Opinion
23-CV-2025 (LTS)
06-12-2023
ODRAY KEVIN THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. DONALD J. TRUMP, INC., USA; PRINCE ANDREW; PRINCESS KATE MIDDLETON MEGAN MARKLE; L. WARD; ALVIN BRAGG; BENNY BOSCIO, JR.; WARDEN CORT, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Plaintiff was detained at the George R. Vierno Center on Rikers Island when he filed this action pro se. By order dated March 10, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), that is, without prepayment of fees.Thereafter, Plaintiff was transferred to Mid-Hudson Forensic Psychiatric Center.
Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed IFP. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Plaintiff brings this action against members of the British royal family (“Prince Andrew,” Kate Middleton, and Meghan Markle); “Donald J. Trump, Inc. (USA)”; New York Supreme Court Justice Laura Ward; Anna M. Kross Center Warden Cort; New York County District Attorney Alvin Bragg; and New York City Correction Officers Benevolent Association (COBA) President Benny Boscio, Jr. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons set forth below and allows Plaintiff, within 60 days, to amend his complaint to replead certain claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a prisoner's IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915I(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). “[A]n action is ‘frivolous' when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . .; or (2) the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”) Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
Under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff alleges the following:
I did the applecaion with Noble Pearson Bay. I hav a docket number, my S.S. number is still active here in New York City and this is the 3rd times I have been kidnaped by that NYPD Police Gang and the Supreem Court of New York and this slave complex Rickers Island. I am a Mooris American of MST of A. The trib am from the Maroons/Isrillight Moor/Moslem. What I stand for is love truth peace justice unity [illegible] power. I need my brith right and right natinolty. Am sueing because my name is in capital letter of the strawman.(ECF 2 at 6.)
All spelling and punctuation in quoted material is from the original.
Plaintiff further seeks to “come for[war]d to the Kings and Queens of England, [and] even the prince and princess.” (Id. at 5.) He notes that Jamaica has demanded “billions in slavery reparations from UK.” (Id.)
In response to a question on the form complaint about his injuries, Plaintiff writes:
Kidnapping by NYPD Department of Police. Druge wrongfuly by the court of Supreme Brooklyn, Manhattan, Queens Bronx. Traumatized, eye raping handcuffed bind back beating in jeail working as a slave for 5 five cents a day.(Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff seeks “freedom out of jail, reparations for slavery of Africa,” and recognition that he is a creditor landlord with land, money, and gold worth more than $70 billion.
DISCUSSION
A. “Redemptionist” and Sovereign Citizen Theories
Plaintiff's assertions appear to be based, at least in part, on the “redemptionist” or “sovereign citizen” theory. Courts have explained the idea behind these false and misguided ideas:
“Redemptionist” theory . . . propounds that a person has a split personality: a real person and a fictional person called the “strawman.” The “strawman” purportedly came into being when the United States went off the gold standard in 19[3]3, and, instead, pledged the strawman of its citizens as collateral for the country's national debt. Redemptionists claim that government has power only over the strawman and not over the live person, who remains free. Individuals can free themselves by filing UCC financing statements, thereby acquiring an interest in their strawman. Thereafter, the real person can demand that government officials pay enormous sums of money to use the strawman's name or, in the case of prisoners, to keep him in custody. If government officials refuse, inmates are encouraged to file liens against correctional officers and other prison officials in order to extort their release from prison. Adherents of this scheme also advocate that inmates copyright their names to justify filing liens against officials using their names in public records such as indictments or court papers.Monroe v. Beard, 536 F.3d 198, 203 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); United States v. Cook, No. 3:18-CR-00019, 2019 WL 2721305, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. June 28, 2019) (“[S]overeigns believe they can use the court systems to access funds tied to their birth certificate and Social Security numbers, through a tactic known as ‘redemption.'”).
These pseudo-legal theories have been consistently rejected by federal courts as frivolous. See Muhammad v. Smith, No. 3:13-CV-760, 2014 WL 3670609, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2014) (“Theories presented by redemptionist and sovereign citizen adherents have not only been rejected by the courts, but also recognized as frivolous and a waste of court resources.”). Even when read with the “special solicitude” due pro se pleadings, Triestman, 470 F.3d at 475, there is no viable legal theory on which Plaintiff can rely, see Denton, 504 U.S. at 33; Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437. The Court therefore dismisses these claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i), and does not grant Plaintiff leave to replead any claims based on redemptionist or sovereign citizen theories in his amended complaint, if he chooses to file one.
B. Excessive Force
Plaintiff alleges, without more, that he suffered “j[ai]l beatings.” (ECF 1 at 6.) The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of pretrial detainees to be free from excessive force amounting to punishment. United States v. Walsh, 194 F.3d 37, 47 (2d Cir. 1999). To state an excessive force claim, a pretrial detainee must show that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable. Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015).
Here, Plaintiff fails to plead any facts about what occurred. He does not state who was involved, what happened, where the use of excessive force occurred, or when. Plaintiff's allegations thus do not comply with Rule 8 because the facts alleged are insufficient to put defendants on notice of the claim against them. Moreover, Plaintiff does not appear to have named any individual who was personally involved in violating his rights as a defendant. See Spavone v. N.Y. State Dep' t of Corr. Serv., 719 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013) (“It is well settled in this Circuit that personal involvement of defendants in the alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under § 1983.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff's allegation of excessive force is therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Because Plaintiff may be able to plead facts sufficient to make out of a claim for excessive force under these standards, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead this claim in an amended complaint.
C. Forced Labor Claim
1 Thirteenth Amendment Claim
The Thirteenth Amendment provides that “[n]either slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States ....” U.S. Const. amend. XIII, § 1. The Amendment was intended to prohibit all forms of involuntary labor, not solely to abolish chattel slavery. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872). The Supreme Court has defined involuntary servitude as “a condition of servitude in which the victim is forced to work for the defendant by the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use or threat of coercion through law or the legal process.” United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988). The prohibition on involuntary servitude does not “bar labor that an individual may, at least in some sense, choose not to perform.” Immediate v. Rye Neck Sch. Dist., 73 F.3d 454, 459-61 (2d Cir. 1996) (concluding that school's mandatory community service requirement did not constitute impermissible involuntary servitude).
“Pretrial detainees are not outside the ambit of the Thirteenth Amendment's involuntary servitude provision.” McGarry v. Pallito, 687 F.3d 505, 511 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that it “would be grotesque to read ‘involuntary servitude' as not covering a situation where an employee was physically restrained by guards,” or where servitude was created “by a credible threat of imprisonment”).In McGarry, a pretrial detainee adequately pleaded that he was subjected to involuntary servitude where he asserted that his “work in the prison laundry was compelled and maintained by the use and threatened use of physical and legal coercion,” which he supported with allegations that “defendants threatened to send him to ‘the hole' if he refused to work and that he would thereby be subjected to 23 hour-per-day administrative confinement and shackles,” and they threatened him with disciplinary reports that could affect the length of his confinement,. Id. at 511-12.
Cf Toliver v. New York, No. 20-CV-607, 2020 WL 6748847, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2020) (“As a sentenced prisoner, the requirement that Plaintiff work does not run afoul of the provisions of the Thirteenth Amendment.”), aff'd, 2022 WL 351057 (2d Cir. Feb. 7, 2022).
Here, Plaintiff states that, while he was a pretrial detainee at Rikers Island, he was “working as a slave for 5 five cents a day.” (ECF 2 at 6.) Although Plaintiff alleges generally that he was “working as a slave,” he does not include any allegations that he was required - explicitly or through threats or coercion - to work while he was a pretrial detainee. These allegations therefore do not state a claim for a violation of Plaintiff's rights under the Thirteenth Amendment.
2. Failure to Pay Minimum Wages
An individual who qualifies as an employee under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219, can sue for unpaid minimum wages. Danneskjold v. Hausrath, 82 F.3d 37, 39 (2d Cir. 1996). Where a prisoner is providing labor services to a prison, however, the FLSA generally does not apply because “[t]he relationship is not one of employment; prisoners are taken out of the national economy; prison work is often designed to train and rehabilitate; prisoners' living standards are determined by what the prison provides; and most such labor does not compete with private employers.” Id. at 42 (noting “a congressional assumption that prison labor will not be paid at FLSA minimum wage level”); Wingate v. New York City, 2014 WL 3747641, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2014) (rejecting FLSA claim based on allegations that plaintiff was paid less than the minimum wage for work he performed while confined at Rikers Island as a pretrial detainee).
Plaintiff does not suggest that, as a pretrial detainee, he was working in a capacity other than providing services to the prison. Nor does he plead any other facts that could give rise to an inference that he was an employee within the meaning of the FLSA while he was doing unspecified work at Rikers Island. Plaintiff's allegation that he was paid wages substantially below the federal minimum wage for his work as a pretrial detainee, without more, thus does not state a claim upon which relief may be granted under federal law. See Danneskjold, 82 F.3d at 42.
Although the complaint gives no indication that Plaintiff can plead additional facts that would suggest that, as a pretrial detainee, he was subjected to involuntary servitude or performing work governed by the FLSA, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to replead such claims if he is able to do so.
Insofar as Plaintiff states that he has been kidnapped and seeks “freedom out of jail,” the Court notes that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is the sole remedy for prisoner seeking to challenge the fact or duration of his confinement. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973). A habeas petitioner must raise his federal grounds for relief through one complete round of the state's established review process before bringing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999). Plaintiff has not identified any ground for relief, and thus there does not appear to be any basis for recharacterizing this action - which otherwise seeks only money damages - as a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
D. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Plaintiff's claims based on the redemptionist theory should not be repleaded. Because Plaintiff may be able to allege additional facts to state a valid claim for excessive force, or some claim arising from his labor while a pretrial detainee at Rikers Island, the Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend his complaint to detail the excessive force and labor-related claims.
If Plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must name as the defendants (in the caption and in the statement of claim) those individuals who were allegedly involved in the deprivation of his federal rights. If Plaintiff does not know the name of a defendant, he may refer to that individual as “John Doe” or “Jane Doe” in both the caption and the body of the amended complaint.The naming of Doe defendants, however, does not toll the three-year statute of limitations period governing this action and Plaintiff shall be responsible for ascertaining the true identity of any “Doe” defendants and amending his complaint to include the identity of any “Doe” defendants before the statute of limitations period expires.
For example, a defendant may be identified as: “Correction Officer John Doe #1 on duty August 31, 2022, at Sullivan Correctional Facility, during the 7-3 p.m. shift.”
Should Plaintiff seek to add a new claim or party after the statute of limitations period has expired, he must meet the requirements of Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the “Statement of Claim” section of the amended complaint form, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant. If Plaintiff has an address for any named defendant, Plaintiff must provide it. Plaintiff should include all of the information in the amended complaint that Plaintiff wants the Court to consider in deciding whether the amended complaint states a claim for relief. That information should include:
a) the names and titles of all relevant people;
b) a description of all relevant events, including what each defendant did or failed to do, the approximate date and time of each event, and the general location where each event occurred;
c) a description of the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
d) the relief Plaintiff seeks, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, Plaintiff's amended complaint should tell the Court: who violated his federally protected rights; how, when, and where such violations occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to replead solely with respect to his claims that he suffered “jail beatings” and was required, as a pretrial detainee, to work.
E. Referral to NYLAG Pro Se Clinic
Plaintiff may consult the legal clinic in this District that assists people who are parties in civil cases and do not have lawyers. The Clinic is run by a private organization called the New York Legal Assistance Group (“NYLAG”); it is not part of, or run by, the court (and, among other things, therefore cannot accept filings on behalf of the court, which must still be made by any pro se party through the Pro Se Intake Unit).
To request limited-scope assistance from the Clinic, Plaintiff may mail a signed retainer and intake form to the NYLAG Pro Se Clinic at 40 Foley Square, LL22, NY, NY 10007. Once the paperwork is received, the Clinic will coordinate contact with the litigant. Once the paperwork is received, it may take up to two weeks for the Clinic to contact the litigant. Copies of the Clinic's flyer, retainer, and intake form are attached to this order.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii). The Court is directed not to enter judgment and to hold this matter open on the docket to allow Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to replead his claims that he was subjected to excessive force and involuntary labor as a pretrial detainee at Rikers Island.
If Plaintiff chooses to submit an amended complaint, it must be submitted to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within 60 days of the date of this order, captioned as an “Amended Complaint,” and labeled with docket number 23-CV-2025 (LTS). An Amended Civil Rights Complaint form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, or seek an extension of time if he intends to file an amended complaint, the Court will enter judgment dismissing the complaint.
The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.