Opinion
No. 62904-2-I.
January 25, 2010.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 08-2-22546-1, Michael J. Fox, J., entered January 22, 2009.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Leach, J., concurred in by Grosse and Lau, JJ.
Minnie Thomas appeals the dismissal by summary judgment of her complaint and the subsequent denial of her motion for reconsideration. She also challenges an award of attorney fees under RCW 4.84.185 and a sanction under CR 11. Because Thomas failed to present any evidence in opposition to the University's amply supported summary judgment motion and does not present any legally recognizable challenge to the court imposed sanctions, we affirm the trial court.
Factual Background
On May 4, 2005, Thomas called Sheri Ewers, a medical assistant at the Harborview Dermatology Clinic, to cancel an appointment. Ewers summarized this telephone conversation as follows:
[Thomas] calls sounding upset, says she wants to cancel her May 5, 2005 Dermatology appt. with Dr. Kirby, M.D. I asked [Thomas] her reason for her cancellation. She responded, "I just don't want Dr. Kirby to worry about me if [I] don't show up for my appt." I asked[,] "Why do you feel that Dr. Kirby would worry?" [Thomas] replied, "He knows that sometimes I feel down, and I just don't want him to worry if I don't show up." . . . I asked [Thomas] if she would be willing to speak with a nurse, and she refused saying, "I don't want to talk to anybody else." I asked her, "How are you feeling right now?" [Thomas] replie[d], "I'm embarrassed to be seen right now, because I haven't combed my hair or gotten dressed in a while." I asked why[.] [Thomas] sa[id], "I don't feel good inside and my life is not worth living." "I've lost the battle, every day is too hard and I don't want to go on." I asked [Thomas] if she was having thoughts of hurting herself. [Thomas,] crying[,] sa[id], "No, but I just want to die."
During the course of this conversation, Ewers notified the charge nurse on duty that Thomas might be a suicide risk. While Ewers continued to speak with Thomas, the charge nurse consulted a hospital social worker on duty, who advised the nurse that it was improper to assess a suicide risk over the phone and suggested a 911 call. After unsuccessfully trying to call Thomas's psychiatrist, the charge nurse called 911. Ewers continued her conversation with Thomas. She tried to discuss positive things in Thomas's life and told her that 911 had been notified and was sending police to do a "welfare check."
The social worker, who never spoke with Thomas, wrote in her final report that Thomas had called the dermatology clinic and said that "she was going to kill herself."
Thomas refused to open her door for the police, who were eventually let into the apartment by the apartment manager. After the police entered her apartment, Thomas remained uncooperative and attempted to hide. By the time an ambulance crew arrived, Thomas was seated and visibly upset. She refused to answer questions but denied saying that she wanted to kill herself. The police forcibly placed her on a stretcher. Because she was physically resisting, the ambulance medic tightened the restraints to keep her confined to the stretcher. According to an ambulance report, the police reported to the medic that Thomas had called a "[h]otline" threatening suicide, that she had multiple plans for carrying out the threat, and that Thomas refused to let the police in upon their arrival.
She arrived at Harborview at 6:10 p.m. with a reported history of "bizarre behavior," including a call to 911 saying she was suicidal followed by boarding her door and not letting people into her apartment. Upon admission, a nurse observed Thomas to be disheveled, anxious, tearful, and withdrawn. Thomas did not appear to recall why she was at Harborview.
At 7:15 p.m., Thomas complained of high blood pressure and feeling dizzy. The Advanced Registered Nurse Practitioner (ARNP) on duty evaluated Thomas from 7:45 p.m. to 8:25 p.m. and reported that Thomas continued to exhibit hostile behavior and continued to deny ever threatening suicide. At this point, Thomas was described as having paranoid thought processes, exhibiting poor judgment, and showing an unwillingness to accept help. Thomas was then diagnosed as suffering from a major depressive disorder with an impaired ability to care for herself. The ARNP recommended hospitalization pending an evaluation by a County Designated Mental Health Provider (CDMHP) for suicidal intent.
The CDMHP completed an evaluation by 1:00 a.m. on May 5, 2005. The CMDHP reviewed Thomas's charts, police reports, and individually met with Thomas. Because the police reports and medical charts contained no firsthand evidence of suicidal behavior, and Thomas denied ever threatening that she would hurt herself, the CDMHP recommended release on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to support continued detention under chapter 71.05 RCW. Thomas was released, and later that day she called the charge nurse complaining about the 911 call and threatening to initiate legal action.
Procedural Background
On July 3, 2008, Thomas filed a lawsuit pro se against the University of Washington and Harborview Medical Center (UW) and the charge nurse who made the 911 call. Though her complaint identified no legal theory of liability, she claimed that a "false 911" call had been made which precipitated a "horrific chain of events" leaving her "greatly traumatized," that she was "taken to the Hospital against [her] will" and that she was "held there for many hours before [she] was evaluated" and that staff members were "impatient" with her, locking her in the room for 9 to 10 hours. She asked for $10.5 million in economic damages plus unspecified damages for "great pain and suffering."
The text of Thomas's complaint describes Heidi Sitton as a defendant, but she is not named in the caption and did not participate in the trial court proceedings.
On July 31, 2008, UW filed its answer to the complaint, denying the allegations and pleading a number of affirmative defenses. A cover letter accompanying the copy of the answer served on Thomas invited her to retain counsel, described statutes alleged to bar her lawsuit, and informed her that if she did not drop the suit, UW would file a summary judgment motion and seek attorney fees and costs. In response to this letter, Thomas contacted UW's counsel by telephone on September 3, 2008. Counsel again advised Thomas to seek legal advice regarding the merits of her suit and requested that Thomas drop the lawsuit. Thomas refused.
On October 27, 2008, UW moved for summary judgment, and a hearing was set for December 5, 2008. On the same day, this motion with supporting documentation was served on Thomas by mail. Counsel's cover letter explained that the motion was noted for oral argument and that her opposition, if any, to the motion was due November 24, 2008. Thomas, however, took no further action.
On December 5, 2008, the trial court entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of UW. The court also found "that Plaintiff's lawsuit was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause." Based upon this finding, the court awarded the UW attorney fees and costs under RCW 4.84.185 in the amount of $1,500 and imposed CR 11 terms in the amount of $1,000, payable to the King County Superior Court.
On December 15, 2008, Thomas filed a motion for reconsideration. Her motion explained that due to a "severe vascular condition," she was housebound and unable to open mail, seek legal advice, prepare a response to UW's summary judgment motion, or appear in court. Her motion was denied on December 26, 2008.
Thomas appeals both orders.
Analysis
On appeal Thomas repeats many of the same allegations made in her complaint and motion for reconsideration.
A pro se litigant is bound by the same rules of procedure and substantive law as a licensed attorney. With this in mind, we proceed with an analysis of the issues presented in this case.
Westberg v. All-Purpose Structures, Inc., 86 Wn. App. 405, 411, 936 P.2d 1175 (1997).
The first issue we must decide is whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the UW. We review a summary judgment order de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the trial court. Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." "A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends in whole or in part." In determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, we "view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party."
Quadrant Corp. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 154 Wn.2d 165, 171, 110 P.3d 733 (2005).
CR 56(c); Torgerson v. N. Pac. Ins. Co., 109 Wn. App. 131, 136, 34 P.3d 830 (2001).
Atherton Condo. Apartment-Owners Ass'n Bd. Of Dirs. v. Blume Dev. Co., 115 Wn.2d 506, 516, 799 P.2d 250 (1990) (citing Morris v. McNicol, 83 Wn.2d 491, 494, 519 P.2d 7 (1974)).
VersusLaw Inc. v. Stoel Rives, L.L.P., 127 Wn. App. 309, 320, 111 P.3d 866 (2005) (citing City of Lakewood v. Pierce County, 144 Wn.2d 118, 125, 30 P.3d 446 (2001)).
The specific application of this standard is subject to a burden-shifting scheme. The moving party bears the initial burden of showing an absence of any genuine dispute as to any material fact. A party may meet this burden in one of two ways: it may "'set[] out its own version of the facts or . . . alleg[e] that the nonmoving party failed to present sufficient evidence to support its case.'" If the defendant is the moving party and alleges an absence of material facts in support of the plaintiff's case, then the burden shifts to the plaintiff to make a prima facie case concerning the essential elements of its claim. In so doing, the plaintiff may not rely on conclusory statements, mere allegations, or argumentative assertions. Instead, the plaintiff must put forth evidence showing a triable issue exists. If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden on an element for which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof at trial, then summary judgment is warranted "'since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.'"
Indoor Billboard/Wash., Inc. v. Integra Telecom of Wash., Inc., 162 Wn.2d 59, 70, 170 P.3d 10 (2007).
Indoor Billboard, 162 Wn.2d at 70 (quoting Pac. Nw. Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of Sequim, 158 Wn.2d 342, 350, 144 P.3d 276 (2006)).
Young v. Key Pharms., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989).
CR 56(e); Vacova Co. v. Farrell, 62 Wn. App. 386, 395, 814 P.2d 255 (1991).
Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm't Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1 (1986).
Young, 112 Wn.2d at 225 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)).
In this case, UW filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that Thomas was not entitled to relief as a matter of law under Washington's Health Care Information Act, chapter 70.02 RCW, or Washington's statutes governing actions for injuries resulting from health care, chapter 7.70 RCW, and that it was entitled to qualified immunity under chapter 71.05 RCW because it had acted within its authority under this statute. The UW supported its motions with copies of the original reports filed by the medical assistant who initially answered the phone, the charge nurse who called 911, the social worker on duty, the ambulance medics who transported Thomas from her home to the hospital, the ARNP on duty, and, finally, the CDMHP who evaluated and released Thomas. It also submitted its counsel's declaration detailing the phone conversations with Thomas regarding her claim. Thomas filed no response and did not appear at the summary judgment hearing.
The UW met its initial burden, thereby shifting the burden to Thomas to produce evidence supporting the essential elements of her claim. Thomas provided the court with no opposition to the motion, either by way of pleadings or argument, at the hearing. Before the hearing she did not request any additional time to respond or attempt to explain why she had not responded. Thomas's complete failure to controvert the UW's amply supported motion entitled the UW to summary judgment.
We next address the trial court's denial of Thomas's motion for reconsideration. We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for a manifest abuse of discretion. A trial court abuses its discretion when it is exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons. The litigant must "identify the specific reasons in fact and law as to each ground on which the motion is based." This motion, however, does not provide litigants with a "second bite at the apple." The motion may be granted if, among other reasons, the litigant produces newly discovered material evidence, or if material evidence was available but not produced before the motion was granted, that the litigant made diligent though unsuccessful attempts to obtain it.
Kleyer v. Harborview Med. Ctr. of Univ. of Wash., 76 Wn. App. 542, 545, 887 P.2d 468 (1995).
State ex rel. Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971).
No such showing was made here. Thomas's motion recites her version of the facts and makes a host of unsubstantiated accusations but raises no genuine issue of material fact. Additionally, it fails to establish any grounds for relief under CR 59. Under these facts, the trial court acted well within its discretion in denying Thomas's motion for reconsideration.
Sanctions for Bringing a Frivolous Lawsuit
We turn next to the sanctions imposed against Thomas by the trial court. We review a trial court's decision to award attorney fees under RCW 4.84.185 and sanctions under CR 11 for an abuse of discretion. Absent a showing of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's decision.
Skimming v. Boxer, 119 Wn. App. 748, 754, 82 P.3d 707 (2004).
Clarke v. Equinox Holdings, Ltd., 56 Wn. App. 125, 132, 783 P.2d 82 (1989).
Upon written findings that an action was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause, RCW 4.84.185 authorizes a court to order the nonprevailing party to pay the prevailing party's reasonable attorney fees and costs.
A lawsuit is frivolous if, when considering the action in its entirety, it cannot be supported by any rational argument based in fact or law. A trial court awarding fees and costs under this statute must explain in written findings the objective basis for its decision.
Clarke, 56 Wn. App. at 132; Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wn.2d 129, 136, 830 P.2d 350 (1992).
Highland Sch. Dist. No. 203 v. Racy, 149 Wn. App. 307, 316, 202 P.3d 1024 (2009) ("In awarding reasonable attorney fees [under RCW 4.84.185], a trial court should have an objective basis for the award."); Havsy v. Flynn, 88 Wn. App. 514, 521-22, 945 P.2d 221 (1997) (reversing an order construed as an award of attorney fees under RCW 4.84.185 for failing to support the order with written findings).
The trial court made the following findings:
The Court also finds, based upon its review of the record in this matter, that Plaintiff's lawsuit was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause. Based upon this finding, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that Defendants are entitled under RCW 4.84.185 to the reasonable attorney fees and costs associated with Defendants' Motion, in the amount of $1,500.00.
Though Thomas was aware of the court ordered sanctions at the time she filed her motion for reconsideration, her motion does not provide any legal argument explaining why sanctions were improper. Thomas's appellate brief mentions the sanctions only in passing. She contends that the judge was "wrong," "rewarded the defendants for severely damaging me when he dismissed my claims and ordered me to pay their attorney fee," and that the judge was seeking to "punish[] me for seeking justice" even though her case had merit.
Because she does not present an appropriate argument or cite any legal authority in support of her challenge to the award of attorney fees and costs, we do not consider this issue. Further, the record adequately supports the trial court's exercise of its discretion in making its award.
See State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 629, 801 P.2d 193 (1990); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).
Our CR 11 analysis parallels our RCW 4.84.185 analysis. CR 11 permits the trial court to impose sanctions against a pro se litigant for filing claims not well-grounded in fact or law and/or interposing filings for improper purposes. Thus, a trial court may impose CR 11 sanctions if the action lacks a basis in fact or is unwarranted by existing law and if the pro se litigant signing the pleading failed to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the factual and legal basis of the claim. However, a court exercising this discretion "must make explicit findings as to which pleadings violated CR 11 and as to how such pleadings constituted a violation of CR 11. The court must specify the sanctionable conduct in its order."
Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 217, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992).
Harrington v. Pailthorp, 67 Wn. App. 901, 912, 841 P.2d 1258 (1992).
N. Coast Elec. Co. v. Selig, 136 Wn. App. 636, 649, 151 P.3d 211 (2007).
Here, the trial court added a hand-written note to the end of its order stating, "The Court also imposes $1000 in terms upon plaintiff in favor of the King County Superior Court for filing a frivolous action." For the same reasons that we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court under RCW 4.84.185, we find no abuse of discretion under CR 11: Thomas presents no legally cognizable argument that the sanction was an improper abuse of discretion.
Consequently, we affirm the trial court's summary judgment dismissal of Thomas's claim, the award of attorney fees under RCW 4.84.185, and terms under CR 11.