Opinion
C/A No. 7:19-1427-BHH-KFM
06-06-2019
Rashaad Thomas, Plaintiff, v. Michael Walsh, Spencer Smith, Esq. Defendants.
REPORT OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
The plaintiff, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Constitutional rights (doc. 1). Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in this case and submit findings and recommendations to the district court.
The plaintiff's case was entered on the docket on May 15, 2019 (doc. 1). By order dated May 21, 2019, the undersigned informed the plaintiff that his case was not in proper form (doc. 7). On June 3, 2019, the plaintiff submitted additional documents, and the case is now in proper form for judicial screening. Having reviewed the plaintiff's complaint, the undersigned recommends it be dismissed.
BACKGROUND
The plaintiff brings the instant action seeking damages as a result of two criminal convictions in the Spartanburg County Court of General Sessions (doc. 1). The court takes judicial notice of the plaintiff's proceedings in the General Sessions Court of Spartanburg County, as well as a pending post-conviction relief ("PCR") action pending in the Spartanburg County Court of Common Pleas. See Spartanburg County Public Index, https://publicindex.sccourts.org/ spartanburg/publicindex/, (enter the plaintiff's name and 2016A4210104742, 2016A4210104743, 2016A4210104744) (last visited June 6, 2019). Here, the plaintiff has named as defendants Assistant Solicitor Spencer Smith, and charging officer Michael Walsh (doc. 1). The plaintiff, a state prisoner in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections currently housed at Lieber Correctional Institution, alleges that his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated by the defendants (id. at 4). He also contends that the defendants' actions violated several South Carolina statutes: 23-17-90 (regarding illegal arrest); 17-13-50 (regarding behavior required of officers during an arrest); and 23-17-20 (defining breach of duty by an officer) (id.). Although the sequence of events is difficult to decipher from the plaintiff's pleading, he contends that at some point Asst. Sol. Smith told Off. Walsh that he lacked probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, but Off. Walsh ignored him and arrested the plaintiff on April 11, 2017 (id. at 4-5). The plaintiff contends that the arrest by Off. Walsh was made under false pretenses (id. at 14). The plaintiff also contends that Asst. Sol. Smith's decision to continue prosecuting the case against the plaintiff—after telling Walsh that there was no probable cause to make the arrest—constituted malicious prosecution (id.). For relief, the plaintiff seeks a declaration that the defendants violated his rights, $108,768.00 in damages, additional punitive damages, a jury trial, costs, and any additional relief the court deems just (id. at 6, 14).
Phillips v. Pitt Cty. Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009) (courts "may properly take judicial notice of matters of public record."); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) ("We note that '[t]he most frequent use of judicial notice . . . is in noticing the content of court records.'").
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The plaintiff filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the in forma pauperis statute. This statute authorizes the District Court to dismiss a case if it is satisfied that the action "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," is "frivolous or malicious," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Further, the plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had prepaid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff's lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if (1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
As a pro se litigant, the plaintiff's pleadings are accorded liberal construction and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007) (per curiam). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the Court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
This complaint is filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which "'is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides 'a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'" Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). A civil action under § 1983 "creates a private right of action to vindicate violations of 'rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws' of the United States." Rehberg v. Paulk, 566 U.S. 356, 361 (2012). To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged violation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
DISCUSSION
As noted above, the plaintiff filed the instant action pursuant to § 1983 and seeking damages from the defendants. For the reasons that follow, the instant matter is subject to summary dismissal. The plaintiff's complaint is barred by Heck v. Humphrey
Although Younger abstention may apply in the instant action, because the plaintiff has a pending PCR action, the undersigned will address the plaintiff's claims in light of Heck v. Humphrey, since the plaintiff's criminal proceedings have terminated and he seeks monetary relief in addition to declaratory relief.
With respect to the plaintiff's accusations that his rights were violated when he was arrested by Off. Walsh, as well as during the subsequent prosecution by Asst. Sol. Smith, his claims are currently barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the United States Supreme Court held that in order to recover damages for imprisonment in violation of the Constitution, the imprisonment must first be successfully challenged. The Court stated:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, . . . a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted); see also Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641 (1997) (the preclusive rule of Heck extended to § 1983 claims challenging procedural deficiencies which necessarily imply the invalidity of the judgment). This is known as the "favorable termination" requirement. See Wilson v. Johnson, 535 F.3d 262, 263 (4th Cir. 2008). As noted, judicially-noticed, publicly-available online records for the Spartanburg County Seventh Judicial Circuit indicate that the plaintiff pled guilty to Armed Robbery (warrant number 2016A4210104743) and Second Degree Burglary (warrant number 2016A4210104744) in exchange for his murder/attempted murder charge (warrant number 2016A4210104742) being disposed via nolle prosequi indicted on February 7, 2018. See See Spartanburg County Public Index, enter the plaintiff's name and 2016A4210104742, 2016A4210104743, 2016A4210104744) (last visited June 6, 2019). As an initial matter, the plaintiff's armed robbery and second degree burglary convictions do not indicate a favorable termination. Further, the entry of nolle prosequi indicted on his murder/attempted murder charge does not indicate a favorable termination because it was nolle prossed as part of the plaintiff's guilty plea on the other two charges. As such, the plaintiff's claims are barred by Heck at this time, because he has not received a favorable termination on his underlying state criminal charges.
The plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim for relief
As noted above, the plaintiff's claims for relief are barred by Heck. Nevertheless, even on the merits, the plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
Assistant Solicitor Smith
Asst. Sol. Smith has prosecutorial immunity from this civil action and should be dismissed. The plaintiff alleges that Asst. Sol. Smith violated his rights when he prosecuted his case despite earlier advising Off. Walsh there was no probable cause to arrest the plaintiff (doc. 1 at 14). However, prosecutors have absolute immunity from civil liability for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings such as criminal trials, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial motions hearings. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 267-71 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000). The plaintiff's bare allegations alone of a one-time opinion purportedly held by Asst. Sol. Smith are insufficient to overcome the immunity afforded to him; thus, he should be dismissed.
Officer Walsh
Liberally construing the plaintiff's complaint as alleging a Fourth Amendment violation against Off. Walsh, his claims are subject to summary dismissal. Section 1983 actions premised on malicious prosecution, false arrest, and/or false imprisonment are analyzed as actions claiming unreasonable seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68 (4th Cir. 2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff alleging a § 1983 false arrest claim needs to show that the officer decided to arrest him without probable cause to establish an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment); Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 294 (4th Cir. 2001) (stating claims of false arrest and false imprisonment "are essentially claims alleging a seizure of the person in violation of the Fourth Amendment").
Under § 1983, "a public official cannot be charged with false arrest when he arrests a defendant pursuant to a facially valid warrant." Porterfield v. Lott, 156 F.3d 563, 568 (4th Cir. 1998) ("[A] claim for false arrest may be considered only when no arrest warrant has been obtained."); see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation when an arrest is based on probable cause); Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 181-83 (4th Cir. 1996) (determining that when the arresting official makes the arrest with a facially valid warrant, it is not false arrest). Moreover, "an indictment, 'fair upon its face,' returned by a 'properly constituted grand jury,' conclusively determines the existence of probable cause." Durham v. Horner, 690 F.3d 183, 189 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 117 n.19 (1975)); see also Provet v. S.C., C/A No. 6:07-1094-GRA-WMC, 2007 WL 1847849, at *5 (D.S.C. June 25, 2007) (section 1983 claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution were precluded because of indictment). This Court, as noted above, has taken judicial notice of the plaintiff's state criminal proceedings, including grand jury indictments for the three charges the plaintiff complains of in the present action. See Spartanburg County Public Index, enter the plaintiff's name and 2016A4210104742, 2016A4210104743, 2016A4210104744) (last visited June 6, 2019). The indictments act as a bar to the plaintiff's claims against Off. Walsh, and as such the claim are subject to summary dismissal.
South Carolina State Law Claims
To the extent the plaintiff seeks damages due to the defendants' alleged violations of S.C. Code of Laws Sections 23-17-90 (regarding illegal arrest); 17-13-50 (regarding behavior required of officers during an arrest); and 23-17-20 (defining breach of duty by an officer), the court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction over such claims. Such claims can be considered by this court through the exercise of "supplemental jurisdiction," which allows federal courts to hear and decide state law claims along with federal claims. Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 387 (1998); 28 U.S.C. § 1367. However, federal courts are permitted to decline supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) if "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." Here, as noted, in addition to being barred by Heck, the complaint fails to state a claim for a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Thus, this court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). See Lovern v. Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 655 (4th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he Constitution does not contemplate the federal judiciary deciding issues of state law among non-diverse litigants.").
RECOMMENDATION
The undersigned is of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot cure the defects identified above by amending his complaint. See Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc'y, 807 F.3d 619, 623 (4th Cir. 2015). As noted in more detail above, the instant action is subject to dismissal due to the plaintiff's failure to indicate a favorable termination of his state criminal charges. Moreover, his claims against Asst. Sol. Smith are barred by prosecutorial immunity, and his claims against Off. Walsh fail in light of probable cause established by the resulting grand jury indictments against the plaintiff. Thus, the undersigned recommends that the court decline to automatically give the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that the District Court dismiss this action without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. The undersigned also recommends that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims. The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
s/ Kevin F. McDonald
United States Magistrate Judge June 6, 2019
Greenville, South Carolina
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
300 East Washington Street, Room 239
Greenville, South Carolina 29601
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).