the court, therefore, concludes that she has not presented a proper ground for relief before this court.
ORDER IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by a Person in State Custody (Doc. 1) is denied.