Thompson v. Department of Correction

Full title: VICKI THOMPSON, EMPLOYEE CLAIMANT v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION, EMPLOYER…

Court: Before the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission

Date published: Apr 13, 2007

2007 AWCC 39 (Ark. Work Comp. 2007)

Opinion

CLAIM NO. E105634

OPINION FILED APRIL 13, 2007

Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION, Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.

Claimant represented by HONORABLE PHILIP M. WILSON, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Represented by HONORABLE RICHARD S. SMITH, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Respondent represented by HONORABLE JUDY RUDD, Attorney at Law, Little Rock, Arkansas.

Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.

OPINION AND ORDER

The respondents appeal a decision of the Administrative Law Judge finding that respondent no. 1 is still responsible for the 25% penalty for a safety violation after respondent no. 2, the Death Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund, took over payments. Based upon our de novo review of the record, we find that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge should be and is hereby reversed.

The claimant in this case sustained an admittedly compensable injury on March 6, 1991, which rendered her permanently and totally disabled. The claimant's compensation was increased 25% when it was found that the claimant's injury was caused in substantial part by her employer's failure to comply with applicable safety provisions. Respondent no. 1 paid benefits until it reached the $75,000 limit pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502 (1987). The 25% penalty, was not included in the $75,000 threshold. The Death Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund, respondent no. 2, took over liability on September 11, 2000. At this time, the claimant is requesting the difference of the 25% penalty to be paid by either respondent no. 1 or respondent no. 2. When respondent no. 2 assumed payments for the claimant's permanent and total disability benefits, respondent no. 1 quit paying the claimant the 25% penalty. Respondent no. 2 did not pay the 25% penalty either. The Administrative Law Judge found that respondent no. 1 was still responsible for the 25% penalty even though respondent no. 2 had assumed payment for permanent and total disability benefits. In our opinion, the Administrative Law Judge was wrong to conclude that it was the responsibility of respondent no. 1 to continue to pay the 25% penalty. We do, however, agree with the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that the Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund was not responsible for payment of the 25% penalty. However, we do not agree with the Administrative Law Judge's finding that respondent no. 1 continues to be responsible for the 25% penalty.

This very issue has been before the Commission previously inNorris (Dec'd.) V. Georgia Pacific Corp., FC Opinion filed April 14, 19999, AWCC File No. E111034. In an unpublished opinion, the Full Commission affirmed and adopted a June 22, 1998 opinion, of the Administrative Law Judge finding that the claimant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that entitlement to the 25% safety violation penalty continued after the respondent employer paid a 25% penalty and the Death and Permanent Disability Trust Fund became liable to pay dependancy benefits to the claimant's survivor. Although the Commission affirmed and adopted the Administrative Law Judge and this was an non-published opinion, we find that the Full Commission's finding in Norris should be followed.

In Norris, the claimant was injured prior to July 1993, and Act 796 did not apply. The appropriate statutes are Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-501 through 503 (1987). Section 11-9-501 sets out limitations (such as how long one may receive maximum weekly benefits and percentage of the average weekly wage) on compensation received for death resulting from an injury.

Section 502(b)(1) limits to $75,000.00 the amount of weekly benefits the respondent employer is responsible for paying in a death claim. Section 502(b)(2) makes it clear that once the employer pays $75,000.00 under (b)(1), the Fund shall pay ALL benefits in excess of that amount (emphasis added.)

Section 503, "Additional Compensation — Violations of Safety Provisions," provides the difficulty in this claim. It states that once a safety violation has been proven, compensation provided for by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9- 501(a) — (d) shall be increased by twenty five percent (25%). Section 503, being penal in nature, is to be construed in favor of those upon whom a penalty is to be imposed, Franklin Collier Farms v. Chapple, 18 Ark. App. 200, 712 S.W.2d 334 (1986). Therefore, it must be construed in favor of the respondent employer. A penal statute is one which imposes punishment for an offense committed against the state. It is clear that Section 503 is designed to penalize employers for their behavior and to insure employers conform to the requirements of the law by taking certain precautions to protect the employee.

The express absence of statutory language making the Fund responsible for payment of the 25% penalty makes it clear that the Legislature never intended the Fund to be responsible for paying a penalty incurred by the respondent employer, no matter when the respondent employer's responsibility for paying a penalty ends.

Section 503 assesses the penalty on benefits awarded in Section 501; and Section 502 sets out the exceptions to 501, which includes the $75,000.00 limit on weekly benefits to be paid by the respondent employer. Section 502 states "how long" and "how much" weekly benefits a respondent employer must pay in a death case. Section 501 tells us how to compute the amount of weekly benefits owed. Section 503 assesses a 25% penalty on "compensation provided for by Section 11-9-501 (a)-(d)." One must then look at the exceptions in Section 502 to see what is "provided for" (in terms of length of payment and amounts.) From the unambiguous language of the statute, (strictly construing it in favor of the respondent employer), it appears the legislature clearly intended the maximum amount subject to the 25% penalty assessment was to be $75,000.00 for the respondent employer.

According to the evidence in this case, the respondent employer paid $75,000.00 of weekly benefits plus the 25% penalty. The clear weight of the evidence indicates that the respondent employer has complied with the dictates of the law with respect to the penalty. It would take a great deal of speculation and conjecture to read the statutes involved and then conclude that the legislature in any way intended the respondent employer to pay a 25% penalty after paying the statutorily-limited compensation amount of $75,000.00 and the 25% penalty. The heading on Section 503 is "Additional Compensation," which the Legislature intended for the "additional" on the respondent employer to be 25% of the amounts designated in § 501, as limited by § 502.

The claimant argues that the 25% penalty is payable on all compensation which the respondent employer is obliged to pay under the Workers' Compensation law. However, the respondent employer has paid all compensation which it is obliged to pay under the law. Therefore, the obligation to pay a 25% penalty ceases when the respondent employer reaches its maximum liability. It would not be reasonable to find that the respondent employer should pay 25% of what the law says the Fund should now pay. It is noted once again that Section 502 states that after the employer pays $75,000.00 in weekly benefits to a claimant, ". . . ALL benefits in excess of $75,000.00 shall be payable from the [Fund]" (Emphasis added). In our opinion, there is no indication the Legislature intended the Fund to be responsible for a safety violation penalty. To do so would penalize ALL employers who contribute.

The basic rule for statutory construction is to give the full effect to the intent of the Legislature. Ford v. Keith, 338 Ark. 487, 996 S.W.2d 20 (1999). If the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the analysis need go no further. Burcham v. City of Van Buren, 330 Ark. 451, 954 S.W.2d 266 (1997). In interpreting a statute and attempting to construe legislative intent, courts look to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, legislative history, and other appropriate matters that throw light on the matter.Hanford Produce Co. v. Clemons, 242 Ark. 240, 412 S.W.2d 828 (1987);Board of Trustees v. Stodola, 328 Ark. 194, 199-200, 942 S.W.2d 255 (1997), quoting of City of Ft. Smith v. Tate, 311 Ark. 405, 409-410, 844 S.W.2d 356 (1993). Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9- 503 is penal in nature and must be strictly construed. The Legislature clearly intended to punish the employer with a safety violation, and to deter others similarly situated; but only based on a stated amount of benefits paid. In our opinion, statutory interpretation mandates a denial of an award of an additional safety violation penalty against the respondent employer or the Fund.

Therefore, after considering the evidence, we find that respondent no. 1 should not be liable for the penalty pursuant to the safety violation after the claimant's benefits are being paid by the Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Administrative Law Judge.

IT SO ORDERED.

OLAN W. REEVES, Chairman

KAREN H. McKINNEY, Commissioner

Commissioner Hood dissents.

DISSENTING OPINION

I must respectfully dissent from the Majority opinion finding that neither Respondent No. 1 or Respondent No. 2 are responsible for paying the claimant a 25% penalty. After a de novo review of the record, I find that the purpose of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-503 was penal in

nature and designed to punish employers that had safety violations. Accordingly, I find that while the Death and Permanent Total Disability Fund should not be liable for an ongoing payment of a penalty, the respondent carrier should.

Specifically, I find that the payments attributable to the safety violation are a penalty and therefore separate and distinct from a weekly benefit as defined by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-501 (a-d). Accordingly, I find that Respondent No. 1 should continue to pay the claimant a 25% penalty in addition to her weekly benefit amount as previously assessed.

Arkansas Code Annotated 11-9-503 (1987) provides that:

Where established by clear and convincing evidence that an injury or a death is caused in substantial part by the failure of an employer to comply with any Arkansas statute or official regulation pertaining to the health or safety of employees, compensation provided for by 11-9-501(a)-(d) shall be increased by 25 percent

The language of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502 (b) is also relevant. It provides,

(b)(1) For injuries occurring on and after March 1, 1981, the first seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) of weekly benefits for death or permanent total disability shall be paid by the employer or his insurance carrier in the manner provided by this chapter.

(2) An employee or dependent of an employee who receives a total of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) in weekly benefits shall be eligible to continue to draw benefits at the rates prescribed in this chapter, but all benefits in excess of seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000) shall be payable from the Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund.

As noted by the Fund in their brief, they are only liable for payment of weekly benefits. I agree with the Fund's assertion that the penalty assessed by Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-503 is not a "weekly benefit". The Arkansas Courts have consistently held that "weekly benefits" as used in Section 502, refers to payments for death or permanent total disability only. "Weekly benefits" do not include payments for temporary disability or lump sum payments to widows upon re-marriage. Sparks Regional Medical Center v. Death and Permanent Total Disability Bank Fund, 220 Ark. App. 204, 737 S.W.2d 463(1987); Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund v. Tyson Foods, 304 Ark. 359, 801 S.W.2d 653 (1991).

Alternatively, I find nothing in the plain language of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-503, its legislative history, or public policy considerations for a safety violation statute indicating that the employer's liability for the penalty extinguished on September 11, 2000, as the Public Employee Claims Division asserts. Likewise, nothing in the plain language of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502 or § 11-9-503 indicates any express or implied legislative intent to limit the respondent carrier's liability once the Death and Permanent Trust Fund takes over.

The Majority relies on the case Norris (Dec'd v. Georgia Pacific Corp., Full Commission Opinion filed April 14, 1999, AWCC File No. E111034 to assert that no penalty is payable after the Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund assumes payments pursuant to Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-502. The administrative law judge's June 22, 1998 opinion and the Majority's current opinion appears to me to have reasoned that (1) the Section 503 penalty is only computed on benefits referenced in Section 501; (2) benefits after $75,000 are payable under Section 502, not under Section 501; therefore (3) no further penalty is payable by the respondent employer under Section 503 after paying $75,000 under Section 501, because then the Death and Permanent Total Disability Trust Fund starts payments under Section 502, not Section 501, after the employer pays $75,000 in weekly benefits. I disagree with this conclusion for two reasons.

First, I conclude that the reference to Section 501 in Section 503 is in regard to determining the rate of compensation payable to the claimant, thereby establishing the method for calculating the penalty payments due, and not intended to identify the entity paying the compensation, as the Majority's opinion appears to reason. Moreover, I point out that benefits payable by the Fund under Section 502 are payable at compensation rates determined under Section 501, just as the penalty owed by the employer under Section 503 is based on compensation rates determined under Section 501. Second, I note that on December 9, 1998, approximately six months after the ALJ's analysis, the Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed a separate Full Commission decision finding that (1) the safety violation penalty applies to the wage-loss portion of permanent total disability and (2) a controverted attorney's fee also applies on the controverted 25% increase in compensation payable under Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-501. Bussell v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 64 Ark. App. 194, 981 S.W.2d 98 (1998).

In summary, the plain language of Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-503, the Court's reasoning in Prier Brass v. Weller, supra., and the public policy considerations in enacting a safety violation penalty statute, all lead me to conclude that a safety violation penalty against the employer/carrier for permanent and total disability is appropriate where, as here, the compensable injury caused the permanent total disability. I therefore find that the Public Employee Claims Division should have been liable for continuing penalty payments after September 11, 2000.

For the aforementioned reasons, I must respectfully dissent.

PHILIP A. HOOD, Commissioner