Opinion
No. 1:16 CV 21
01-21-2016
JACOB JOHN THOMPSON, Plaintiff, v. ALLEN COUNTY JUVINILE COURT, Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Jacob John Thompson, a pro se plaintiff, filed a complaint against the Allen County Juvenile Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE # 21.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the Court must review a complaint filed by a prisoner and dismiss it if the action is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Incorrectly identified in the complaint as "Allen County Juvinile Court." (DE # 1 at 1, 2.) --------
Courts apply the same standard under § 1915A as when deciding a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, the complaint must state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602-03 (7th Cir. 2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 603. In other words, "a plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that might be redressed by the law." Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original). Nevertheless, a pro se complaint "must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Here, Thompson complains about the proceedings that took place in the Allen County Juvenile Court. According to the complaint and its attachments, Thompson pleaded guilty to assaulting his father. Thompson complains that his court-appointed attorney wrongfully told him that self-defense could not be successfully employed, which led him to plead guilty to the offense. As a result of his plea, Thompson received a two year sentence of probation. Mr. Thompson brings suit against the Allen County Juvenile Court for money damages and "to be released from the system." (DE # 1 at 3.)
Even giving the complaint liberal construction, the court cannot discern within it any plausible federal claim against any defendant. As a threshold matter, the Allen County Juvenile Court is not a suable entity under Indiana law and thus cannot be sued for constitutional violations. See IND. CODE § 36-1-2-10; Sow v. Fortville Police Dept., 636 F.3d 293, 300 (7th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, this court has no authority to dismiss, review, or otherwise interfere with the state court case. See In re Campbell, 264 F.3d 730, 731 (7th Cir. 2001) (observing that as a general matter, federal courts lack authority to "control or interfere with state court litigation"); Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 771-72 (7th Cir. 2002) ("lower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to conduct direct review of state court decisions.").
Additionally, although Thompson complains about the presiding judge, she would be entitled to immunity for her actions taken in the state case, even if Thompson believes she acted improperly. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978) (judicial immunity). Any claim against his court-appointed lawyer would fare no better. The Constitution only protects against acts of defendants acting under color of state law, Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670 (7th Cir. 2006), and the Supreme Court has held that "a public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).
Finally, while it is unclear what Thompson intends by requesting to be "released from the system," it may be that he is seeking to have his conviction invalidated or otherwise obtain release from custody. If so, he must pursue such relief in a habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, subject to the requirements of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). See 28 U.S.C. § 2254; Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488 (1973) (habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement).
Though it is usually necessary to permit a plaintiff the opportunity to file an amended complaint when a case is dismissed sua sponte, see Luevano v. Wal-Mart, 722 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 2013), that is unnecessary where the amendment would be futile. Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420, 432 (7th Cir. 2009) ("[C]ourts have broad discretion to deny leave to amend where . . . the amendment would be futile.") Such is the case here. No amendment could overcome fact that the court is not a suable entity, the presiding judge immune from suit, and the public defender a non-state actor.
For these reasons, the court DISMISSES this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
SO ORDERED.
Date: January 21, 2016
s/James T. Moody
JUDGE JAMES T. MOODY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT