Opinion
C.A. No. 03-031 S
September 8, 2003
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Carl Thomas, pro se, filed with the Court a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his conviction of kidnaping, first degree sexual assault, assault, and battery. The Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island, designated a party respondent, has objected to the petition.
This matter has been referred to me pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) for a report and recommendation. For the reasons that follow, I recommend that the instant petition be denied and dismissed. I have determined that a hearing is not necessary.
Background
In 1994, Carl Thomas kidnaped and physically and sexually assaulted his estranged wife. Thomas initially pleaded not guilty to the charges and proceeded to be tried before a Kent County Superior Court jury. Following the completion of the direct examination of his wife, Thomas informed his attorney that he wished to change his plea from not guilty to guilty to spare his wife from the ordeal of having to testify further. Against the advice of his counsel, Thomas pleaded nolo contendere to the each of the charges levied against him, even though the trial justice warned that the plea would be "open ended," meaning that there was no agreement as to the sentence to be imposed. Although Thomas understood there would be no agreement on the sentence to be imposed, he maintained his decision to plead nolo contendere.
During the plea hearing, Thomas indicated to the trial justice that he made his plea knowingly and voluntarily. The trial justice determined that Thomas understood the nature of the charges against him and that he had waived his right to trial. After the trial justice asked Thomas if he was under the influence of any medication, Thomas asserted, "[n]o, sir. I have been off my medicine." State v. Thomas, 794 A.2d 990, 992 (R.I. 2002). The trial justice then determined that Thomas had "the mental capacity to understand the nature of his plea" and the plea was accepted. Id.
At sentencing, the trial justice ordered Thomas to serve concurrent life sentences on each of the three counts of first degree sexual assault and a twenty year consecutive sentence for the kidnaping charge. Thomas also received a one year sentence for the assault and battery charges, to be served consecutively.
Thomas thereafter moved in the state courts to reduce his sentence. The Superior Court denied the motion and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Thomas, 723 A.2d 788 (R.I. 1998). Thomas also filed application for post conviction relief in the state courts. In the application, Thomas challenged the validity of his plea, contending that he was not competent to enter into a plea since he had been "off" his medication. The Superior Court, after holding an evidentiary hearing, denied his application. The Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed. State v. Thomas, 794 A.2d 990 (R.I. 2002).
Thomas has now filed the instant application for federal habeas relief, contending (1) his plea was not voluntary, and (2) his trial counsel was ineffective. The Attorney General objected to the petition, seeking dismissal.
Discussion
A. Habeas Corpus Standard
The Anti-terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") significantly limits the scope of federal habeas review. AEDPA precludes the granting of habeas relief to a state prisoner, unless the state court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by. the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). A decision is "contrary to" federal law if the state court applies a legal principle different from the governing principal set forth in Supreme Court cases, or if the state court decides the case differently from a Supreme Court case on materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000)).
To hold that a state court's decision is an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law, the federal habeas court must find that "the state court correctly identifie [d] the governing legal principle from [Supreme Court] decisions but unreasonably applie[d] it to the facts of the particular case." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. In making this determination, a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Williams, 529 U.S. at 409. The Court should be mindful that in order to grant habeas relief, the state court decision must be objectively unreasonable as opposed to merely incorrect.Williams, 529 U.S. at 411 ("A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable."). Finally, the court's focus "is not how well reasoned the state court decision is, but whether the outcome is reasonable." Hurtado v. Tucker, 245 F.3d 7, 20 (1st Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 925 (2001).
In federal habeas proceedings, the federal court shall presume that the state court's determination of factual issues is correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1).
B. Whether Petitioner's Plea was Voluntary
As his first basis for federal habeas relief, petitioner claims that his nolo contendere plea was "not made voluntary with the understanding of the nature of the charges and the consequences of his plea." Habeas petition, p. 2 ¶ 12. In support thereof, petitioner avers that he suffers from mental illness and had not been taking his medication at the time of the plea. Indeed, there is no dispute that the petitioner had not taken his medication prior to trial nor during the plea colloquy.
In addressing this issue, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, relying on controlling U.S. Supreme Court precedent, namely Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993), found that the petitioner's plea was voluntary and that he understood the proceedings. Thus, this issue cannot proceed under the "contrary to" prong of the habeas corpus standard.See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Rather, this Court's chore is to determine whether the Rhode Island Supreme Court's decision was "unreasonable." Id.
It is well settled that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an affirmative showing that an accused's plea is entered knowingly and voluntarily before the trial court may accept the plea. Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400. In order to ensure that a guilty plea represents a "voluntary and intelligent choice among alternative courses of action open to the defendant," the trial court must make an inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the plea. Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 28 (1992) (internal quotations omitted).
At a plea hearing, statements made by a defendant and his lawyer, as well as determinations made by the trial judge, constitute a "formidable barrier" which cannot be easily attacked in subsequent collateral proceedings. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1970). "Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity."Id. That the petitioner stated his guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily cannot be overcome by mere suggestions, with nothing more, to the contrary. Id. A guilty plea is knowingly and voluntarily when it is:
entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, [and is not] induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper. . . . Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970) (internal quotations omitted).
The Supreme Court has held that the standard for mental competency at a plea of guilty is the same as the competency standard for standing trial. That standard looks to whether the defendant has "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and "a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396-397. Thomas fails to satisfy either prong of the Godinez inquiry.
The first prong of the Godinez inquiry looks to the defendant's ability to consult with his lawyer. Id. If a defendant is unable to consult with his lawyer, the Court may presume that the lawyer would make such a problem known to the Court at that time. Id. Here no facts demonstrate that Thomas's lawyer ever alerted the court to any issues regarding their attorney-client relationship. Indeed, Thomas consulted with his lawyer prior to trial, at length during the direct examination of his wife, and at length prior to his entry of the plea. Thomas, 794 A.2d at 993-994. No facts demonstrate that Thomas had any difficulty whatsoever consulting with his lawyer. Id.
The second prong of the Godinez inquiry looks to whether Thomas had an understanding of the proceedings that were occurring against him. After observing the petitioner first hand during jury selection, the trial, and the plea hearing, the trial justice made factual findings and determined that Thomas understood what was occurring. Moreover, the state court found that the petitioner's answers to the trial justice's inquiries during the plea hearing were "entirely responsive, appropriate, and intelligent. . . ." Thomas, 794 A.2d at 994. Furthermore, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the petitioner's counsel spoke to Thomas prior to the plea and she found him to be "rational and determined to change his plea." Id. at 992. No evidence indicates that the petitioner was unaware or misunderstood what was occurring.
Finally, during the post conviction proceedings, the petitioner had an opportunity to present evidence to the state courts on this issue. In that vein, the petitioner presented testimony from one of his treating physicians. The state courts discounted the physician's testimony as "an opinion not supported by the record" and one that was "based on speculation." Id. at 994. As a matter of fact, Thomas's physician could not offer an opinion about the degree of any impairment that the petitioner could have been suffering from on the day of his plea. Id.
Here, no reasonable basis exists for doubting Thomas's competence to enter into a plea. I reject Thomas's contention that his plea was not made knowingly and voluntarily. More importantly, I find that the state courts properly considered the facts and reasonably applied them, all in accordance with U.S. Supreme Court precedent. Accordingly, this ground fails to provide a basis for federal habeas relief.
C. Petitioner's Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim
As a second basis for federal habeas relief, petitioner claims that his trial counsel was ineffective, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). However, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief must first exhaust his available state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1) (c). This exhaustion requirement is satisfied only after the federal claim has been "fairly presented" to the state courts. Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Jackson v. Coalter, 337 F.3d 74, 85-86 (1st Cir. 2003). Here, Thomas never presented his ineffective assistance of counsel claim to any of the Rhode Island state courts, and an avenue exists in which petitioner may do so. See R.I. Gen. Laws 10-9.1-1et seq. (state post conviction remedy). Accordingly, petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim should be dismissed as unexhausted. I so recommend.
Normally, this Court follows Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509(1982), requiring the dismissal of "mixed petitions." However, since the petitioner faces time constraints, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), this Court opted to decide petitioner's exhausted claim.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, I recommend that Thomas's writ of habeas corpus be denied and dismissed. Any objection to this Report and Recommendation must be specific and must be filed with the Clerk of Court within ten days of its receipt. Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Local Rule 32. Failure to file timely, specific objections to this report constitutes waiver of both the right to review by the district court and the right to appeal the district court's decision. United States v. Valencia-Copete, 792 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Park Motor Mart, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 603 (1st Cir. 1980).