One exception to the warrant requirement is the existence of exigent circumstances. Thompson v. Clark, 364 F.Supp.3d 178, 190 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).

Notably, the District Court also opined that the relevant Second Circuit precedent "can and should be changed" to say that a favorable termination occurs so long as the prosecution ends without a conviction. 364 F.Supp.3d 178, 181, 196–197 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). On appeal, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit adhered to its precedent in Lanning and affirmed the dismissal of Thompson's Fourth Amendment claim.

One exception to the warrant requirement is the existence of exigent circumstances. Thompson v. Clark, 364 F.Supp.3d 178, 190 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).

In that case, following dismissal of state criminal charges, a pretrial detainee brought a Section 1983 action in a federal district court for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, against the police officers who had initiated the state criminal proceedings against him. After trial of the federal Section 1983 action, the district judge granted judgment for the officers, 364 F.Supp.3d 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), finding that the arrestee failed to establish that his state criminal proceeding was terminated in his favor, as required for malicious prosecution.

There, the plaintiff had brought a Fourth Amendment claim for malicious prosecution after he was charged and detained pursuant to state criminal proceedings, and the charges against him were dismissed without explanation. Thompson v. Clark, 364 F.Supp.3d 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). The District Court for the Eastern District of New York dismissed the malicious prosecution claim, holding that one of the claim's elements, “favorable termination of the underlying criminal prosecution,” required a showing of an affirmative indication of innocence, something the plaintiff had not alleged.

The cases Plaintiff relies on are not to the contrary. In Thompson v. Clark, 364 F. Supp. 3d 178 (E.D.N.Y. 2019), the court found that the fact that a prosecutor moved to dismiss criminal charges "in the interest of justice" did not mean that the dismissal was not a "favorable termination," noting that the "court did not give its reasons on the record for a dismissal in the interest of justice," and opining that "any ambiguity on whether the dismissal was on the merits should be decided in defendant's favor." Id.

Thus, "where a dismissal in the interest of justice leaves the question of guilt or innocence unanswered, . . . it cannot provide the favorable termination required as the basis for [that] claim." Thompson v. Clark, 364 F. Supp. 3d 178, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Lanning, 908 F.3d at 28-29). Nothing in Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration changes the Court's de novo determination that "the Second Department's decision reversing the disorderly conduct and resisting arrest convictions is not a termination in Plaintiff's favor."

In general, the question of whether a termination was favorable to the accused is a matter of law for the court, but where questions remain as to the reason for the termination, this becomes an issue of fact for the jury." Thompson v. Clark , 364 F. Supp. 3d 178, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2019).

Thus, "[w]here a dismissal in the interest of justice leaves the question of guilt or innocence unanswered, it cannot provide the favorable termination required as the basis for that claim." Thompson v. Clark, 364 F. Supp. 3d 178, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Doc. 32-5. "'In general, the question of whether a termination was favorable to the accused is a matter of law for the court, but where questions remain as to the reason for the termination, this becomes an issue of fact for the jury.'" Thompson v. Clark, 364 F. Supp. 3d 178, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (quoting Rodriguez v. City of New York, 291 F. Supp. 3d 396, 413-14 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (emphasis added). Had the prosecution, upon moving for dismissal of the charges argued that the evidence of guilt was legally insufficient, "a jury could easily find . . . the explanation given by . . .[the] District Attorney's Office for dropping that charge affirmatively admits [plaintiff's] entitlement to prevail."