Opinion
Case No. 00-3150-JWL
October 8, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Kodi A. Thomas claims that defendant Timothy Yevak subjected him to excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution while plaintiff was an inmate in the Lansing Correctional Facility ("LCF") in Lansing, Kansas. The matter was tried to the court on October 1, 2002. The court has thoroughly considered the evidence and arguments presented at trial. It has relied to a considerable degree on its opportunity to form conclusions about the credibility of the witnesses from close observation of their demeanor while testifying at trial. The court is now prepared to issue its findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). For the reasons set forth fully below, judgment is entered in favor of defendant.
• Findings of Fact
Mr. Thomas is currently an inmate in the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections at the El Dorado Correctional Facility, but was formerly a resident at LCF. On February 17, 1998, Mr. Thomas was housed in the lower level of the B cell house ("B cell") at LCF. Defendant Timothy Yevak was the corrections officer in charge of the B cell from 6:00 A.M. through 2:00 P.M. on that day. As part of his duties, Mr. Yevak controlled the B cell "lock box", which is an automated system that opens and closes the cell doors and is located in a control booth on the lower level of B cell. To open and close cell doors, officers must pull a selector pin on the lock box to activate a particular cell lock and then pull a lever to open or close the cell door.
At approximately 12:20 P.M. on February 17, 1998, Mr. Thomas was cleaning his prison cell, using equipment and supplies that were placed just outside his closed and locked cell door. As Mr. Thomas reached through the cell bars to grab a mop, the door began to open, trapping his right wrist and arm between the bars of the cell. Mr. Thomas screamed out in pain and yelled for corrections officers to close his cell door. Plaintiff testified that while his arm was trapped, he stuck his head outside the cell door and saw defendant Timothy Yevak simply staring at him, knowing Mr. Thomas was agonizing in pain. Mr. Thomas' wrist and arm remained trapped for approximately seven to ten seconds, until Mr. Yevak closed plaintiff's cell door by activating the lock box in the control booth. Mr. Thomas testified that despite his obvious suffering, Mr. Yevak did not respond to his requests for medical treatment. Mr. Yevak, however, testified that he had no recollection of the event and that if such an event did in fact occur, he would have prepared an "incident report" and/or noted the incident in the daily "log book".
As explained in greater detail below, the court does not find that the weight of the evidence supports Mr. Thomas' assertion that he observed Mr. Yevak staring at him while he was in pain.
Just after Mr. Yevak's shift expired at approximately 2:00 P.M., plaintiff reported an injury to his right wrist to corrections officer Owen L. Golden, who relieved defendant from his shift. Mr. Golden testified that he had no recollection of the event, but he did prepare an incident report that described Mr. Thomas' request for medical attention. Mr. Golden sent plaintiff to the LCF medical clinic in response to his complaint. At approximately 8:30 P.M., prison health service officials placed plaintiff's arm in a splint, gave him medication to treat his soft tissue swelling and pain, and ordered x-rays of the injury. On February 19, 1998, prison health officials took x-rays of Mr. Thomas' right arm. The x-ray report indicates that Mr. Thomas' right arm was normal. (Plaintiff's Ex. I).
On April 28, 2000, after exhausting his administrative remedies, plaintiff filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this court. Mr. Thomas alleged that Mr. Yevak violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from excessive force by opening his cell door on his wrist and forearm. Even assuming that Mr. Thomas' arm was injured when Mr. Yevak opened his cell door and that he sustained compensable injuries as a result, this court finds that defendant did not act maliciously, wantonly, sadistically or with deliberate indifference toward Mr. Thomas. Plaintiff's evidence of malice is based entirely upon his testimony that while his wrist and forearm were trapped, he was able to stick his head outside of the cell door and observe defendant Yevak staring him down, knowing that Mr. Thomas was in obvious peril and in great pain. The weight of the evidence, however, does not support a finding that Mr. Thomas was in a position to place his head outside of his cell door to observe defendant or that plaintiff could have determined whether defendant Yevak was staring him down from such a position. First, the evidence suggests that Mr. Thomas was not in a position to look outside his cell. Plaintiff testified that his wrist was pinned soon after the cell door began to open. The cell door did not open any further, once Mr. Thomas' arm was trapped. Charles Caldwell, a locksmith for six years at LCF, testified that if plaintiff's arm was trapped shortly after the door began to open, there would not be a sufficient opening for him to place his head outside the cell. Michael Robinson, a resident of LCF at the time of the incident, testified that on the date of the injury he was in the B cell unit standing outside his own cell near defendant Yevak. Mr. Robinson testified that after Mr. Yevak opened one of the cell doors he heard some "hollering". Mr. Robinson then walked down the cell block and found that plaintiff was yelling, but was not sticking his head outside the cell door. Based upon this evidence, the court finds that Mr. Thomas did not have his head outside the cell door in a position to observe Mr. Yevak in the control booth, and therefore, could not have observed defendant's response to the incident.
Mr. Thomas also named David R. McKune, the LCF Warden, and Lisa Mendoza, Special Assistant Attorney General for the State of Kansas, as defendants. Judge Van Bebber dismissed plaintiff's claims against Ms. Mendoza in an order dated August 25, 2000. (Doc. 5). This court dismissed plaintiff's claims against defendant McKune in an order dated May 7, 2002. (Doc. 24). In that same order, the court dismissed Mr. Thomas' Eighth Amendment claims that were grounded on the theory of indifference toward his medical care and all other claims against Mr. Yevak in his official capacity. Thus, after May 7, 2002, Plaintiff's only surviving claim was against defendant Yevak, in his individual capacity, based upon the theory that Mr. Yevak violated Mr. Thomas' constitutional rights by subjecting him to excessive force contrary to the protections of the Eighth Amendment.
Mr. Robinson was a witness for the plaintiff and testified on his behalf.
Even if Mr. Thomas was able to look outside his cell, the evidence suggests that he was not in a position to observe whether defendant was staring him down. Plaintiff testified that his cell was located approximately ten feet away from the lock box where defendant Yevak stood. Michael Robinson testified, however, that plaintiff's cell was about seventy-five (75) feet away from the lock box. Charles Caldwell also testified that plaintiff's cell was sixty-five (65) to seventy-five (75) feet away from the lock box. The location of plaintiff's cell in relation to the location of the lock box corroborates the testimony of Mr. Robinson and Mr. Caldwell. Plaintiff's cell at LCF was located in the middle of the row on the lower level of the B unit, or approximately fifteen (15) to sixteen (16) cells from the lock box. The cells at LCF were five (5) feet wide and seven (7) feet deep. These dimensions suggest that plaintiff's cell was indeed located approximately seventy-five (75) feet from the lock box. While plaintiff may have been able to determine that defendant was staring him down from a distance of ten feet, it is highly unlikely that Mr. Thomas could have made such an observation from seventy-five (75) feet away, especially considering that he allegedly made the observation while pinned behind his cell door in a great deal of pain. Based upon this evidence, the court finds that Mr. Thomas was not in a position to observe whether defendant was staring him down.
Conversely, this evidence also indicates that Mr. Yevek did not have a clear view of defendant from the control booth where the lock box was located. Mr. Yevek could not have intentionally activated the lock box to open the cell door on Mr. Thomas' arm without a relatively close and unobstructed view of the prisoner in his cell.
Not only did plaintiff fail to establish that defendant acted with malice, but also the weight of the evidence suggests that the incident was an accident and that defendant acted in good-faith. First, Mr. Robinson testified that defendant was opening cell doors for multiple prisoners. Rather than targeting Mr. Thomas when he was in a vulnerable position, this testimony confirms that defendant was simply performing a legitimate penalogical objective: releasing prisoners from their cells. Second, as noted above, plaintiff testified that his arm was pinned for approximately seven (7) to ten (10) seconds. This means that within seven (7) to ten (10) seconds of plaintiff's arm being pinned, Mr. Yevak realized Mr. Thomas' peril, pulled a selector pin on the lock box to activate the lock on plaintiff's cell, pulled the lever to initiate the closing of plaintiff's cell door, and plaintiff's cell door closed enough to relieve the pressure from his arm. This evidence demonstrates that defendant responded in a timely fashion to plaintiff's predicament, which is contrary to a culpable state of mind. Based upon this evidence, the court finds that defendant neither acted maliciously or sadistically at the time of the alleged incident, nor inflicted pain in a wanton fashion or in deliberate disregard to Mr. Thomas' well-being. In short, the weight of the evidence indicates that Mr. Thomas' injury was, at worst, a result of unfortunate timing.
II. Conclusions of Law
Plaintiff claims that Mr. Yevak used excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment when he opened the cell doors at approximately 12:20 P.M. on February 17, 1998. As alluded to above and discussed in more detail below, the court simply does not find that defendant acted with malice or deliberate indifference when he opened the cell doors. As such, defendant's conduct does not give rise to a constitutional violation.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits officials from inflicting "cruel and unusual punishment" on prisoners convicted of crimes. Clemmons v. Bohannon, 956 F.2d 1523, 1525 (10th Cir. 1992). Eighth Amendment protections apply to the states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 662 (1962). "The use of excessive force by jail officials violates a prisoner's rights under the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause when the prisoner is subjected to an `unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1566 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986)).
"Ordinarily, an excessive force claim involves two prongs: (1) an objective prong that asks `if the alleged wrongdoing was objectively `harmful enough to establish a constitutional violation,' and (2) a subjective prong under which the plaintiff must show that `the officials act[ed] with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.'" Giron v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 191 F.3d 1281, 1289 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)). As to the prison official's subjective state of mind, the Supreme Court has held that "the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7.
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Hudson, the Tenth Circuit suggested that the standard for determining excessive force depended upon whether the official acted in the midst of a prison disturbance. Where officials acted in response to a disturbance, "wantonness" consisted of acting maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Miller v. Glanz, 948 F.2d 1562, 1566 (10th Cir. 1991). Where the official was acting in non-emergency situations, "deliberate indifference" was the appropriate Eighth Amendment standard. Id. at 1566-67 (citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991)). In Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 n. 3 (10th Cir. 1992), the Tenth Circuit noted, however, that the Supreme Court's decision in Hudson negates the dicta in Miller suggesting that the deliberate indifference standard for Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement cases also applies to non-emergency excessive force claims. Even so, recent unpublished opinions from the Tenth Circuit continue to rely on Miller for the proposition that "deliberate indifference" is the proper standard in non-emergency excessive force cases. See e.g., Gunderson v. Uphoff, 216 F.3d 1087, 2000 WL 854283, at *2 (10th Cir. June 28, 2000). This court views defendant's conduct to determine whether he acted maliciously and sadistically to cause harm because that standard is most consistent with Supreme Court precedent and published Tenth Circuit opinions. Even so, whether the Eight Amendment standard is "deliberate indifference" or "maliciously and sadistically" causing harm the outcome in this case is the same. The court's finding that defendant lacked a culpable state of mind demonstrates the absence of malice. Similarly, the court's findings that defendant did not observe plaintiff trapped in the cell door and that defendant responded in a timely fashion demonstrate the lack of deliberate indifference.
Even assuming that plaintiff's injury was harmful enough to establish the objective prong of an excessive force claim, the court finds that the defendant did not act maliciously and sadistically to cause injury (the subjective component of an excessive force claim). First, plaintiff's own evidence failed to establish culpability. As fully explained in the findings of fact, plaintiff's only evidence of culpability was his own testimony that while his arm was pinned in the cell door he looked outside of his room and observed defendant staring him down. The court finds, however, that plaintiff did not look outside his cell to observe Mr. Yevak's response to the incident. The court further finds that even if plaintiff had looked outside, his cell was located so far away from Mr. Yevak that he was in no position to determine whether or not defendant was staring him down or engaged in any other conduct evidencing a culpable state of mind. Moreover, the court finds that Mr. Yevak was acting in good-faith. The evidence demonstrated that defendant was not targeting Mr. Thomas when he opened multiple cell doors and that he closed Mr. Thomas' cell door in a timely fashion. Thus, plaintiff has not established a constitutional violation.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT that judgment be entered in favor of defendant on plaintiff's Eighth Amendment excessive force claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.