Trigger is thus procedurally barred from raising the issue on appeal. See Wright v. State, 275 Ga. 427, 429 (___ S.E.2d ___) (2002)Hufstetler v. State, 274 Ga. 343, 345(3) ( 553 S.E.2d 801) (2001);Thompkins v. State, 272 Ga. 835, 836(2)(c) ( 536 S.E.2d 747) (2000). 7. Trigger contends that in the portion of the bifurcated trial dealing with the possession offense, the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury that the State had the burden to disprove Trigger's defense of justification.

We have frequently held that a malice murder indictment gives a defendant sufficient notice that he is accused of aggravated assault when it sets out the aggravated nature of the assault by naming a weapon which is deadly per se. Borders v. State, supra at 807(1). See also Thompkins v. State, 272 Ga. 835, 837(3) ( 536 S.E.2d 747) (2000). It is also sufficient, however, for the indictment implicitly to allege the use of a deadly weapon.

Even if the offense of felony murder had been before the jury,"there can be no harmful Edge violation when the jury convicts on a malice murder charge." Thompkins v. State, 272 Ga. 835, 837(4) ( 536 S.E.2d 747) (2000), quoting Taylor v. State, 271 Ga. 497 (2) ( 521 S.E.2d 814) (1999). Trial courts are not required "to follow an exact formula in instructing juries so long as the charge as a whole ensures that the jury will consider whether evidence of provocation and passion might authorize a verdict of voluntary manslaughter."

Therefore, the strategic decision not to attempt to introduce this evidence was founded on legitimate evidentiary concerns and did not constitute ineffective assistance. Thompkins v. State, 272 Ga. 835, 836(2)(a) ( 536 S.E.2d 747) (2000). Moreover, the prior acts evidence, relied on by Canada, was proffered at the hearing on the motion for new trial in only a skeletal way and, even when viewed in the best light, would not have changed the outcome of the case.

261 Ga. 865 ( 414 S.E.2d 865) (1992). See, e.g., Thompkins v. State, 272 Ga. 835, 837 ( 536 S.E.2d 747) (2000); Taylor v. State, 271 Ga. 497, 497 ( 521 S.E.2d 814) (1999). 4. Anderson also claims that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance because he failed to request a broader charge on voluntary manslaughter and completely failed to request a charge on mutual combat.

This contention was waived when appellant failed to raise it at the hearing on the motion for new trial. See Thompkins v. State, 272 Ga. 835, 836 (2) (c) ( 536 S.E.2d 747) (2000). Moreover, the record shows there was no bolstering, as the expert simply cited the testimony of the other witnesses as a partial basis for his own opinion that the victim, rather than Hufstetler, was the abused spouse.

Thus, "this aspect of his ineffective assistance claim was waived because it was not raised at the hearing on the motion for new trial." Thompkins v. State , 272 Ga. 835, 836 (2) (c), 536 S.E.2d 747 (2000). Moreover, even if this claim were not waived, Grier has failed to show how this deficiency prejudiced him "to the point that a reasonable probability exists that, but for counsel's errors, the outcome of the trial would have been different."

This aspect of his ineffective assistance claim is therefore waived for purposes of appeal. See Thompkins v. State, 272 Ga. 835, 836-837 (2) (c) ( 536 SE2d 747) (2000). (h) Robbins further argues that the combined effect of his trial counsel's deficient performance was prejudicial.

However, Palmer did not raise this ground of ineffective assistance before the trial court, and this issue is therefore waived. Thompkins v. State, 272 Ga. 835, 836-837 (2) (c) ( 536 SE2d 747) (2000). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in concluding that Palmer had not received ineffective assistance of counsel.

In the area of criminal law involving ineffective assistance of counsel, it has been repeatedly held that the decision to call or not call a witness is a matter of trial tactics and strategy. Thompkins v. State, 272 Ga. 835, 836 (2) (a) ( 536 SE2d 747) (2000); Holmes v. State, 272 Ga. 517, 520 (8) ( 529 SE2d 879) (2000). Thus, the question to call or not call a witness comes within the area of professional judgment that may be covered by judgmental immunity in the appropriate case, which a jury must decide if there exists any issue as to the independent exercise of such judgment.