Opinion
No. C 03-00944 WHA.
September 7, 2004
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
INTRODUCTION
In this civil-rights case, pro se plaintiffs Gary Thomas and Clara Thomas seek relief following Mr. Thomas' incarceration in Sonoma County Jail. Defendant County of Sonoma moves to dismiss. This order GRANTS defendant's motion.
STATEMENT
Pro se plaintiff Gary Thomas retained Jonathan Steele as his defense attorney on December 15, 1995, to represent him in a state criminal proceeding following a probation violation (First. Amd. Compl. 2). Plaintiff claims that Steele entered into a plea agreement with the Sonoma County District Attorney's Office and Probation Department without his knowledge or consent ( ibid). Plaintiff further asserts that the plea agreement caused him to be confined in jail for a period of six months ( id. at 2-3). Plaintiff was actually incarcerated in the Sonoma County Jail from November 13, 1995, to March 11, 1996.
Although plaintiffs Gary Thomas and Clara Thomas have brought this action, the complaint alleges facts and incidents specific only to Gary Thomas. For purposes of clarity and consistency, this order will refer to Mr. Thomas as "plaintiff."
Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the docket of the state court criminal proceeding (Request for Judicial Notice Exh. A). This Court has reviewed the record extensively and acknowledges the existence of chronological discrepancies between the record and the complaint, as well as within the record itself. The Court cannot draw conclusions based solely on these discrepancies. As such, the allegations set forth in plaintiff's complaint remain operative in the analysis of this motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff filed two administrative complaints with the County of Sonoma on May 22, 1997. The first complaint alleged that the probation report prepared in plaintiff's case was "false" (Request for Judicial Notice Exh. A). The second complaint claimed that the deputy district attorney failed to file plaintiff's bail information, causing him to spend 120 days in custody without a conviction ( id. at Exh. B). On June 23, 1997, the County of Sonoma rejected plaintiff's claims and notified him that pursuant to California Government Code Section 945.6, he had six months to "file a court action on this claim" ( id. at Exh. C).
Plaintiff commenced this action on March 4, 2003, naming Jonathan Steele as the sole defendant. On June 24, 2003, plaintiff applied to the Clerk of the Court to enter Steele's default. The Clerk declined the application on June 30, 2003, because plaintiff had failed to properly serve Steele. On July 3, 2003, plaintiff again applied to the Clerk to enter Steele's default. That application was declined on December 5, 2003, for the same reason. Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on June 18, 2004, adding several defendants, including the County of Sonoma. Although the facts and claims in the complaint are generally ambiguous, plaintiff appears to state claims for conspiracy, false imprisonment, libel and deprivation of due process (First Amd. Compl. at 1-2, 5). On June 30, 2004, plaintiff for the third time applied for entry of default as to Steele. The Clerk declined the application the same day, once again because of plaintiff's failure to properly serve Steele. The record remains ambiguous as to whether, to date, Steele has been properly served.
Plaintiff served defendant County of Sonoma on July 6, 2004. The County of Sonoma filed a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on July 23, 2004. Although the proof of service indicates that plaintiff was served by mail, plaintiff did not file an opposition to the motion. To date, no other defendants have been served.
ANALYSIS
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissal for failure to state a claim is appropriate only when it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support a claim entitling him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 46 (1957). On a motion to dismiss, the allegations of plaintiff's complaint are assumed true and a court must draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor. Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir. 1987). Even if the face of the complaint suggests that the chance of recovery is remote, a court must allow plaintiff the opportunity to develop a case, especially at an early stage of the proceedings. United States v. City of Redwood City, 640 F.2d 963, 966 (9th Cir. 1981). Moreover, complaints of plaintiffs appearing pro se are judged by a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys. Klingele v. Eikenberry, 849 F.2d 409, 413 (9th Cir. 1988).
Plaintiff in this case fails to state facts sufficient to support a cause of action against County of Sonoma for violation of his constitutional rights. Plaintiff seeks to hold the County of Sonoma liable for alleged deprivation of due process stemming from his incarceration. As a general matter, due process claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. A local government entity may be sued under Section 1983 where the alleged constitutional deprivation was inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690-91 (1978). A municipality, however, is not liable under Section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor — that is, a municipality cannot be held liable under Section 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 691. As such, to maintain a Section 1983 action against a government entity, a plaintiff must first prove that there was a constitutional violation and that the allegedly unconstitutional activities of the official were pursuant to a "policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by [the entity's] officer." Id. at 690.
Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege that defendant has any policy that relates to the actions of which plaintiff complains nor has he demonstrated how any policy of the county violated any constitutionally protected right. In fact, plaintiff's only reference to due process is as follows:
The Due Process In case # SCR-22569 [sic] Charge 273.5A Probation Hearing minute and Court Transcript for Accurate Amend State of CA Criminal History Record.
(First Amd. Compl. 5). The Ninth Circuit has determined that particularly in civil rights cases, where the plaintiff is pro se, the pleadings should be construed liberally and plaintiff should be afforded the benefit of any doubt. Klingele, 849 F.2d at 413. Even if this Court could somehow construe plaintiff's ambiguous statement to find that his incarceration was in fact a deprivation of his civil rights, proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity would be insufficient for purposes of Monell unless proof of the incident included proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy attributable to a municipal policymaker. City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985). Plaintiff's efforts to state a cause of action for deprivation of due process are thus futile. As presented, plaintiff fails to provide any proof of, or even mention, an unconstitutional policy by the County of Sonoma. As such, this constitutional claim brought against defendant fails.
Another threshold issue in this case is one of timeliness. Defendant County of Sonoma contends that the complaint should be dismissed as untimely. The statute of limitations for an action brought under Section 1983 is the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury. Johnson v. State of California, 207 F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 2000). In California, the residual statute of limitations for personal injury claims is one year. Cal. Civ. P. Code § 340. Claims under Section 1983 accrue when a plaintiff "knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Trotter v. Int'l Longshoremen's Warehousemen's Union, Local 13, 74 F.2d 1141, 1143 (9th Cir. 1983). There is no formal requirement for the exhaustion of state judicial or administrative remedies for claims under Section 1983. Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1975).
California Civil Procedure Code Section 335.1, which became effective on January 1, 2003, increased the statute of limitations for personal injury to two years. Cal. Civ. P. Code § 335.1. Except as to the victims of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, however, there is no indication that the legislature intended the provision to apply retroactively. See Gallo v. Superior Court, 200 Cal. App. 3d 1375, 1378, 246 Cal. Rptr. 587, 588 (1988) ("[A]s a rule of statutory construction, it is established that an enlargement of limitations operates prospectively unless the statute expressly provides otherwise"). As such, the one-year statute of limitations period is the proper standard in this case.
In this case, even if plaintiff had a Section 1983 claim against the County of Sonoma, it would have accrued on November 13, 1995, the day he claims he was falsely incarcerated. Plaintiff, however, filed his complaint on March 4, 2003, six-and-a-half years after the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations period. Plaintiff's Section 1983 claim for deprivation of due process would thus be time-barred.
Plaintiff's complaint also seeks relief against defendant for various violations of state law, including conspiracy, libel and false imprisonment. California Government Code Section 945.6 provides for a special six-month statute of limitations period that accrues when a public entity rejects a tort claim. Cal. Gov. Code § 945.6. This special statute of limitations, however, is limited to state-law claims. Silva v. Cran, 169 F.3d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that "California's general residual tort statute of limitations of one year . . . is the proper statute to use for § 1983 actions arising in that state"). The County of Sonoma rejected plaintiff's administrative complaints on June 23, 1997. In the rejection letter, defendant notified plaintiff of the six-month statute of limitations applicable to any potential state-law claims. Despite the warning, plaintiff did not file a complaint until March 4, 2003. Because plaintiff brought this action over five years after the expiration of the six-month statute of limitations period, his state-law claims are time-barred.
* * *
The above ruling is dispositive as to the County of Sonoma's motion to dismiss. As for the remaining, nonmoving defendants,
[a] District Court may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants are integrally related.Silverton v. Dep't of Treasury, 644 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981). Although it is unnecessary to reach the issue of dismissal of the complaint as to the nonmoving defendants, this Court acknowledges that even if plaintiff had properly served the nonmoving defendants, he cannot cure the deficiencies in the face of the complaint that arise from its untimeliness. In that respect, all of the defendants in this action are in a position similar to that of the County of Sonoma. It is undisputed that no defendant (other than the County of Sonoma and perhaps Jonathan Steele) has been properly served and the time for proper service has long since passed. All of plaintiff's claims, including the state-law claims, are thus dismissed as to all defendants.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this order GRANTS defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint. The Clerk SHALL CLOSE THE FILE. A judgment shall so issue.