Opinion
No. COA12–93.
2012-09-18
Corria THOMPSON, Plaintiff v. CHARLOTTE–MECKLENBURG BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
Tin Fulton Walker & Owen, PLLC, by S. Luke Largess, for plaintiff-appellant. Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Jill R. Wilson, Robert J. King III and Julia C. Ambrose, for defendant-appellee.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 26 October 2011 by Judge Richard L. Doughton in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 16 August 2012. Tin Fulton Walker & Owen, PLLC, by S. Luke Largess, for plaintiff-appellant. Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Jill R. Wilson, Robert J. King III and Julia C. Ambrose, for defendant-appellee.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Corria Thompson (“plaintiff”) appeals from an order granting summary judgment in favor of Charlotte–Mecklenburg Board of Education (“defendant”). We affirm.
I. Background
In 1975, plaintiff, formerly known as Corria Hudson, began teaching in North Carolina. From 1975–1985 she was employed by Polk County schools. During the period from 1985–1996, plaintiff obtained career status while employed with Charlotte–Mecklenburg Schools (“CMS”). In 1996, plaintiff relocated to California, where she was also employed as a teacher. When plaintiff returned to North Carolina in 2002, she worked at CMS for the 2002–2003 school year. In 2003, she returned to California, but moved back to Charlotte in 2005 and was employed by CMS from March 2005 until June 2009. Each year, plaintiff entered into a one year contract with defendant. Despite her eligibility for career status, defendant never granted plaintiff tenure. When there was a budget decrease in June 2009, plaintiff was terminated from employment because she was not a tenured teacher. Although eligible for rehire, plaintiff was not rehired. Plaintiff first consulted an attorney in the fall of 2009 and learned that, pursuant to statute, she should have obtained career status after one year of teaching.
On 5 February 2010, plaintiff filed a complaint alleging a statutory right to career status. Plaintiff believed that since defendant voted to continue her employment after the 2005–06 school year, defendant violated the statute by failing to confer career status at the end of the 2005–06, 2006–07 and 2007–08 school years. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that she was entitled to a vote on her career status and that she was entitled to one month's pay for each month from 15 June 2009, the date of her termination. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. On 17 June 2010, the trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss as to plaintiff's claims for damages sought in her complaint, but denied the motion to dismiss as to any claim for damages from the time defendant should have voted on plaintiff's tenure status until the time plaintiff was denied tenure status. Defendant appealed on 29 June 2010. On 18 August 2010, plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal.
On 20 August 2010, plaintiff re-filed her complaint and declaratory judgment action alleging defendant violated her statutory rights. In the re-filed complaint plaintiff changed the dates for the period of time she was entitled to compensation, to one month's pay for each 30 days or portion thereof, from the date defendant should have voted on granting her career status in June 2006 until it voted to deny career status in June 2009. Defendant filed a timely answer and subsequently a motion for summary judgment. On 7 October 2011, plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment also on the grounds that no genuine issue as to any material fact existed. After a hearing, on 26 October 2011, the trial court entered an order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 56(c) (2011). When “the parties have cross motions for summary judgment, and there is no dispute as to any material fact, the sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly concluded that one party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law or if judgment should have been entered in favor of the opposing party.” IMT, Inc. v. City of Lumberton, –––N.C.App. ––––, ––––, 724 S.E.2d 588, 592 (2012). When reviewing an order of summary judgment, the standard of review is de novo. Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. North Main Constr. Ltd., 361 N.C. 85, 88, 637 S.E.2d 528, 530 (2006).
III. Statute of Limitations
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment and granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of the statute of limitations. We disagree.
When a claim is based on a liability that is created by statute, a three-year statute of limitations applies. Hicks v. Wake Cty. Bd. of Educ., 187 N.C.App. 485, 489, 653 S.E.2d 236, 239 (2007) (citing N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–52(2) (2005)). See also Rose v. Currituck County Bd. of Education, 83 N.C.App. 408, 412, 350 S.E.2d 376, 379 (1986) (finding that the applicable statute of limitations for a claim brought under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325 is the three-year statute of limitations identified in N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1–52(2)).
In Hicks, the plaintiff's resume indicated he had previously been employed by the North Carolina school system from 1984 to 1996. Hicks, 187 N.C.App. at 486, 653 S.E.2d at 238. However, when the Wake County Board of Education (“WCBE”) hired the plaintiff in 1999, he did not disclose his complete history or his prior tenured status on his application. Id. at 486, 653 S.E.2d at 237. In 2003, when plaintiff was informed by WCBE that he had not yet obtained career status, he had been “aware by the summer of 2001 that he should have received career status[.]” Id. at 486–87, 653 S.E.2d at 238. Even though the plaintiff's statutorily mandated time was 2001, WCBE did not grant the plaintiff tenure until the end of his fourth year in May 2003. Id. at 487, 653 S.E.2d at 238–39. In June 2005, the plaintiff filed a complaint seeking relief under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325, which indicated a teacher was entitled to “one additional month's pay for every 30 days beyond June 16 that the board fail[ed] to vote upon the issue of granting career status.” Id. at 487–89, 653 S.E.2d at 238–39 (quoting N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325 (c)(2) (2001)). Although the trial court found the plaintiff's claim was barred by a two-year statute of limitations, this Court recognized that a three-year statute of limitations applied to the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 489, 653 S.E.2d at 239. The Court determined that since WCBE should have voted on plaintiff's career status by 15 June 2001 and failed to do so, the statute of limitations for the plaintiff's cause of action began to accrue on 16 June 2001. Id. Because the plaintiff waited to file his claim until June 2005, the Court held that he had failed to file within the appropriate statute of limitations and his claim was barred. Id. at 490, 653 S.E.2d at 240.
Subsequent to Hicks, the legislature amended N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325. Previously, the statute read, “[i]f the board fails to vote on granting career status: ... [t]he teacher shall be entitled to an additional month's pay for every 30 days after June 16 that the board fails to vote upon the issue of granting career status.” N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325(c)(1) (2007). The statute was amended in 2009 and now reads:
If the board fails to vote on granting career status, the teacher shall be entitled to an additional month's pay for every 30 days or portion thereof after June 16 or such later date as provided in G.S. 115C–325(m)(7) if a majority of the board belatedly votes against granting career status.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325 (c)(1) (2011). The bill amending the section indicates that the “act applies to proceedings initiated after August 31, 2009.” 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 530.
As an initial matter, we must determine if the new version of the statute applies to plaintiff's claim. The statutory amendment indicated that the act should apply to “proceedings initiated after August 31, 2009.” Id. Plaintiff initiated her claim on 5 February 2010. If the “proceeding” referenced in the statute means the “proceeding” initiated by the plaintiff, then the 2009 version of the statute would apply because plaintiff's “proceeding” was initiated after 31 August 2009.
Ordinarily in North Carolina “statutes are presumed to act prospectively only, unless it is clear that the legislature intended that the law be applied retroactively.” Twaddell v. Anderson, 136 N.C.App. 56, 66, 523 S.E.2d 710, 717 (1999).
Statutes are remedial and retrospective, in the absence of directions to the contrary, when they create new remedies for existing rights, remove penalties or forfeitures, extenuate or mitigate offenses, supply evidence, make that evidence which was not so before, abolish imprisonment for debt, enlarge exemption laws, enlarge the rights of persons under disability, and the like, unless in doing this we violate some contract obligation or divest some vested right.
B–C Remedy Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Comm'n, 226 N.C. 52, 57, 36 S.E.2d 733, 737 (1946). A “statute may be applied retroactively only insofar as it does not impinge upon a right which is otherwise secured, established, and immune from further legal metamorphosis.” Gardner v. Gardner, 300 N.C. 715, 719, 268 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1980). A statute or amendment will operate prospectively only, “where the effect of giving it a retroactive operation would be to ... destroy a vested right.” Smith v. Mercer, 276 N.C. 329, 337, 172 S.E.2d 489, 494 (1970).
A vested right, entitled to protection from legislation, must be something more than a mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuance of the existing law; it must have become a title, legal or equitable, to the present or future enjoyment of property, a demand, or legal exemption from a demand by another.
Armstrong v. Armstrong, 322 N.C. 396, 402, 368 S.E.2d 595, 598 (1988).
In Bowen v. Mabry, relied on by plaintiff, the Court retroactively applied an equitable distribution statute. 154 N.C.App. 734, 737, 572 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2002). During the pendency of actions for divorce and equitable distribution, the husband died. Id. at 735, 572 S.E.2d at 810. Subsequently, the wife filed a motion to abate both the divorce and equitable distribution actions. Id. Based on a Supreme Court case that interpreted the statute at issue to require abatement of an equitable distribution proceeding upon the death of a spouse if no divorce had been entered, the trial court granted the wife's motion. Id. However, subsequent to the Supreme Court case, but prior to the husband's death, the legislature amended the statute to clarify that equitable distribution actions did not abate upon the death of a party. Id. at 736, 572 S.E.2d at 811. Therefore, this Court found that the legislature “made clear its intent” that the prior statute did not mandate abatement and the amended statute must be applied retroactively unless it impaired a vested right. Id. at 736, 572 S.E.2d at 811. The Court determined that the defendant would not suffer impairment of a vested right and thus applied the statute retroactively. Id. at 736–37, 572 S.E.2d at 811.
In the instant case, we agree with plaintiff that by amending N.C. Gen.Stat. § 115C–325(c)(1) the legislature intended to limit the remedy to those who are denied career status. However, we can only apply the amendment retroactively if it does not impair a vested right. See id. Applying the statute retroactively would destroy defendant's vested right to rely on a statute of limitations defense, and thus the statute may only be applied prospectively. See Staley v. Lingerfelt, 134 N.C.App. 294, 299, 517 S.E.2d 392, 396 (1999) (“[t]he statute of limitations [defense] is ‘inflexible and unyielding,’ and the defendants are vested with the right to rely on it as a defense.”); Armstrong, 322 N.C. at 402, 368 S.E.2d at 598 (an example of a vested right is a “ legal exemption from a demand by another.”).
In addition, we find the cases cited by plaintiff distinguishable. In B–C Remedy Co., the Court recognized that the legislature has the power to retroactively apply a statute altering the statute of limitations, “if it has that in mind.” 226 N.C. at 56–57, 36 S .E.2d at 736 (recognizing that “the Legislature can waive statutes of limitation which have completely run in favor of the State” and allowing an expansion of the statute of limitations where the amendment to the statute showed “[n]o material change ... except the extension of time for making application for the refund” and finding that the amendment “strongly leads to the conclusion that it was intended [that those still equitably entitled to relief, or entitled under previously existing law] should have the benefit of the extended time.”). In Bowen, the Court recognized that the General Assembly had specifically indicated that the statute was to apply retroactively. Bowen, 154 N.C.App. at 736, 572 S.E.2d at 811. The intent of the legislature in Bowen was further explained by the title of the Act, whereby the General Assembly noted the amendment was to “clarify” the statute at issue. Id.
In the instant case, we find nothing in the amended statute to indicate that the legislature intended the amendment to apply retroactively. Furthermore, the title of the 2009 amendments is “An Act to Modify the Hearing Process Applicable to Probationary Teachers.” There is no indication in the title of the amendment that the legislature sought to retroactively alter the rule articulated in Hicks. Therefore, we find that plaintiff is subject to the old statute and the new version of the statute does not apply retroactively to her case.
Applying the older version of the statute, plaintiff's claim is clearly barred by the statute of limitations. After the 2005–2006 school year, defendant should have voted on plaintiff's tenure status. Defendant failed to do so and plaintiff signed another contract as a probationary teacher for the following year. Under the language of the old statute, and Hicks, the statute of limitation on plaintiff's claim accrued on 16 June 2006, the day after the Board should have first voted on her career status, but did not. Plaintiff should have filed her claim within three years from 16 June 2006. Since plaintiff filed her claim on 5 February 2010, she failed to file her claim before the statute of limitations had run on her claim and her claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
IV. Equitable Estoppel
Plaintiff alleges that defendant should be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations argument because plaintiff had no knowledge of her rights, defendant incorrectly classified her as a probationary employee for four years and plaintiff relied on that mistaken classification. We disagree.
To support a finding of equitable estoppel it is necessary to show: “(1) lack of knowledge and the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question; (2) reliance upon the conduct of the party sought to be estopped; and (3) action based thereon of such a character as to change his position prejudicially.” Hawkins v. Fin. Corp., 238 N.C. 174, 178, 77 S.E.2d 669, 672 (1953).
In the instant case, plaintiff asserted that she lacked knowledge regarding her employee classification. However, plaintiff failed to show that she did not have “the means of knowledge of the truth as to the facts in question....” Id. Plaintiff was well aware of her long employment history in North Carolina schools. The policy regarding granting career status to previously tenured teachers after one year was available to plaintiff. She cannot now claim equitable estoppel because of her ignorance of the law. See In re Forestry Foundation, 296 N.C. 330, 342, 250 S.E.2d 236, 244 (1979) (recognizing the well-settled principle that “everyone is presumed to know the law.”); see also Dalton v. Dalton, 164 N.C.App. 584, 586, 596 S.E.2d 331, 333 (2004) (reciting general principles that “everyone is equally capable of determining the law, is presumed to know the law and is bound to take notice of the law and, therefore, in legal contemplation, cannot be deceived by representations concerning the law or permitted to say he or she has been misled.”). Since plaintiff has failed to meet the first requirement of equitable estoppel, we find there is no reason that defendant should be estopped from asserting the statute of limitations defense to plaintiff's claim.
V. Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel
Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in denying her motion for summary judgment and granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of res judicata or collateral estoppel. Since we have determined that the trial court properly granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations there is no reason to determine whether res judicata or collateral estoppel applied.
VI. Conclusion
Plaintiff failed to file her claim in time and the revised version of the statute does not apply retroactively. Thus, the trial court properly granted defendant's motion to dismiss, as plaintiff's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. In addition, we find that plaintiff's claim for equitable estoppel is without merit.
Affirmed. Judges STROUD and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).