Opinion
Record No. 0863-93-1
November 9, 1993
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
(James T. Martin; Moody, Strople Kloeppel, on brief), for appellant.
(Amy Moss Levy; Willcox Savage, on brief), for appellees.
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
James A. Thompson contends that the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that (1) his emotional injury did not arise out of and in the course of his employment; and (2) his evidence did not establish a compensable disability. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27.
Thompson worked for Reed Carnrick as a pharmaceutical sales representative for twenty years. In 1984, he was designated as a special account representative, which entitled him to additional compensation and benefits. In the fall of 1989, he sustained atypical rib fractures which were found not to be related to his employment. Due to this condition, he missed work from October 1989 through mid-January 1990. In January 1990, he returned to work only to again be absent from work later in January 1990 due to a similar condition.
On February 23, 1990, Thompson met with his regional manager and his division manager with regard to his absence from work. At this meeting, Thompson was told that he would no longer be designated as a special account representative. He was also advised to look for employment elsewhere, return to work, assume disability status, or be admitted to a hospital and remain there until physicians could diagnose his problem. He decided to return to work.
Two weeks after the meeting, Thompson received a certified letter which confirmed that he had lost his special account representative designation. Thompson filed a grievance through the company grievance procedures but did not obtain a favorable decision.
Thompson also sought medical treatment from a psychiatrist, Dr. James H. Holmes, after he received the letter. Thompson testified that he began to experience emotional problems immediately after the February 1990 meeting with his supervisors. Dr. Holmes diagnosed Thompson's condition as post-traumatic stress disorder caused by work and the threatened loss of employment. Dr. Holmes testified that he did not find anything peculiar about Thompson's job that contributed to his condition. Dr. Holmes also admitted that the stress experienced by Thompson could have resulted from any job, type of business, or work environment.
The record also reveals that Thompson experienced numerous personal stress events prior to the meeting with his supervisors. These events included the collapse of his twenty-three year marriage, his son dropping out of high school, the filing of bankruptcy, unexplained rib fractures, a fear of cancer, and the breakup of his relationship with a woman after several years. Additionally, in 1987, Thompson was diagnosed as suffering from dysthymic depression. On July 30, 1991, Thompson went on sick leave. In January 1992, he was terminated after his sick leave expired and he failed to return to work. He has not sought other employment.
The commission found that "an employer-employee dispute or an employment action [such as the one in this case] which results in emotional stress to an employee does not, without more, constitute . . . a compensable occupational disease." The commission also found that Thompson failed to prove that his ordinary disease of life "had its origin in a risk connected with the employment and flowed from that source as a natural consequence." The commission's finding that Thompson's emotional injury did not constitute an injury by accident has not been raised as an issue on appeal.
On appellate review, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the party prevailing below. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990). The commission's findings of fact are binding and conclusive upon us if supported by credible evidence. James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va. App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989).
In order to show that an ordinary disease of life is compensable a claimant must prove that:
[T]he disease (1) arose out of and in the course of employment, (2) did not result from causes outside of employment, and (3) follows as an incident of an occupational disease, is an infectious disease or contagious disease contracted in the course of employment, or is characteristic of the employment and was caused by conditions peculiar to the employment.
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va. App. 1, 11, 365 S.E.2d 782, 788 (1989). "However, purely psychological disability resulting from disagreements over managerial decisions and conflicts with supervisory personnel that cause stressful consequences which result in purely psychological disability ordinarily are not compensable." Teasley v. Montgomery Ward Co., Inc., 14 Va. App. 45, 49, 415 S.E.2d 596, 598 (1992).
Credible evidence supports the commission's finding that Thompson failed to prove a compensable ordinary disease of life. The February 1990 meeting and the stress, which Dr. Holmes opined were the causes of Thompson's emotional problems, grew out of a disagreement over Thompson's sales representative designation and his absence from work. Thus, the evidence failed to prove a compensable cause. See id.
Since our ruling on this issue disposes of this appeal, it is not necessary for us to address the disability issue.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the commission's decision.
Affirmed.