Opinion
August 28, 1951. Rehearing Denied November 6, 1951.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Dade County, Stanley B. Milledge, J.
Smathers, Thompson, Maxwell Dyer, Miami, for appellant.
Field Spence, Miami, for appellee.
This cause comes before the Court on an appeal from a Final Decree, designated a Judgment, in favor of the plaintiff, entered by the Honorable Stanley Milledge, one of the Judges of the Circuit Court, in and for Dade County, Florida.
The plaintiff (appellee) filed his complaint in November, 1950, against the executor of the estate of Ogden M. Goodsell, deceased, (appellant) alleging in substance that during his lifetime Goodsell held the title to a certain airplane; that the title was actually held in trust, one-half for the benefit of the plaintiff, who had paid one-half of the purchase price thereof; that the airplane was subsequently destroyed by fire and one-half of the net proceeds of the insurance, being $28,000, was owing to the plaintiff but he had only received from Goodsell the sum of $4,000; that he was therefore entitled to $10,000 plus interest from September 29, 1947; that a claim was filed against the estate of the decedent to which objection was made.
The defendant Executor filed his Answer in due course admitting that a claim was filed and objected to, but denying all the remaining allegations of the Complaint.
Testimony in behalf of the plaintiff was taken before the Honorable Stanley Milledge, Circuit Judge, on February 5 and 9, 1951, the defendant having no testimony to offer.
On February 23, 1951, Judge Milledge entered a Final Decree finding that the plaintiff and the deceased were joint owners of the airplane; that the defendant held title thereto in trust for himself and the plaintiff; that the net proceeds of the fire insurance amounted to $26,992.65, one-half of which belonged to the plaintiff and of which only $4,000 had been paid to him, thereby leaving a balance of $9,496.32, together with interest in the amount of $1,402.29 for which the estate was liable.
The controlling question in this case is whether the evidence is sufficient to justify the decree of the Chancellor in favor of the appellee, declaring in effect a resulting trust of a one-half interest in and to the airplane which was destroyed by fire and ordering one-half of the proceeds of the insurance policy which was paid to Ogden M. Goodsell prior to his death, turned over by the Executor of Goodsell's Estate to appellee. Our answer to this question is in the affirmative because we find in the record competent, substantial evidence which sustains the findings of fact necessarily made by the Chancellor and upon which his Final Decree was predicated. There was evidence before the Chancellor which, if believed by him, was sufficient to remove from his mind every reasonable doubt as to the existence of a trust.
We are unalterably committed to the rule that we will not reverse a Final Decree entered by a Chancellor which is predicated upon conflicting evidence if the record contains competent, substantial testimony to sustain such Final Decree, or, stated in another way, unless the Chancellor's findings were clearly erroneous. See Harmon v. Harmon, Fla., 40 So.2d 209; Hamilton v. Laesch, 134 Fla. 591, 184 So. 110; White Furniture Co. v. Mather, 154 Fla. 129, 17 So.2d 118; Baxter v. Liddon, 62 Fla. 428, 56 So. 410; Lluis v. Lluis, 91 Fla. 706, 108 So. 671; Guerra v. Guiterrez, 66 Fla. 570, 64 So. 232; Simpson v. First National Bank of Pensacola, 74 Fla. 539, 77 So. 204; Lovett v. Armstrong, 61 Fla. 681, 54 So. 381 and Sarasota Ice, Fish Power Co. v. Lyle Co., 58 Fla. 517, 50 So. 993. This rule is particularly applicable when, as in this case, the witnesses appeared and testified personally before the Chancellor. See Harmon v. Harmon, supra, and Guerra v. Guiterrez, supra.
Our judgment must be one of affirmance.
Affirmed.
SEBRING, C.J., and TERRELL and THOMAS, JJ., concur.