Thompson v. Forest

62 Citing cases

  1. Kurowski v. Town of Chester

    170 N.H. 307 (N.H. 2017)   Cited 10 times
    Assuming without deciding that Thompson ’s discussion of intentional and non-intentional torts applied in the context of recreational use immunity statutes

    Although RSA 212:34 does not define "intentional act," see RSA 212:34, I, V, both parties argue that we should interpret "intentional act" under RSA 212:34 in the same fashion as we did when construing the Workers' Compensation Law: for a tort to be an "intentional tort" the tortfeasor must act with the knowledge that "his conduct [is] substantially certain to result in injury." Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 220, 614 A.2d 1064 (1992) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 870, at 280 (1979) ). Because the parties agree on this definition, we assume, without deciding, that it applies here.

  2. Boulter v. Eli and Bessie Cohen Foundation

    166 N.H. 414 (N.H. 2014)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that the firefighter's rule applied to a police incident while quoting Thompson ’s discussion of intentional and non-intentional torts

    We reach a similar conclusion regarding the plaintiff's claim of intentional conduct. SeeThompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 219, 614 A.2d 1064 (1992) (‘‘To constitute an intentional tort, the tortfeasor must have known that his conduct was substantially certain to result in injury."). Accordingly, the Firefighter's Rule applies and the plaintiff has not, as a matter of law, alleged facts satisfying the exceptions set forth in the statute.

  3. Iddings v. Mee-Lee

    82 Haw. 1 (Haw. 1996)   Cited 115 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Interpreting words of Hawaii's workers compensation statute using their common meaning

    Such intent is not limited to consequences that are desired. See Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 614 A.2d 1064 (1992). If an actor knows that an injury is substantially certain to result from his act and he nevertheless completes the act, he is treated by the law as if he in fact desired to produce the injury.

  4. Miller v. Sunapee Difference, LLC

    918 F.3d 172 (1st Cir. 2019)   Cited 9 times

    Thus, conduct is "reckless" where "the known danger ceases to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable person would avoid, and becomes in the mind of the actor a substantial certainty." Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 614 A.2d 1064, 1068 (1992) (quoting W.P. Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 8, at 36 (5th ed. 1984) ). Miller argues that Mount Sunapee's conduct meets this high bar because "Mount Sunapee knew, or should have known, in light of receiving thirty-five inches of snow in the weeks leading up to the accident, that unmarked snowmaking equipment, such as that with which he collided, had become covered, and concealed from view, by snow."

  5. Lizzol v. Bros. Prop. Mgmt. Corp.

    2017 DNH 183 (D.N.H. 2017)   Cited 7 times

    Boulter v. Eli & Besse Cohen Found., 166 N.H. 414, 421 (2014). Moreover, as the court noted in Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 220 (1992), a litigant's characterization of conduct as "wanton and reckless" is not particularly useful in identifying the line separating negligence and intentional torts because, "willful, wanton and reckless conduct may, or may not, be the basis for a properly pleaded intentional tort." "Recklessness" as plaintiffs mean the term to be understood here — equating to bad faith in contract performance — must, at a minimum, describe conduct qualifying as an intentional tort (i.e., more than negligence), that is, "where the known danger ceases to be only a foreseeable risk which a reasonable person would avoid, and becomes in the mind of the actor a substantial certainty.

  6. McKinnon v. Harris

    Civil No. 1:05-CV-93-JAW (D.N.H. Sep. 21, 2005)   Cited 2 times

    What is "wanton" in New Hampshire? The Supreme Court of New Hampshire has never precisely defined the term, but has discussed the concept. In 1992, the Supreme Court issued two opinions that shed some light: Thompson v. Forest, 614 A.2d 1064 (N.H. 1992) and Akerley v. Hartford Ins. Group, 616 A.2d 511 (N.H. 1992). For Judge McAuliffe's discussion of these cases, see Minion, 929 F. Supp. at 525; see also Inserra v. Nedeau, No. 93-279, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16278, at *12 (D.N.H. Nov. 10, 1994). In Thompson, the plaintiff alleged her co-employees engaged in "willful, wanton and reckless" conduct, which was sufficient to allow a civil action overriding the co-employee immunity provisions under New Hampshire's workers' compensation law.

  7. Spencer v. Kantrovitz

    392 F. Supp. 2d 29 (D. Mass. 2005)   Cited 3 times
    Holding that Massachusetts law applied to a New Hampshire plaintiff where the accident occurred in Massachusetts and benefits were paid to the plaintiff from a Massachusetts workers' compensation plan

    Spencer concedes in the Agreed Statement of Facts that he had not availed himself of the exception to the exclusivity bar set forth in G.L. c. 152, § 24, that permits an employee to give written notice at the time of hiring of the intent to retain the right to sue at common law in the event of an employment-related injury. The workers' compensation scheme is based on a "fundamental quid pro quo," Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 219, 614 A.2d 1064, 1067 (1992), which is "the tort immunity conferred on the employer . . . [in exchange] for providing no-fault workers' compensation benefits." Id. at 218, 614 A.2d at 1066 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted).

  8. Fernandes v. TPD, Inc.

    Civil No. 99-330-JD, Opinion No. 2000DNH007 (D.N.H. Jan. 7, 2000)

    The statute also precludes claims against a co-employee for negligent torts. See Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 219 (1992). Fernandes argues that the injuries she suffered fall outside the scope of injuries covered by the worker's compensation statute.

  9. Minion Inc. v. Burdin

    929 F. Supp. 521 (D.N.H. 1996)   Cited 13 times
    In Minion, Judge McAuliffe concluded it is "entirely consistent with New Hampshire tort law for `wanton' conduct justifying enhanced damages to be found in connection with an unintentional tort."

    That enhanced compensatory damages are available in negligence cases when the defendant's conduct is also wanton, malicious, or oppressive finds further support in the New Hampshire Supreme Court's treatment of the first of these three types of aggravated conduct. In Thompson v. Forest, 136 N.H. 215, 614 A.2d 1064 (1992), the court determined that an allegation of "wanton" conduct does not necessarily constitute and allegation of "intentional" conduct that would give rise to a claim for an intentional tort. Rather, the court held that wanton conduct, in some situations, may only give rise to a negligence claim: "The defendant who acts in the belief or consciousness that the act is causing an appreciable risk of harm to another may be negligent, and if the risk is great the conduct may be characterized as reckless or wanton, but it is not an intentional wrong." Id. at 220, 614 A.2d 1064 (emphasis added).

  10. In re Beaconvision Inc.

    340 B.R. 674 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006)   Cited 8 times
    Finding that the $200,000 was "an interest of the debtor in property" that the transfer was made within one year of the Debtor's petition date, that the Debtor received less than reasonably equivalent value, and that the Debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer

    Pac. Atl. Shippers, Inc. v. Schier, 258 A.2d 351, 353 (N.H. 1969). A party can be liable for conversion without having "a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm."Thompson v. Forest, 614 A.2d 1064, 1067 (N.H. 1992). Similarly, good faith does not rescue a party from liability, Pac. Atl. Shippers, Inc., 258 A.2d at 353, but "[t]he tortfeasor must have known that his conduct was substantially certain to result in injury."